r/Bakur • • 12m ago

News/Article Dîroka Mîrekiya Botanê di bin gefê de ye: Mizgefta Mîrekan dibe Kulliyeya Cemal Kadooglu

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Cizre's historic Mosque of the Emirs is being fully demolished to make way for a new "Cemal Kadooglu Külliye". Critics say the Botan emirate's heritage is under threat.


r/Bakur • • 16m ago

News/Article Heyeta DEM Partiyê çû Îmraliyê

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The DEM Party's Imrali delegation of MPs Pervin Buldan, Mithat Sancar and Faik Özgür Erol travelled to the island to meet Abdullah Öcalan.


r/Bakur • • 26m ago

News/Article Inside KASED: a Kurdish arts space by women, for women

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The Amargi visited the Women’s Culture, Arts and Literature Association (KASED) in the narrow streets of Sûr, Amed. Inside its historic stone courtyard, we found a vibrant space shaped by women, where art, culture, and solidarity come together. Joining some of the courses organized by KASED, we spoke with Toprak, one of the association’s founders, and Merve Admiş, a singing instructor, about the association’s work and what a space like this means for women.


r/Bakur • • 1d ago

News/Article ARSÎSA 11 mamosteyên Kurdî mezûn kirin

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Wan's language and culture association ARSÎSA gave teaching certificates to 11 Kurdish teachers who finished its teacher-level course. Speakers at the ceremony called for mother-tongue education.


r/Bakur • • 1d ago

News/Article Dayîka Ugur Kaymaz behsa êşa 22 salan kir: Zarokekî 12 salî çawa dibe terorîst?

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Twenty-two years after police shot 12-year-old Uğur Kaymaz and his father in Kızıltepe, his mother still seeks justice. The officers were acquitted; the ECHR later ruled against Turkey.


r/Bakur • • 1d ago

News/Article SÊRT - Şaredar Enes Cengîz û 4 endamên meclisê ji DEM Partiyê îstifa kir

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Enes Cengiz, mayor of Weysel Qereniyê in Siirt's Baykan district, and four council members have quit the DEM Party. They will continue as independents and say no one pressured them.


r/Bakur • • 1d ago

Opinion 🔥 Janet Biehl: Democratic integration should guide the peace process

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American thinker Janet Biehl said that alongside the implementation of the legal framework, additional confidence-building measures were also necessary.


r/Bakur • • 1d ago

Opinion 🔥 Kurdish strategy means DEM and HEVBENDI work together

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Kurds have spent a century proving they will not be erased. The task now is different: to show they can govern, build alliances, and win. That requires feeling to be disciplined by strategy, and a politics that can survive its own raid; not a politics of emotional appeal.

Turkish police detained nine people from the newly formed Kurdistan National Alliance, HEVBENDİ, this week, including Kurdistan Socialist Party chairman Bayram Bozyel. According to a legal source cited by AFP, the charge is “disrupting the unity of the state” under Article 302. The investigation file is restricted, and detainees were barred from seeing lawyers for 24 hours. Arresting politicians within days of their founding conference is indefensible and the detainment of these activists and politicians should be strongly condemned. 

While some media organizations have been describing the alliance as opposed to the peace process, Bozyel’s own account is more careful. In his founding interview, he said disarmament “does not solve the Kurdish question” but has the potential to “let politics breathe,” and that the Kurdish status he seeks “may well take the form of a federal system within Turkey’s borders”. That is a legitimate, peaceful position.

The question this article asks is narrower and harder: Is a politics built mainly on nationalist sentiments and resonant emotions the right instrument at this moment for Kurds? I argue for a social democratic position and offer four more strategic and rational things we should be focusing on.

Kurdish nationalism

Nobody should be patronizing others about the pull of ethnonationalism. A people whose language was banned, whose villages were burned, and whose existence was denied has every reason to want its name spoken aloud. Nationalist politics offer dignity, belonging, and a story in which suffering means something. That is why it resonates so strongly, and why social media rewards it.

There is such a strong emotion and mood that now runs through social media, where young figures such as Ali Cecen (among the founders of the movement and also detained) produce emotionally charged, heavily edited videos that circulate grievance and defiance. Such edited videos travel fast, and young Kurds who have inherited that history find in them a feeling of being seen. But resonance does not mean being right. Emotion tells people what they should be angry about. It does not, however, tell them how to win a municipality, protect a school, free a prisoner, or pass a constitutional amendment through a parliament.

