Note: This post isnāt necessarily long, itās just very refrence heavy. Please read in your own time.Ā Hopefully the layout/style makes it easy to follow.
Whenever African economic development comes up online two dominant narratives usually take over the thread:
- The "Good Institutions & Free Market" narrative:Ā Botswana succeeded because it had visionary leaders, clean governance, and smart capitalist policies.
- The "Settler Infrastructure" narrative:Ā The bad faith take that African economies only develop if they had a massive European settler presence (usually pointing to South Africa).
And (sometimes) even the rapidly developing economies under strict leadership of Rwanda.
To be transparent Botswana already pokes aĀ massive hole in theĀ second narrative.Ā It had virtually no settler population unlike its neighbours in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia. It started at independence with almost zero infrastructure and yet ended up significantly more stable, safer and wealthier per capita than South Africa.Ā
But if you look atĀ Gabon, it actually underminesĀ all of these narratives at the same time and opens up a more undeniable truth about the reality of African Development and how issues are actually due to the deep structure of how these colonies were set up in the first place.Ā
By almost every governance metric, Gabon has been the exact opposite of Botswana and can be seen as a poster child for the ācorrupt African leader archetypeā both African locals and western critiques alike tend to perpetuate in discussions. It spent 56 years under a single family dynasty (the Bongos), ranks near the bottom on Transparency International's corruption index, failed to diversify its economy, and went through a military coup in 2023. It also didn't have a South African-style settler economy that made it so that exploited wealth was at least somewhat concentrated in the country regardless of how unequal the country remains due to said historical exploitation.Ā
Yet if you compare Gabon, Botswana, and South Africa on baseline living standards and macro data, the results are pretty wild. Heres some extracts.Ā
- GDP per Capita (Nominal):Ā Gabon (~$10,000ā$11,000) actually sitsĀ aheadĀ of both Botswana (~$8,500) and South Africa (~$7,500).
- Human Development Index (HDI):Ā Gabon (0.733) and Botswana (0.731) are virtually tied in the "High Human Development" tier.
- Income Inequality (Gini Index):Ā Despite being notoriously corrupt, Gabon's Gini coefficient is aroundĀ 38.0Ā (moderate inequality). Botswana sits aroundĀ 54.9, and South Africa is the most unequal country on earth atĀ 63.0.Ā
Thereās a counter argument from those who are typically more savvy when it comes to economics that Gabons oil mirage. The idea of said mirage goes like this, high oil export revenues inflate Gabons per capita GDP and GNI (which makes up one-third of the HDI formula). Even though much of that wealth is captured by elites or foreign oil firms. When adjusted for inequality Gabon according to the UNDP for HDI a nation like Gabon loosesĀ 24% of its Hdi score.Ā Hereās the flaws with these arguments.Ā
- Gabon is still higher than most African countries as extreme poverty is only 3%-9% which is tinyĀ Ā compared to subsaharan Africas 35%Ā Ā and even lower than South Africaās 20% extreme poverty line and its Hdi is nearlyĀ 50% higherĀ than the Sub-Saharan regional average. And itās still comparable to Botswana and South Africa even when you adjust the figures because Both Botswana and especially South Africa have higher inequality than Gabon on overall HDIĀ Ā Gabons Hdi isĀ 0.558 which is higher than botswanas 0.509 and much higher than South Africa which isnāt top 10 on the continent due to its incredibly high inequality thus South Africaās Hdi is only 0.476
- Botswana also has a similar situation with resciurce reliance as Gabons oil that being Botswanas reliance on diamondsĀ which are both countries main exports by far (70%-80% for each)
So how does a country with terrible governance and no settler-colonial industrial base end up with comparable living standards andĀ less inequality than the continent's poster child for good governance like Botswana?
