Over the past two years, media outlets, political statements and policy discussions have repeatedly referred to a “new peace process” between Turkey and the Kurds. However, despite promising domestic and regional advances by the parties involved, in a context marked by authoritarian and transactional practices this process hardly fits the canonical understanding of “liberal peace”. Is this time different, or merely a reshuffling of past conflict-management patterns?
Is it real peace this time?
After years of civil war and political turmoil, many signs seem to point in a hopeful direction: the Turkish government has relaunched a “Kurdish opening”, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) dissolved its organisational structures following its leader Abdullah Öcalan’s February 2025 call, and Turkey’s regional environment, though in constant risky flux because of October 7 spillovers and the more recent developments in Iran, has paradoxically opened some windows of opportunity. However, more cautious observers should recognise the stark reality: the ruling elite’s vague promises and Kurdish actors’ (un)willingness to compromise are not creating a favourable environment for a transition from conflict to peace through democratic governance, support for the rule of law and liberal reforms.
In line with the framework of this volume, we argue that, though framed as a “peace process”, Turkey’s approach to the “Kurdish question” still does not meet any liberal-peace benchmark. Rather, it combines authoritarian, transactional and adaptive elements: it is managed from the top through coercive and disciplinarian practices; it proceeds through interest-driven, short-term bargains and deliberate ambiguity; and it is continuously recalibrated to shifting regional dynamics and political tactical needs.
Our premise is that Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has long shaped the societal and (geo)political context in which the concept of peace coexists with other concepts, such as securitisation, authoritarianism and power asymmetry (Baser & Ozerdem, 2021). However, we aim to shed light on how the current situation is one in which, even more than in the past, peace keeps taking on multiple shades. That is because of the government’s oscillation between a securitised version around the slogan of a “terror-free Turkey”, where the main goal is to neutralise Kurdish armed groups, and a more politically conciliatory one of “freedom and brotherhood” for electoral purposes.
Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has long shaped the societal and (geo)political context in which the concept of peace coexists with other concepts, such as securitisation, authoritarianism and power asymmetry.
These are not stylistic variations on a single referent but the product of the distinct political work the peace label is asked to do for different actors, which is why the vocabulary persists even as the process’s material features do not reflect it. Consistent with this volume’s view, this chapter tries to go beyond the “liberal vs. illiberal” dichotomy to examine the internal and external dynamics underlying the dichotomic coexistence of peace and conflict vis-à-vis the latest developments in Turkey’s “Kurdish question”.
The domestic limits of peace: authoritarian and transactional
Turkey’s Kurdish question has historically experienced waves of open and frozen conflict. What started as a societal claim from Turkey’s largest minority escalated, beginning in the 1990s, into a cycle of violence between the Turkish state and groups such as the PKK, ultimately extending to the regional and international level (Gasco & Abrami, 2024).
Concurrently, it has witnessed periods of “truce” during which multiple governments, political parties and non-state actors have opened negotiation channels aimed at de-escalating the conflict, though never bringing it to a settled resolution. However, the imbalances between the parties, Turkey’s democratic deficits and the evolving geopolitical context have prevented a genuine “peace process” from materialising.
Our crucial premise is not to treat Turkey’s renewed engagement with the Kurdish issue as a conventional peace process, or as a simple revival of the failed talks of the early 2000s and 2010s. Although there are surely similarities, the previous attempts to reach a peace agreement occurred in a different context, shaped over time by Turkey’s Europeanisation path towards democratic reforms, the 2010 referendum to change the constitution and then the Kurdish groups’ rising geopolitical relevance in the late 2010s. While previous attempts were shaped by Europeanisation, constitutional reform and Kurdish geopolitical ascent, today the process is unfolding within a very different configuration, in which different shades of peace underpin a trajectory that appears at once authoritarian, transactional and adaptive (Somer, 2022).