A politics that mistakes identification for organization ends up rich in symbols and poor in outcomes, and the state, which does have a strategy, can wait it out, kill it from the inside, or jail it.

Ethnonationalism and Kurdish life

Ethnonationalism is a poor fit for how Kurds live. Love it or hate it, the Kurdish population is spread across four states and many classes. Within Turkey alone, it includes the Alevi worker in Istanbul, the Sunni farmer in Çewlig/Bingol, the professional in Izmir, and the Zaza-speaking student in Dêrsim/Tunceli.

A project that insists the nation comes before every other question will simply abandon whatever it cannot fit into its picture of the nation.

A social-democratic project starts from the opposite premise. People organize around wages, land, schooling, healthcare, and dignity; and recognition of identity is won as part of that wider fight.

A nation-first program faces additional challenges too: it must persuade the state to concede what Turkey’s constitution and its ruling coalition regard as a non-negotiable. Only days before the raids, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli published a 50-point statement insisting the peace process involves no concessions, surrender or bargaining and must preserve constitutional integrity. A demand for a national status, however peacefully made, collides head-on with that line. It gives hardliners the argument they need and the security services a pretext. The nationalist opposition in IYI and Zafer, which opposed the framework law, will treat each such demand as proof that the process was always a trick. Leaving the process to fail hurts the Kurdish question in the long term and collapses hope for future aspirations.

Emotional appeal can be principled and even righteous, but it does not mean it should be self-defeating.

What Rojava’s Kurds learned

Syria shows what happens when a movement rests on force and foreign patronage. After 14 years, the Kurdish-led SDF’s experiment in self-rule ended in dissolution into the state military, and Kurds reacted with mixed emotions. A Kurdish researcher told Al Jazeera that the Kurdish dream is gone. That kind of despair is what a politics of pure sentiment produces when the support behind it disappears.

The next stage of the process will be won and lost on specifics. The National Security Council could confirm PKK disarmament on 27 November, which would trigger the framework law.

Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin has described democratization as one of the process’s two pillars and called for “stronger rule of law, democracy, and political pluralism”. Of course, those words have no power unless someone converts them into statute, budgets, and court orders; and that is the work of coalitions, not of slogans.

Additionally, the DEM Party is pressing for an end to trustees replacing elected mayors, the release of prisoners including Selahattin Demirtas, implementation of European Court of Human Rights rulings, and clarity on Abdullah Ocalan’s status.

The more useful analysis is institutional. The human rights lawyer Roula Baghdadi told The Amargi this week that the danger of integration is absorption: communities that are represented in name and marginalized in practice. Her remedies are constitutional guarantees rather than presidential decrees, decentralized power, independent civil society, and genuine participation for women.

These are more strategic and long-term solutions, not feelings and resonance. Rights written into law, power spread across institutions, and organized citizens who can hold government accountable are what protect a minority when the headlines move on.

What Kurdish strategy would look like

First, we need to be very clear, rank demands by winnability, and sequence them. Municipal autonomy, language in schools, an end to trustees, and compliance with court rulings are demands a broad majority, if not quite literally all Kurds, support. Constitutional and possibly federal status can follow as the product of a democratization once the ground has shifted.

Second, competing for non-Kurdish votes: A Kurdish politics that speaks only to Kurds will remain a minority politics. One that organizes around wages, housing, healthcare, and regional investment, with Kurdish rights as part of that agenda, can build a majority. DEM Party has been trying to that, and we should be more vocal about it. However, we also need realize that without freedom of speech, it is increasingly hard to publicize and advertise this political movement. Currently, all media in Turkey are controlled by the government.

Third, investing in what lasts: Municipal capacity, legal teams, trade unions, women’s cooperatives, and youth organizing turn anger into leverage. Online mobilization is useful, but it is not organization.

Fourth, unifying around outcomes rather than identity: Bozyel is right that Kurdish unity matters, and he says HEVBENDI is “not against any party.” Taking that seriously means competing and cooperating with the DEM Party on a shared agenda rather than presenting a rival nationalist pole at the moment of greatest leverage. We need to realize that they can be used against each other by the state.