It comes down to structural math rather than "great man" history. Iāll break down three main points for readers to follow.Ā
- The Small-Population Divisor:Ā Both Gabon and Botswana have tiny populations (around 2.5 to 2.6 million people) sitting on massive, high-value export commodities (oil/manganese in Gabon, diamonds in Botswana). Even after Gabon's elites skimmed billions off the top, there was still enough resource rent per citizen to fund urban infrastructure, public-sector jobs, and basic services. This is the biggest by far difference between Botswana and Gabon (and most small African nations) compared to larger nations like Nigeria and Angola. Nigeria is huge and is putting on millions of people each few years due to its incredibly high fertility rate particuly in the Northern regions, this puts preasure on existing institutions and makes it harder for the public and privste sector to absorb soo many people. Thus when distributed, Its oil reserves (though not small) isnāt enough to sustain a country with the demographics of Nigeria.Ā
- Absence of Mass Civil War:Ā Unlike resource rich countries with larger and more fractured populations that got pulled into devastating proxy wars (like Angola or the DRC), both Gabon and Botswana avoided prolonged internal conflict. Thus allowing resource revenue to keep flowing. This is due to the fact that neither country had large isolated rural populations trapped in places plagued by desertification or containing rugged terrain where rebels could hide and recruit. Heck Botswana didnāt even have a standing army until 1977, removing the primary institution behind coups across Africa. Botswana is also largely homogenous being roughly 80% Tswana, so it avoided the deep colonial divide and rule fault lines. Gabon has over 40 smaller ethnic groups with no single dominant majority but Omar Bongo used oil money to systematically buy off regional elites with government posts rather than letting any one group feel locked out. In fact it was this patronage system being damaged When global oil prices dropped and the economy stagnated in the late 2010s and early 2020s that led directly to theĀ August 2023 military coupĀ that ended 56 years of Bongo family rule.
- Resource Type Matters:Ā Iāll say it again People love to dismiss Gabon as "just an oil state," ignoring that Botswana still relies on diamonds forĀ 70% to 80% of its export earnings. Neither country built serious downstream refining or processing capacity early on Gabon exported crude oil and imported refined fuel, while Botswana shipped rough diamonds to London, Antwerp, and India to be cut and polished. Because both economies stayed wired for raw extraction, neither escaped commodity dependency and Botswana actually contracted in 2024 and 2025 when lab grown diamonds crashed global prices, while Gabon kept growingā¦. and yes, these countries were lucky to have diamonds and oil. The Dutch disease resource trap is true but two of some of Africas most developed countries in Botswana and Gabon are far less diversified than decent but not widely as developed or nations such as Kenya, Tanzania or Cameroon.Ā
And rescources themselves can only go so far without the tools to refine them. Due to the model of colonialism African countries were designed to extractive so they never developed their own refineries, which is why their economies (Botswana and Gabon) go through stagnation cycles. They never developed very deep (key word deep) intercontinental trade (not just regional) which would allow wider markets for themselves thus they become heavily reliant on the west and their institutions (credit rating systems, trade partners and FDI, manufacturing, currency reserves etc). There was a push in the 60s and 70s to avoid this cycle however, unfortunately due to Cold War politics many people such as Patrice Lumumba in the Congo being overthrown by Belgium and American intelligences and also Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana being overthrown or the immediate threat of sanctions in places like the newly democratic South Africa in the 90s, rescource rich big countries that can help diversify smaller African countries just didnāt have the chance to develop in a way that didnātĀ meet western interests.Ā
Some people would say that Botswana just perfected or āembracedā whatever the west was doing (capitalism, certain policies etc) and to that Iāll bring up the African lost decades. Iāll discuss this era more in a future post but for those unaware, During the 1980s and 1990s universally (known asĀ Africa's Lost Decades) over 40 African nations were essentially āadvisedā by IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs to adopt textbook laisseze faire policies to help support their economies after public spending post colonialism that boosted the living standards in African countries significantly (causing the fastest growth in these countries histories) proved to be too expensive. However what this ended up doing was slashing public spending, privatizing state industries, removing tariffs, and opening capital accounts. And by the end Instead of sparking a boom, those policies triggeredĀ massive capital flight, premature deindustrialization, and gutted public infrastructure. Billions in wealth flowedĀ out of the continent via debt servicing and deregulated foreign capital markets, while local factories collapsed against cheap imports. It wasnāt until the Jubilee 2000 protest movement that pressured Western governments into cancelling developing world debt along with the arriving Asian markets that African companies tapped into that this cycle was alleviated and Africa started to witness growth again. Meanwhile,Ā Botswana completely bypassed Structural Adjustment. Because it had diamond money and didn't need IMF bailouts it ignored the free market orthodoxy and ran a 50/50 state owned diamond joint venture (Debswana) that poured public money into schools, roads, and healthcare.Ā
Honestly even if you look at an African success storyĀ withoutĀ massive oil or diamond reserves,Ā RwandaĀ breaks the exact same myths while proving aĀ soberingĀ truth about time. Rwanda had no settler-colonial industrial base, no major mineral windfall, and had to rebuild from near-total destruction after 1994. Rather than relying on handsĀ off free markets, it used a centralized, East Asian-style developmental state model to sustain 7%ā8% annual growth for decades (one of the highest growth rates in the world).Ā Yet Despite nearly three decades of rapid growth and tight governanceĀ Rwanda's GDP per capita (~$1,300 nominal / ~$4,650 PPP) isĀ still lower than Nigeria'sĀ (~$1,600 nominal / ~$10,000 PPP) a country notorious for corruption and instability. When you start near the bottom with no massive resource windfall, even disciplined development takes a very long time to reach everyone and in this rate it will take a few decades before Rwanda hits the level of developed nation not to talk of the other interventionist things Rwanda has partaken in.Ā
The Ultimate Truth Behind All of This
When you put Gabon, Botswana, South Africa, and Rwanda side by side, the big takeaway isn't that leadership doesn't matter. Good leaders fought for the independence of African nations, helped avoid civil wars and combat conflicts and well planned leadership helped Africa and many other countries in plenty of times of need, so by no means is this a post that is against the very idea of positive leadership. Heck Botswana's schools, healthcare, and low debt prove that good stewardship counts.