First, situating the initiative within Turkey’s domestic political conjuncture reveals the authoritarian nature of the current Kurdish peace process. It is “managed from the top through coercive means that suppress pluralism and dissent” and peace is promoted through “discipline and control, prioritising order, securitisation, stability and regime continuity” (see Introduction of this report). Indeed, the dialogue with Kurdish actors is unfolding alongside a mounting process of authoritarianism, characterised by the dismantling of the opposition, the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, continued pro-government trustee appointments in Kurdish-majority municipalities and the systematic non-implementation of European Court of Human Rights rulings. Moreover, this renewed openness to dialogue is tied to domestic political strategy for the 2028 elections. Erdoğan cannot run again for the presidency unless there is a constitutional change or early elections, both of which need a supermajority that the ruling alliance does not have, but that pro-Kurdish votes could guarantee.
As of today, the PKK leadership accuses Ankara of having “frozen” the process, the DEM Party speaks more cautiously of “blockages”, while Erdoğan insists that everything is moving within a “positive atmosphere”. This divergence captures the puzzle in miniature: peace persists as the organising vocabulary of a process whose participants fundamentally disagree on what is unfolding within it, and whose trajectory remains tightly bound to the ruling coalition’s electoral calculation ahead. Regarding Kurdish actors, their room for manoeuvre expands or contracts depending on the political needs of the moment. Put simply, what is often described as a “new opening” operates domestically less as a roadmap to liberal reform than as a controlled repertoire aimed at preserving order and regime continuity, while keeping Kurdish political agency conditional and reversible.
Such a backdrop shapes and reinforces a second characteristic of the process, namely its transactional framework. Officially framed as a path towards a “terror‑free Turkey”, the initiative has relied on its traditionally security-centred language even as it has reopened discreet channels of negotiation. The coexistence of these narratives – peace on the one hand, counterterrorism on the other – has generated deep uncertainty about what is actually being offered. As a matter of fact, many analysts agree that, although the PKK remains labelled as a terrorist organisation by the government and other international actors, it had already substantially reduced its operational capacity after 2016. However, regardless of the central state’s military superiority, maintaining a broad securitised definition of terrorism has enabled the government to label a wide range of actors as such, both for political purposes and on security grounds (Dinc & Ozduzen, 2023).
As such, this aligns with the idea of a transactional peace that “rather than seeking deep political transformation, transitional justice, or normative convergence, transactionalism focuses on what works in the short to medium term to stabilize relations, manage violence, or secure cooperation” (see Introduction of this report). In the case of the Kurdish issue, this ambiguity is reinforced by the nature of the newly ad hoc-created parliamentary commission: formally inclusive yet procedurally opaque, operating largely behind closed doors, and with unclear authority over substantive reform. In our view, this opacity is not a temporary ambiguity but rather the process's operating logic, in which “the final offer” is deliberately left unclear. Although the August 2026 legislation specified conditional reintegration measures for eligible PKK members, the broader political offer and its implementation remain uncertain. But this opacity is not necessarily a weakness from the executive's perspective, since ambiguity serves as a governing device that keeps cooperation possible while preserving the option of coercion, delay, or reversal, in line with regime-survival needs and fluid geopolitical dynamics. In other words, the process resembles a form of peace in which dialogue is tolerated only so long as it serves political timing and short- to medium-term stabilization.
The outside-in limits of adaptive peace
The domestic motive for initiating Turkey’s new peace process predates the post-October 7 spillovers, but the regional context has decisively shaped the timing and the leverage of the process. Thus, situated at the intersection of domestic dynamics and regional developments, the peace process also reveals its adaptive nature, namely a nonlinear path of conflict management that is continually adjusted based on experience, tactical needs and changing structural variables.
Since October 7, the regional architecture in which Kurdish armed actors had been operating has changed substantially. Israel’s war on Gaza, the severe degradation of Hezbollah, the exposure of Iran, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, and sustained Turkish and Iraqi pressure on the Qandil corridor have all contributed to a weakening of the regional environment that had previously sustained PKK-linked structures. The recalibration gathered pace during the 12-day war and the conflict with Iran, often placing Kurdish groups in a position where they alternated between hoping to maintain their strategic importance and fearing they would be exploited as proxies and discarded by external players. In Syria, the Damascus offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in January 2026 and the subsequent integration agreement further reduced Kurdish armed leverage on Turkey’s southern border. In August 2026, the SDF leadership announced the completion of integration into state institutions, although guarantees for Kurdish rights remained unresolved.