--

Azat Welat is a scholar based in Turkey.


r/Bakur • • 2d ago

News/Article Turkish opposition party removes itself from peace process, but says peace is still priority

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Turkey’s main opposition New Party leader Ozgur Ozel said his party would not appoint members to a proposed parliamentary commission tasked with monitoring the Kurdistan Workers Party’s disarmament, arguing that the government had failed to meet its democratization commitments. The decision drew criticism from figures who warned that the withdrawal could weaken the process’s democratic foundations and limit the opposition’s ability to press for reforms.

New Party representatives argued that the proposed panel risked becoming a decorative body that would legitimize government decisions rather than advance peace.

Ozel announced the decision on November 18 after meeting Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus, who had been consulting party leaders about the proposed monitoring commission. Ozel said the government had failed to implement the democratization provisions of an earlier parliamentary commission report, but was now proposing a new body to oversee disarmament without addressing those outstanding commitments.

The New Party had taken part in the earlier commission and signed its report. Ozel said the party stood by the report in its entirety, including its recommendations on democratization, and argued that disarmament and democratic reforms should move forward together rather than be treated as separate stages.

He pointed in particular to the continued appointment of government trustees to elected municipalities, the takeover of opposition-aligned television channels, includingHalk TV and Sozcu TV, and the authorities’ failure to implement rulings by Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights; citing the continued imprisonment of figures including Selahattin Demirtas, Figen Yuksekdag, Osman Kavala, Can Atalay, and Tayfun Kahraman. For critics, implementing those rulings and releasing the prisoners would be a concrete demonstration of good faith in its stated commitment to democratization.

Ozel questioned why the proposed monitoring commission would address the report’s provisions on disarmament while leaving aside its democratization recommendations. He said the government was asking the opposition to participate in monitoring one part of the process without honoring the commitments it had made on the other.

“We have not abandoned the path to peace. The government has abandoned the path to democracy,” Ozel said in a subsequent statement, rejecting the suggestion that the decision meant his party had turned against the peace process.

He said the New Party had remained engaged in the earlier parliamentary process despite arrests, pressure on opposition municipalities, and actions against media outlets. But he argued that continuing to participate under the current conditions would give legitimacy to a government that was failing to meet its commitments.

New Party Diyarbakir (Amed) lawmaker Sezgin Tanrikulu reiterated Ozel’s position in an interview with Spot Press Cooperative, saying the party had not withdrawn its promise of peace to Kurds and to Turkey.

Tanrikulu said the government had not only failed to implement the democratic steps set out in the earlier commission report but had intensified its anti-democratic practices. Under these circumstances, he said, there was no basis for the party to sit alongside the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in another commission.

He also questioned the proposed body’s role, saying its mandate and working procedures had not been clearly defined. Decisions concerning the verification of disarmament, he argued, rested largely with the executive and state security institutions. The parliamentary commission’s role in monitoring democratization, by contrast, remained unclear.

Tanrikulu said the New Party would continue to pursue peace and democratic reforms through parliament. If legislation addressing rights, freedoms, and the Kurdish question were introduced, he said, the party would assess and support measures that advanced a genuine solution.

The party’s position was also defended by Party Council member Emine Ucak Erdogan on Ilke TV. She said the objection was not to peace but to the structure and purpose of the proposed commission.

Ucak Erdogan reiterated Tarinkulu’s argument that the body lacked a clearly defined mandate, timetable, and working framework. As proposed, it risked becoming a decorative institution that would lend legitimacy to decisions already made by the government, rather than providing a meaningful parliamentary role in the peace process, she said.

She added that the party would continue working for peace and rights, while maintaining that the process needed genuine political ownership and a democratic framework.

Ucak Erdogan also clarified that Ozel had publicly stated his position, but that the announcement was not yet a formal decision adopted by the party’s governing bodies. She said the issue would be discussed through the party’s authorized structures once they had been established.

DEM Party warns of risks to the process

The decision drew criticism from DEM Party spokesperson Aysegul Dogan, who in a statement said the New Party’s concerns about the government’s democratic record were legitimate but warned that Ozel’s statements could weaken the democratic foundation of the peace process. Dogan argued that all political parties should remain involved in efforts to end a conflict that has lasted for decades.