The real truth is thatĀ economic development is governed by structural math, global supply chains, and time not neat morality fairy talesĀ that people so badly keep perpetuating.Ā
- Pure free-market shock therapy failed Africa, draining capital and stalling growth for twenty years.
- Resource math can overpower bad governance, as long as a small population avoids civil war though staying trapped in raw extraction without local refining leaves both good and bad states vulnerable. Demographic management is a very real and important conversation to have.Ā
- Starting lines and compounding time matter more than quick policy fixes.Ā You cannot shortcut industrial value chains or erase centuries of structural poverty in a single generation.Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā
To put it simply surprisingly (or unsurprisingly)Ā money just fixes a lot of a countries issues not imaginary morality litmus tests.Ā People say Africa is the way it is simply because Africans arenāt progressive enough in their social norms, citing how Africa is ātoo religiousā ātoo discriminatoryā ātoo bigoted to lgbt people and womenāĀ Ā but will praise the successes of the gulf states that criminalised homosexuality, only recently in 2018 fully allowed women to drive (a feat Nigeria overcame in 1951) And essentially has an ethnic coded monarchy that makes it extremely hard for citizens to be naturalised yet their economies are thriving (not to talk of the exploitation of migrant workers). Some people may say itās because Africa puts too much of an emphasis on top down management which inevitably leads to corruption and stagnation even though according to the AU/ECA and the UN report Africa only really loses about 5% of its revenue due to direct stealing from politicians whereas misinvoicing, abusive transfer prices and unequal resource contracts account for 65% of illicit financial flows from Africa. To all these points a book titledĀ kicking the ladder by Ha Joon Chang debunks this western morality and meritocracy narrative. In it Chang shows that virtually every wealthy nation including Great Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Sweden, and Japan used aggressive state policies during their catch-up phases (due to reasons such as How Governments shielded young domestic factories from stronger foreign competitors using steep import tariffs, directly fund industries and emphasised loose intellectual property rules).Ā
And above all else (what is most relevant to this post) Institutions are a result not āsimplyā a cause of growth.Ā Mainstream Western economics often claim that poor countries stay poor because they lack "good institutions" like independent central banks, strict property rights, and modern bureaucracies. Chang flips this argument on its head. When Britain and the US were industrializing, their institutions were corrupt, inefficient, and rudimentary. Universal suffrage, professional civil services, central banks, and strict patent laws were developed after these countries grew rich, not before. The title of the book kick away the ladder is a play in the words of how developed countries will say people should act āmorallyā to develop even though they themselves that the exact opposite when a country is coming up that they are kicking away the ladder when theyāre already on top we seen this perfectly with the IMF and the world Bank under a disaster of the aforementioned lost decades in Africa.Ā
To closeĀ WhetherĀ that be with oligarch states like Gabon Whether that be during the 80s and 90s free market policies, whether tribalism, utopian socialism or whatever kind of ideology people want to imprint. At the end of the day most African countries are poor because they were created not to generate money but to extract wealth and the countries that are doing the best weāre just lucky that they had enough money to go around after the multi national corporations, corrupt politicians and everyone else got their hands on their countries wealth. Thankfully with Africas push towards greater independence in its own credit rating agencies and refineries aswell as stronger trade deals as well as growing frustration. With people against the exploitation of workers in the west, we might see a different future not just for Africa but for the world,Ā thank you for reading.
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