While obviously the changing regional environment alone did not create the opening for peace, it is important to see that the weakening of Kurdish armed actors produced two simultaneous effects on Ankara’s calculus. Tactically, it lowered the immediate security costs, increasing Ankara’s confidence and making it less inclined to offer substantive concessions. Strategically, the Kurdish file had to be low in temperature before regional fragmentation could rebound into Turkey’s domestic politics.
The regional environment is a genuine additional cause of the opening, alongside domestic factors. The weakening of Kurdish armed actors produced two simultaneous effects on Ankara's calculus. Overall, the convergence of domestic political necessity and regional realignment has created a rare opening for peace. But that window could quickly close. The current discourses and developments offer a glimpse of what peace might look like. Turning that image into a lived reality will require not only courage from leaders but also a willingness to widen the conversation beyond closed rooms, both in Ankara and across the region.
Taken together, these observations complicate a binary reading of liberal versus illiberal peace when it comes to the question of whether Turkey falls squarely into the basket of illiberal international actors. Overall, Turkish foreign policy reflects not a revisionist challenge to the liberal international order, but the positioning of a status-ambiguous middle power navigating its erosion. While Turkey’s domestic trajectory exhibits features of “competitive authoritarianism” and its foreign policy remains assertive and transactional, peacebuilding has become an increasingly institutionalised tool, as seen in its traditional participation in multilateral peacebuilding missions and more recent mediation efforts in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran. Still, this does not mean denying that Turkey’s position is selfless. Rather, it is surely driven less by normative commitments than by strategic positioning and, to some extent, regime survival. Given these features, Ankara’s approach to the Kurdish question follows a similar pattern, combining securitised practices with selective engagement and stabilisation efforts, particularly visible in the Syria–Kurdish nexus. Turkey does not endorse a liberal peace but nor does it articulate a coherent alternative normative framework.
Surfing the illiberal or simply navigating troubled waters?
Turkey’s peace practices can be read as part of a wider convergence towards pragmatism, where “repertoires” travel across actors and contexts and are combined in different ways (security‑led and development‑led instruments), even when rhetoric differs. The current peace process displays a “hybridity by design”, through which such repertoires can become politically functional in “homegrown” peace processes: domestic actors selectively adopt liberal peace norms (e.g. democratisation discourse, inclusion language, negotiations talk) while maintaining illiberal practices of hierarchical control and asymmetrical power relations.
This resonates with the caution in certain critical views: without a conflict-transformation logic, peace initiatives tend to remain elite-driven, opaque and vulnerable to short-term political priorities, leaving core identity politics and structural inequalities unaddressed. Therefore, even a limited success in the Kurdish peace process is unlikely to trigger, or emerge from, a genuinely democratic and pluralistic opening in Turkey. For now, Turkey’s peace process rests on two fragile conditions: a parliament that must prove it can be more than a rubber stamp, and a region that must avoid pulling the rug out from under it. If either gives way, the moment could vanish as quickly as it appeared, Turkey will hardly sustain its balancing act and the vocabulary of peace would no longer hold.
References
Baser, Bahar and Alpaslan Ozerdem. 2021. “Conflict Transformation and Asymmetric Conflicts: A Critique of the Failed Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process.” Terrorism and Political Violence 33 (8): 1775–1796.
Dinc, Pinar and Ozge Ozduzen. 2023. “From Resolution to Resecuritization: Populist Communication of the AKP’s Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey.” New Perspectives on Turkey 68: 71–94.
Gasco, Riccardo and Samuele Carlo Ayrton Abrami. 2024. “Beyond the Cold War and East-West Dynamics: Analyzing the PKK’s Agency and Longevity.” In Peter Marton, Gry Thomasen, Csaba Békés and András Rácz (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations, 1–15. Springer International Publishing.
Somer, Murat. 2022. Return to Point Zero: The Turkish-Kurdish Question and How Politics and Ideas (Re)Make Empires, Nations, and States. SUNY Press.