Linking the government’s broader anti-democratic practices directly to the peace process, Dogan warned, could create the impression that those practices were a consequence of the process itself.

DEM Party representatives have maintained that democratization and peace must advance together, but that opposition parties should press for reforms from within the process rather than withdraw from it.

Former HDP lawmaker Idris Baluken made a similar argument, criticizing the New Party’s decision as politically misguided. Speaking on Ilke TV, he said the government’s failure to take democratic steps should be a reason for stronger opposition and collective pressure, not for leaving the parliamentary process.

Baluken argued that supporting peace did not mean endorsing the government’s policies. He said opposition parties should remain engaged and use the process to push for democratic reforms. He also pointed to the absence of conflict-related deaths over the preceding two years, saying that this was significant in itself and should not be put at risk by political decisions that could undermine the process.

--

Serap Güneş is a freelance translator and writer based in Istanbul. She holds a PhD in International Relations and European Politics from Masaryk University, where her research focused on minority rights and EU–Turkey relations. Her work has appeared in both academic journals and independent media outlets.


r/Bakur • • 3d ago

News/Article PKK returns to Turkey underway, DEM co-chair says

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DEM co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları says preparations are underway for PKK members who burned their weapons, and a group from Europe, to return to Turkey. Some Makhmour camp residents also plan to return.


r/Bakur • • 3d ago

The multiple shades of Turkey’s kurdish peace process

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Over the past two years, media outlets, political statements and policy discussions have repeatedly referred to a “new peace process” between Turkey and the Kurds. However, despite promising domestic and regional advances by the parties involved, in a context marked by authoritarian and transactional practices this process hardly fits the canonical understanding of “liberal peace”. Is this time different, or merely a reshuffling of past conflict-management patterns?

Is it real peace this time?

After years of civil war and political turmoil, many signs seem to point in a hopeful direction: the Turkish government has relaunched a “Kurdish opening”, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) dissolved its organisational structures following its leader Abdullah Öcalan’s February 2025 call, and Turkey’s regional environment, though in constant risky flux because of October 7 spillovers and the more recent developments in Iran, has paradoxically opened some windows of opportunity. However, more cautious observers should recognise the stark reality: the ruling elite’s vague promises and Kurdish actors’ (un)willingness to compromise are not creating a favourable environment for a transition from conflict to peace through democratic governance, support for the rule of law and liberal reforms. 

In line with the framework of this volume, we argue that, though framed as a “peace process”, Turkey’s approach to the “Kurdish question” still does not meet any liberal-peace benchmark. Rather, it combines authoritarian, transactional and adaptive elements: it is managed from the top through coercive and disciplinarian practices; it proceeds through interest-driven, short-term bargains and deliberate ambiguity; and it is continuously recalibrated to shifting regional dynamics and political tactical needs.

Our premise is that Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has long shaped the societal and (geo)political context in which the concept of peace coexists with other concepts, such as securitisation, authoritarianism and power asymmetry (Baser & Ozerdem, 2021). However, we aim to shed light on how the current situation is one in which, even more than in the past, peace keeps taking on multiple shades. That is because of the government’s oscillation between a securitised version around the slogan of a “terror-free Turkey”, where the main goal is to neutralise Kurdish armed groups, and a more politically conciliatory one of “freedom and brotherhood” for electoral purposes.

Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has long shaped the societal and (geo)political context in which the concept of peace coexists with other concepts, such as securitisation, authoritarianism and power asymmetry.

These are not stylistic variations on a single referent but the product of the distinct political work the peace label is asked to do for different actors, which is why the vocabulary persists even as the process’s material features do not reflect it. Consistent with this volume’s view, this chapter tries to go beyond the “liberal vs. illiberal” dichotomy to examine the internal and external dynamics underlying the dichotomic coexistence of peace and conflict vis-à-vis the latest developments in Turkey’s “Kurdish question”.

The domestic limits of peace: authoritarian and transactional

Turkey’s Kurdish question has historically experienced waves of open and frozen conflict. What started as a societal claim from Turkey’s largest minority escalated, beginning in the 1990s, into a cycle of violence between the Turkish state and groups such as the PKK, ultimately extending to the regional and international level (Gasco & Abrami, 2024).

