Demand Deficits, Workplace Gemeinschaft, and Public Sector Distortions: The True Root of Japanās Productivity Puzzle
The logic outlined above applies not only to individual workers and firms but also to entire industrial sectors. If every sector were uniformly transformed into a high-productivity sector, the very concept of a "high-productivity sector" would cease to exist. In reality, sectors with varying levels of productivity trade with one another, compete within sectors, and freely enter across sectors, thereby establishing a general rate of profit [Note]. Consequently, to raise aggregate productivity, society as a whole must produce a larger volume of output and actually sell it, which requires a corresponding level of market demand. However, for this demand to function as effective demand (purchasing power), economic agents must have already sold their goods and derived income from those sales.Ā
[Note] (Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, Part 2; op. cit., Japanese translation [6], p. 221 et seq.).Ā
Furthermore, much is said about "rectifying the wage gap for non-regular workers." Yet social laws, no less than natural laws, will inevitably carve out a path to assert themselves so long as they constitute the defining parameters of a given society. They have no choice but to prevail. The expansion of non-regular employment stems from the fact that the wage levels of Japanese regular employees became excessively high. Japanese firms engaged in fierce international competition are placed at a disadvantage, and those bound by irrational regulations are forced into distress. This relates directly to the "sixfold headwinds" (rokujūku) frequently cited regarding the Japanese economy: an overvalued yen, high corporate tax rates, delayed free trade agreements, high electricity costs, rigid labor legislation, and stringent environmental regulations. All of these are interconnected with the inefficiency of the public sector. Indeed, the return on equity (ROE) of Japanese firms remains low.
Fifth, the primary reason the statistical productivity figures for Japan appear "low" is none other than the fact that they include time spent by Japanese workers on personal relaxation and decompression. No human being can sustain labor without enjoyment after work. As Goethe wrote in Faust (Part I): "Without pleasureāwhy, even a dog wouldn't want to live like this!" Unlike Western societies where, after the dissolution of pre-modern agrarian village communities, a sense of local community based on church institutions remained to some degree, Japanese workers have few opportunities to enjoy leisure with peers outside the workplace. In modern Japan, the Gesellschaft doubles as a Gemeinschaft. Consequently, informal recreation is seamlessly interwoven into clock-in working hours.Ā
Proponents of labor reform claim that reducing labor inputs that do not directly contribute to productionāsuch as streamlining redundant meetings and improving operational workflowsāis effective for raising productivity. However, these seemingly "wasteful" events and customs serve as essential pressure valves; workers could hardly sustain themselves without informal drinking sessions (nomikai) after overtime. Any "meeting," regardless of its nature, is naturally included in working hours as long as it is designated as such. Agenda items are inexhaustibleāranging from post-project debriefings to self-reflection sessions (hanseikai). Therefore, administrative attempts under the banner of Work Style Reform to curtail "overtime" (and thereby reduce communal enjoyment) are bound to fail. Furthermore, as rights consciousness among the populace expands, the need for labor inputs that do not directly contribute to productionāsuch as excessive regulations and safety measuresāwill only increase in the future.Ā
In contrast, on the factory floorāthe direct sphere of productionālabor is strictly controlled by machine systems, and shift systems dictate immediate departure upon clock-out. Thus, even after subtracting the inefficiencies of indirect administrative departments, it is entirely natural that Japanese manufacturing productivity remains on par with Western standards. This provides the straightforward explanation for the first half of the opening proposition.Ā
Regarding the low productivity per worker, Japan has unwittingly put work-sharing into practice. Consequently, its unemployment rate remains low compared to other countries. Because members of the corporate community cannot be arbitrarily cast out, executing workforce reductions is uniquely difficult in Japan. There are even instances where distressed firms facing insolvency appoint foreign executives exclusively to carry out structural restructuring.
If the goal is to raise productivity further, prioritizing the correction of domestic inequitiesāabove all, unfair vested interests and institutional distortionsāshould take precedence over measures like Work Style Reform. Consider, for example, the vast gap in wages and working conditions between a public-school cafeteria worker and a supermarket cashierāheaven and earth. In stark contrast to the intense busyness of the cashier, one often observes a relaxed scene in the corners of government offices and public institutions, where personnel sit before underutilized computers merely idling until the end of the shift. (Needless to say, enduring boredom is no easy task, which perhaps explains why such positions command higher pay).
Consider also the agricultural sector, which has continuously declined despite tens of trillions of yen in public funds injected since the post-war era, contrasted against Japanese market-oriented enterprises struggling in the global marketplace through self-reliance. Today, numerous staff members on Agricultural Committees whose primary function is maintaining the restrictive Farmland Lawāwhich now serves only to impede national productive forcesāalongside sprawling Agricultural Cooperative (JA) organizations that foster inefficiency by parasitizing agriculture, serve as prime examples. Of course, such cases are by no means confined to agriculture and represent merely a single instance. While reducing this unproductive labor class that feeds parasitically on public institutions and draws above-market compensation might temporarily induce a deficiency in aggregate demand (as rising labor productivity reduces product sales and thereby lowers nominal output), a more equal redistribution of income would ultimately stimulate private consumption proportionately.Ā
According to an article in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun dated June 30: "Chinese capital is flowing into Japanese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) struggling with succession deficits and stagnant sales... While Chinese firms penetrate deep into the foundation of Japan's supply chains, high-tech local machine shops (machikoba) with valuable technology that face difficulties with succession are being forced into liquidation unnoticed." Under the post-war "convoy system" (gosÅ sendan hoshiki) of financial administration, the banking industry reaped immense profits with minimal effort. Regional banks, which ought to serve as the financial backbone for distressed SMEs, have proven entirely incapable of supporting them in their hour of need [Note].Ā
[Note] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 30, 2019 edition.
(to be continued)
https://www.reddit.com/user/keizaisuki/comments/1xp3omc/table_of_contentsacademic_mysteries_of_the/
Ā