r/CTI • u/bruhMomentBietch • 1d ago
Publication Part 3: I sent the proxy company a right-of-reply email. Their replies told me more than my OSINT did.
r/CTI • u/bruhMomentBietch • 1d ago
r/CTI • u/bruhMomentBietch • 5d ago
r/CTI • u/bruhMomentBietch • 7d ago
r/CTI • u/bruhMomentBietch • 8d ago
Hey all, this is a fresh campaign, new IOCs, they have not been listed anywhere else, please share and block:
A page made to look like a Zoom meeting tells the visitor their app is out of date and offers an update. The update is a ScreenConnect remote-access client set to call a server its sender runs; whoever runs it hands over control of their computer. NSS took the page from the day's new registrations, captured it, read the installer and traced it to that server within 23 hours of the page's registration. The server's domain was registered 63 days before the lure. None of the nine indicators was on any list NSS holds on 12 November 2026.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| File name | ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi |
| Size | 15,216,640 bytes |
| SHA-256 | c98e783442a4ca72244f3bb1d5f8ad28bc1f3f94db8a5afac9597a7c870ca590 |
| MD5 | e6142c9c458795d1fea5e18288c1adfb |
| Kind | Windows Installer package, author "ScreenConnect Software" |
| Client id | 230f9b38c3c088fe, installed as the service "ScreenConnect Client (230f9b38c3c088fe)" |
| Connects to | 524ff283-2094-4f98-b68d-f24f61c5f8fa[.]dotinicon[.]com, port 8041 |
r/CTI • u/Strict-Ad3926 • Oct 14 '26
r/CTI • u/dodarko • Oct 11 '26
Hey everyone,
I'm curious if anyone here has successfully built a structured, scalable, and reliable Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) operations environment using Claude Code, beyond just using it for individual investigations or isolated tasks.
I've been experimenting with building a more comprehensive operational framework, including:
- Defined CTI methodologies and doctrine to maintain analytical consistency.
- Specialized agents and skills for different intelligence workflows.
- Persistent memory and contextual awareness across investigations and projects.
- Standardized workflows for collection, enrichment, analysis, reporting, and intelligence dissemination.
- Consistent deliverables tailored to technical, operational, and executive audiences.
The challenge is that, as the environment grows, I keep running into reliability and consistency issues.
Some recurring problems:
- Instruction drift: Claude gradually stops following established methodologies, analytical standards, or project-specific rules.
- Skills being ignored: Even with relevant skills available, Claude sometimes fails to recognize when they should be invoked.
- Memory and context degradation: Previously established decisions, operational context, or conventions aren't consistently carried forward.
- Inconsistent reporting quality: Deliverables sometimes become unnecessarily verbose, dense, or difficult to read, even when clarity and conciseness are explicitly required.
- Architectural complexity: Finding the right balance between agents, skills, hooks, memory, project instructions, and directory structures without creating an overly complicated system.
What I'm ultimately trying to achieve is something closer to a persistent, doctrine-driven CTI operational workspace, where Claude Code can reliably support day-to-day intelligence operations rather than behave like a collection of disconnected prompts.
I'd love to hear from anyone who has tackled something similar.
A few questions for the community:
I'm particularly interested in real-world implementations, architectural decisions, and lessons learned, including approaches that didn't work.
I'm not necessarily looking for a ready-made solution. I'd genuinely like to exchange ideas, compare methodologies, and learn how others are approaching this problem.
If you've built something similar and are willing to share your architecture, workflows, or even just a few insights, I'd really appreciate it.
Thanks!
r/CTI • u/sheli4k • Sep 19 '26
I've noticed an increase in calendar phishing campaigns targeting Google Workspace. It appears that threat actors, using compromised credentials, send phishing calendar invitations to the victim and also send calendar invites to other company domains found in the victim's address book, provided they use Google Workspace for email.
Has anyone observed similar campaigns recently?
r/CTI • u/Strict-Ad3926 • Aug 24 '26
r/CTI • u/Opposite-Shift-8077 • Aug 20 '26
r/CTI • u/LeatherRip1623 • Jul 06 '26
Long-time SOC and CTI operator, first post here. I open-sourced the memory engine I built for my own workflows and would rather have this community kick the tires than sit on it quietly.
**The problem.** Everyone is wiring LLM agents into intel workflows right now. Agent memory frameworks and generic RAG treat knowledge as embedding soup, and CTI breaks that model in three specific ways:
**What ZettelForge does.** It is a memory layer, not a TIP. It sits between your intel sources and your agents or tooling:
- Deterministic store: TypeDB with STIX 2.1 and ATT&CK as a hard, typed schema. Inference rules handle relationship traversal and alias resolution. Data that violates the schema does not get in.
- Semantic store: LanceDB vectors for fuzzy recall across unstructured reporting.
- Queries hit both in parallel, results get fused with reciprocal rank fusion, then reranked with a cross-encoder.