Concurrently, it has witnessed periods of “truce” during which multiple governments, political parties and non-state actors have opened negotiation channels aimed at de-escalating the conflict, though never bringing it to a settled resolution. However, the imbalances between the parties, Turkey’s democratic deficits and the evolving geopolitical context have prevented a genuine “peace process” from materialising.

Our crucial premise is not to treat Turkey’s renewed engagement with the Kurdish issue as a conventional peace process, or as a simple revival of the failed talks of the early 2000s and 2010s. Although there are surely similarities, the previous attempts to reach a peace agreement occurred in a different context, shaped over time by Turkey’s Europeanisation path towards democratic reforms, the 2010 referendum to change the constitution and then the Kurdish groups’ rising geopolitical relevance in the late 2010s. While previous attempts were shaped by Europeanisation, constitutional reform and Kurdish geopolitical ascent, today the process is unfolding within a very different configuration, in which different shades of peace underpin a trajectory that appears at once authoritarian, transactional and adaptive (Somer, 2022).

First, situating the initiative within Turkey’s domestic political conjuncture reveals the authoritarian nature of the current Kurdish peace process.  It is “managed from the top through coercive means that suppress pluralism and dissent” and peace is promoted through “discipline and control, prioritising order, securitisation, stability and regime continuity” (see Introduction of this report). Indeed, the dialogue with Kurdish actors is unfolding alongside a mounting process of authoritarianism, characterised by the dismantling of the opposition, the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, continued pro-government trustee appointments in Kurdish-majority municipalities and the systematic non-implementation of European Court of Human Rights rulings. Moreover, this renewed openness to dialogue is tied to domestic political strategy for the 2028 elections. Erdoğan cannot run again for the presidency unless there is a constitutional change or early elections, both of which need a supermajority that the ruling alliance does not have, but that pro-Kurdish votes could guarantee. 

As of today, the PKK leadership accuses Ankara of having “frozen” the process, the DEM Party speaks more cautiously of “blockages”, while Erdoğan insists that everything is moving within a “positive atmosphere”. This divergence captures the puzzle in miniature: peace persists as the organising vocabulary of a process whose participants fundamentally disagree on what is unfolding within it, and whose trajectory remains tightly bound to the ruling coalition’s electoral calculation ahead. Regarding Kurdish actors, their room for manoeuvre expands or contracts depending on the political needs of the moment. Put simply, what is often described as a “new opening” operates domestically less as a roadmap to liberal reform than as a controlled repertoire aimed at preserving order and regime continuity, while keeping Kurdish political agency conditional and reversible.  

Such a backdrop shapes and reinforces a second characteristic of the process, namely its transactional framework. Officially framed as a path towards a “terror‑free Turkey”, the initiative has relied on its traditionally security-centred language even as it has reopened discreet channels of negotiation. The coexistence of these narratives – peace on the one hand, counterterrorism on the other – has generated deep uncertainty about what is actually being offered. As a matter of fact, many analysts agree that, although the PKK remains labelled as a terrorist organisation by the government and other international actors, it had already substantially reduced its operational capacity after 2016. However, regardless of the central state’s military superiority, maintaining a broad securitised definition of terrorism has enabled the government to label a wide range of actors as such, both for political purposes and on security grounds (Dinc & Ozduzen, 2023).

As such, this aligns with the idea of a transactional peace that “rather than seeking deep political transformation, transitional justice, or normative convergence, transactionalism focuses on what works in the short to medium term to stabilize relations, manage violence, or secure cooperation” (see Introduction of this report). In the case of the Kurdish issue, this ambiguity is reinforced by the nature of the newly ad hoc-created parliamentary commission: formally inclusive yet procedurally opaque, operating largely behind closed doors, and with unclear authority over substantive reform. In our view, this opacity is not a temporary ambiguity but rather the process's operating logic, in which “the final offer” is deliberately left unclear. Although the August 2026 legislation specified conditional reintegration measures for eligible PKK members, the broader political offer and its implementation remain uncertain. But this opacity is not necessarily a weakness from the executive's perspective, since ambiguity serves as a governing device that keeps cooperation possible while preserving the option of coercion, delay, or reversal, in line with regime-survival needs and fluid geopolitical dynamics. In other words, the process resembles a form of peace in which dialogue is tolerated only so long as it serves political timing and short- to medium-term stabilization.

The outside-in limits of adaptive peace

The domestic motive for initiating Turkey’s new peace process predates the post-October 7 spillovers, but the regional context has decisively shaped the timing and the leverage of the process. Thus, situated at the intersection of domestic dynamics and regional developments, the peace process also reveals its adaptive nature, namely a nonlinear path of conflict management that is continually adjusted based on experience, tactical needs and changing structural variables.

Since October 7, the regional architecture in which Kurdish armed actors had been operating has changed substantially. Israel’s war on Gaza, the severe degradation of Hezbollah, the exposure of Iran, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, and sustained Turkish and Iraqi pressure on the Qandil corridor have all contributed to a weakening of the regional environment that had previously sustained PKK-linked structures. The recalibration gathered pace during the 12-day war and the conflict with Iran, often placing Kurdish groups in a position where they alternated between hoping to maintain their strategic importance and fearing they would be exploited as proxies and discarded by external players. In Syria, the Damascus offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in January 2026 and the subsequent integration agreement further reduced Kurdish armed leverage on Turkey’s southern border. In August 2026, the SDF leadership announced the completion of integration into state institutions, although guarantees for Kurdish rights remained unresolved.

While obviously the changing regional environment alone did not create the opening for peace, it is important to see that the weakening of Kurdish armed actors produced two simultaneous effects on Ankara’s calculus. Tactically, it lowered the immediate security costs, increasing Ankara’s confidence and making it less inclined to offer substantive concessions. Strategically, the Kurdish file had to be low in temperature before regional fragmentation could rebound into Turkey’s domestic politics.

The regional environment is a genuine additional cause of the opening, alongside domestic factors. The weakening of Kurdish armed actors produced two simultaneous effects on Ankara's calculus. Overall, the convergence of domestic political necessity and regional realignment has created a rare opening for peace. But that window could quickly close. The current discourses and developments offer a glimpse of what peace might look like. Turning that image into a lived reality will require not only courage from leaders but also a willingness to widen the conversation beyond closed rooms, both in Ankara and across the region.

Taken together, these observations complicate a binary reading of liberal versus illiberal peace when it comes to the question of whether Turkey falls squarely into the basket of illiberal international actors. Overall, Turkish foreign policy reflects not a revisionist challenge to the liberal international order, but the positioning of a status-ambiguous middle power navigating its erosion.  While Turkey’s domestic trajectory exhibits features of “competitive authoritarianism” and its foreign policy remains assertive and transactional, peacebuilding has become an increasingly institutionalised tool, as seen in its traditional participation in multilateral peacebuilding missions and more recent mediation efforts in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran. Still, this does not mean denying that Turkey’s position is selfless. Rather, it is surely driven less by normative commitments than by strategic positioning and, to some extent, regime survival. Given these features, Ankara’s approach to the Kurdish question follows a similar pattern, combining securitised practices with selective engagement and stabilisation efforts, particularly visible in the Syria–Kurdish nexus. Turkey does not endorse a liberal peace but nor does it articulate a coherent alternative normative framework.

Surfing the illiberal or simply navigating troubled waters?

Turkey’s peace practices can be read as part of a wider convergence towards pragmatism, where “repertoires” travel across actors and contexts and are combined in different ways (security‑led and development‑led instruments), even when rhetoric differs. The current peace process displays a “hybridity by design”, through which such repertoires can become politically functional in “homegrown” peace processes: domestic actors selectively adopt liberal peace norms (e.g. democratisation discourse, inclusion language, negotiations talk) while maintaining illiberal practices of hierarchical control and asymmetrical power relations. 

This resonates with the caution in certain critical views: without a conflict-transformation logic, peace initiatives tend to remain elite-driven, opaque and vulnerable to short-term political priorities, leaving core identity politics and structural inequalities unaddressed. Therefore, even a limited success in the Kurdish peace process is unlikely to trigger, or emerge from, a genuinely democratic and pluralistic opening in Turkey. For now, Turkey’s peace process rests on two fragile conditions: a parliament that must prove it can be more than a rubber stamp, and a region that must avoid pulling the rug out from under it. If either gives way, the moment could vanish as quickly as it appeared, Turkey will hardly sustain its balancing act and the vocabulary of peace would no longer hold.