- Everything is served over MCP, so Claude, LangChain, or homegrown agents consume it as a tool. Vendor neutral by design.
**What it is not.** Not a replacement for OpenCTI or MISP. It complements a TIP as the recall layer your agents query, with structure and sharing rules intact. Also not magic: ingestion quality still decides output quality.
**Status.** Early and solo-built. The core pipeline works, the docs are catching up to the code in a couple of places, and I would rather hear the schema design is wrong now than after I build more on top of it.
**What I would genuinely like feedback on:**
- Is the dual-store approach justified versus a single property graph with vector indexes bolted on?
- Which integration matters most to you: OpenCTI connector, MISP, or Sentinel TI tables?
- Anyone solving agent memory for CTI a different way? I want to compare notes.
r/CTI • u/0xdevbot • Jul 05 '26
Walking a ClickFix fileless PowerShell loader to its C2, pivoting infrastructure to Virtualine Technologies bulletproof hosting. Full IOCs and hunt queries.
r/CTI • u/Intrinsec_ • Jun 12 '26
Hello, we have just published a report on our blog concerning a malspam network spreading a JavaScript backdoor.
• The targets of those campaigns were from all regions and sectors, notably energy and finance ministries, including in the CIS region. • We believe the campaigns to be financially motivated and operated for email account compromise (EAC) and/or business email compromise (BEC).
• Both the IP used to send the spam, and the C2 of the JavaScript backdoor, were hosted on two distinct bulletproof networks; US based GHOSTYNETWORKS, and Seychelles based OMEGATECH.
• GHOSTYNETWORKS can seemingly be considered with a high level of confidence to be a rebrand of OPTIBOUNCE and thus be linked to the unfamous hosting provider AnonRDP. It was notably plebiscite by more sophisticated threat actors like TeamPCP.
• Based on various open-source intelligence, OMEGATECH seems to be yet another network created by hosting provider Virtualine, advertised on underground forums.
• Pivots on the threat actor’s infrastructure unveiled previous malspam and malware activities from the end of 2025, also backed by other bulletproof solutions.
Link for the report: https://www.intrinsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/TLP-CLEAR-Pivoting-on-a-malspam-infrastructure-EN.pdf
r/CTI • u/ANYRUN-team • Jun 11 '26
r/CTI • u/R4yfield • Jun 01 '26
r/CTI • u/Comprehensive_Roof67 • May 30 '26
r/CTI • u/Straight-Common-3937 • May 12 '26
Trying to sanity-check the below.
Say an org has an old subdomain with a CNAME pointing to a cloud resource that no longer exists. Pretty standard dangling DNS issue.
Attacker claims the abandoned cloud alias, gets a valid cert for the real subdomain, and hosts a tiny remote resource there.
Now a targeted employee opens an email that loads that resource from the hijacked subdomain. If cookies are scoped broadly to the parent domain, the browser/mail client may send session cookies automatically to the attacker-controlled subdomain.
So the path is basically:
dangling CNAME → claimed cloud alias → valid cert on real subdomain → remote resource loads → parent-domain cookies leak → possible access to internal apps like HR, finance, CRM, support/admin consoles
My question: would you treat this as a critical pre-attack exposure, or just attack-surface hygiene until there is evidence of abuse?
Also curious who usually owns this in your org.
r/CTI • u/Straight-Common-3937 • Apr 23 '26
r/CTI • u/Fun_Bug_1462 • Apr 22 '26
I recently tracked down the operator behind the "TdataS" Telegram session stealer. How? Because he tested his own malware on his own computer.
His stealer performed perfectly. It packaged up his own personal data, snapped a screenshot of his desktop (exposing his source code), and exfiltrated it straight to a public drop zone I was monitoring.
Using 100% passive OSINT-no exploits, no bypassed authentication, I traced his Gofile tokens and Telegram sessions to unmask his entire operation.
It's the ultimate OpSec fail, and a goldmine for Threat Intel analysts.
Dive into the full case study:
https://maordayanofficial.medium.com/tdatas-stealer-from-c2-discovery-to-operator-attribution-via-operational-security-failures-d11d78cc8e85
r/CTI • u/UtopianKnightUK • Mar 16 '26
Hi all,
I have been bored over the past week so been playing with building a platform that brings some of the things within the CTI space together into one place. This isnt a true CTI platform more an overall cyber project looking for honest feedback and ways to improve.
I have built it with a restful API as well so the content can be ingested into people own platforms and tools.
My plan is to keep this all self funded and 100% free forever.
Look forward to feedback. Please do share with others as the more feedback I get the better it will become. Thanks all and keep safe out there.
r/CTI • u/SirEliasRiddle • Mar 14 '26
Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) this week announced patches for a critical-severity vulnerability in Aruba Networking AOS-CX that could be exploited to reset administrator passwords.