References

Baser, Bahar and Alpaslan Ozerdem. 2021. “Conflict Transformation and Asymmetric Conflicts: A Critique of the Failed Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process.” Terrorism and Political Violence 33 (8): 1775–1796. 

Dinc, Pinar and Ozge Ozduzen. 2023. “From Resolution to Resecuritization: Populist Communication of the AKP’s Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey.” New Perspectives on Turkey 68: 71–94.

Gasco, Riccardo and Samuele Carlo Ayrton Abrami. 2024. “Beyond the Cold War and East-West Dynamics: Analyzing the PKK’s Agency and Longevity.” In Peter Marton, Gry Thomasen, Csaba Békés and András Rácz (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations, 1–15. Springer International Publishing. 

Somer, Murat. 2022. Return to Point Zero: The Turkish-Kurdish Question and How Politics and Ideas (Re)Make Empires, Nations, and States. SUNY Press.


r/Bakur • • 3d ago

Penaberekî siyasî yê Kurd li Tirkiyeyê di bin metirsiya radestkirina Îranê de ye

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Hewlêr (Rûdaw) - Penaberekî siyasî yê Kurd ê xelkê Tîkabê li Tirkiyeyê hatiye desteserkirin û metirsiya wê yekê heye ku radestî Îranê bê kirin.

Îro çalakvana mafên mirovan a li Almanyayê Ejîn Husêniyê ji Rûdawê re got:

“Keyhan Cewanmerdiyê ku wekî Lawan tê naskirin, penaberekî siyasî yê xelkê bajarê Tîkabê yê parêzgeha Urmiyeyê ye ku nêzîkî 10 salan li Herêma Kurdistanê çalakiyên siyasî kirine.

Ew sê meh in li Tirkiyeyê hatiye desteserkirin û metirsiya dersînorkirinê li ser wî heye.”

Li ser sînorê Tirkiye û Yunanistanê hatibû desteserkirin

Li gorî gotina wê çalakvana mafên mirovan, piştî ku li ser torên civakî ji ber çalakiyên wî yên siyasî gef li wî hatine xwarin, Keyhan Cewanmerdî bi armanca gihîştina Ewropayê ji Herêma Kurdistanê derketiye.

Keyhan Cewanmerdî li ser sînorê di navbera Tirkiye û Yunanistanê de hatiye desteserkirin.

Ew destpêkê şandine Kampa Edîrneyê û piştre jî ew veguhastine Kampa Pehlivankoyê.

Serlêdana wî ya ji bo Neteweyên Yekbûyî hat redkirin

Ejîn Husêniyê her wiha got ku parêzerê Keyhan Cewanmerdî heye.

Wê diyar kir ku Cewanmerdî bi rêya parêzerê xwe ji Neteweyên Yekbûyî xwestiye ku rê li ber radestkirina wî ya ji bo Îranê bigirin lê serlêdana wî hatiye redkirin.

“Rewşa kampên Tirkiyeyê gelekî xerab e”

Ejîn Husêniyê li ser rewşa kampên Tirkiyeyê û bi taybetî Kampa Pehlivankoyê hişyarî da û ew wekî “gelekî xerab” bi nav kir.

Wê diyar kir ku li wir fişareke mezin li penaberan tê kirin da ku bi neçarî belgeya vegera bi dilxwazî îmze bikin.

Wê çalakvana mafên mirovan ji Neteweyên Yekbûyî, navend û rêxistinên navneteweyî yên mafên mirovan û parastina penaberan xwest ku demildest helwestê nîşan bidin û rê li ber dersînorkirina Keyhan Cewanmerdî ya ji bo Îranê bigirin.


r/Bakur • • 3d ago

News/Article Li Amedê şahiya xwarinên xwemalî: Ji 62 bajaran 172 şirket

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The 8th Mesopotamia Local Foods Fair opened in Amed with 172 companies from 62 cities showcasing and selling organic regional food. It runs until 22 November.


r/Bakur • • 3d ago

News/Article Lîstika ‘Serpêhatiyên Nîkoyê Şilbik’ derdikeve ser dikê

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1 Upvotes

"The Adventures of Nîko Şilbik", a Kurdish stage play mixing illusion and balloon shows, premieres 22 November at the Amed Metropolitan Municipality City Theatre.


r/Bakur • • 3d ago

News/Article Hemû endamên HEVBENDÎyê hatin berdan

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rudaw.net
1 Upvotes

All 14 Kurdish politicians detained in the Amed-centred operations against the Kurdistan National Alliance (HEVBENDÎ) were released after court proceedings. Waiting families welcomed the decision.


r/Bakur • • 5d ago

News/Article Turkey Detains Nine Kurdish Politicians Amid Demands for Kurdish Rights and Self-Determination

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peregraf.com
6 Upvotes

Turkish police detained at least nine Kurdish political figures, including Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK) leader Bayram Bozyel, in coordinated operations on Tuesday targeting members of a newly established Kurdish political alliance that has called for recognition of Kurdish national rights, constitutional guarantees and the right of the Kurdish people to self-determination.

The arrests targeted politicians associated with the Kurdistan National Alliance (HEVBENDÎ), whose declaration advocating Kurdish self-determination had drawn fierce opposition and threats from Turkish nationalist leaders. The operations come amid Turkey's ongoing peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), raising questions about the government's approach to Kurdish political movements pursuing national rights through political activity.


r/Bakur • • 5d ago

News/Article Several Kurdish Party Leaders Arrested In Türkiye, Kurdistan 24 Learns

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kurdistan24.net
6 Upvotes

Leaders of Kurdish parties in Türkiye have been arrested, including PSK head Bayram Bozyel, deputy head Hasan Dagtekin, PÊLKURD head Fuat Önen, PWK head Cano Amedi and Ali Öncü. All sit on the HEVBENDÎ alliance council, formed Nov. 7.


r/Bakur • • 5d ago

News/Article Serokê PSKê Bayram Bozyel hate binçavkirin

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ajansawelat1.com
4 Upvotes

Several Kurdish politicians were detained in an Amed prosecutor's probe into the new HEVBENDÎ platform. They include PSK leader Bayram Bozyel, his deputy Hasan Dağtekin, PWK's Mehmet Can Azbay and Fuat Önen.


r/Bakur • • 5d ago

Music ‘Keçka Nisêbînê’ sêwî ma: Hozan Kilamedîn koça dawî kir

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2 Upvotes

Nusaybin singer Hozan Kilamedîn, known for "Keçka Nisêbînê" and hundreds of Kurdish songs over 40 years, died of a heart attack aged 55.


r/Bakur • • 6d ago

News/Article باخچەلی لە 50 خاڵدا نەخشەرێی پرۆسەی چارەسەری ئاشکرا دەکات

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rudaw.net
4 Upvotes

MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli said a "terror-free Turkey" is a strategic state matter, not only a security one, and set out a 50-point roadmap for the peace process.


r/Bakur • • 7d ago

News/Article Neviyên Seyîd Riza: Heta ku gor neyên eşkerekirin, dê aştî çawa çêbe?

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3 Upvotes

On the 89th anniversary of the Dersim executions, Seyîd Riza's descendants said there can be no peace until the graves of him and his companions are revealed.


r/Bakur • • 7d ago

News/Article Medea li Amedê bi lîstikvaniya Şebnem Yûsifiyê bi Kurdî li ser dikê ye

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rudaw.net
1 Upvotes

Actress Şebnem Yûsifî stars in a Kurdish-language staging of Medea in Amed, which tells the story of a brave and rebellious woman


r/Bakur • • 8d ago

News/Article PKK says it evacuated over 10 positions near Turkish border

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rudaw.net
4 Upvotes

The PKK says it cleared over ten cave positions near Turkey's border and moved urban cells to Qandil to advance the peace process, accusing the AKP of stalling.


r/Bakur • • 8d ago

News/Article Cezayê Mehmet Siddik Akiş hat pesendkirin: 19 sal

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rudaw.net
3 Upvotes

Van's appeals court upheld the 19-year-6-month sentence of ousted Hakkari co-mayor Mehmet Sıddık Akış, who was replaced by a trustee, along with sentences for nine co-defendants.


r/Bakur • • 9d ago

News/Article Wezareta Perwerdeyê ya Tirkiyeyê: Ji bo 86 hezar xwendekaran tenê 153 mamosteyên Kurdî

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rudaw.net
6 Upvotes

Turkey's Education Ministry says there are only 153 Kurdish teachers for 86,000 students. It cited Article 42, which bars teaching any mother tongue other than Turkish.