France, September to October 1951
When the National Assembly and Council of the Republic authorized Charles de Gaulle to prepare a new Constitution on 31 August 1951, they had placed themselves in a rather peculiar position. Both chambers had agreed that the existing Republic needed to be replaced, and had entrusted the task of designing its successor to a man who had spent the previous five years criticizing the very parliamentary institutions which had now returned him to power. The completed Constitution would not even require a second vote of approval in Parliament. It was to be submitted directly to the French electorate, leaving deputies with the opportunity to influence its preparation, but not to determine its eventual adoption. Whether the country would accept de Gaulle's conception of republican government remained to be seen.
The General had reason to be confident. His Rassemblement du Peuple Français, possessing 210 seats in the 625-member National Assembly, had emerged from the June elections as the largest parliamentary force in France. The demonstrations accompanying his return in August had also shown that his political following extended well beyond the Assembly. In Paris and the provinces, RPF committees were already speaking of the end of the parliamentary system established in 1946, with little patience for suggestions that the new Constitution might amount to little more than a revision of the existing one. De Gaulle had, after all, been advocating substantially the same constitutional principles since his speech at Bayeux in June 1946. The difference was that he now possessed both a government and a political movement capable of putting them into effect.
There were limits to his freedom, however. The RPF remained short of the 313 deputies required for an absolute majority, and the Independents, Christian Democrats and Radicals whose votes had permitted his investiture had not suddenly become Gaullists. Many wanted a stronger executive without accepting the degree of presidential authority favoured by the General. The 148 Communist deputies opposed the constitutional undertaking outright, while the SFIO, holding 74 seats, remained deeply suspicious of the proposed concentration of power. Nor had Parliament surrendered its ordinary political responsibilities during the transition. A government which openly disregarded the wishes of its parliamentary allies might still find itself without the support necessary to remain in office long enough to complete the work.
The August constitutional law imposed several conditions upon the drafting process. France was to remain a republic founded upon universal suffrage, with the separation of executive and legislative powers, ministerial responsibility before Parliament, judicial independence and the protection of fundamental liberties. The Council of Ministers would prepare the text, obtain the opinion of a constitutional consultative committee containing parliamentary representatives, submit the draft to the Council of State and finally present it to the electorate. Within those boundaries, considerable latitude remained. There was nothing preventing de Gaulle from giving the presidency a far more substantial place in the Republic than it had enjoyed under the Constitution of 1946.
Responsibility for preparing the new institutions fell chiefly upon Michel Debré, the Minister of Justice, who assembled a group of senior officials and constitutional advisers including René Capitant. Debré had long concerned himself with the defects of parliamentary government and was well acquainted with de Gaulle's constitutional thinking. His task was nevertheless considerably more difficult than simply putting the Bayeux speech into legal language. The General had outlined the principles of a stronger executive and a second chamber representing interests beyond parliamentary parties, but had left many questions concerning the actual operation of these institutions unanswered. In particular, the relationship between the President, the Prime Minister and the National Assembly required more careful attention than it had received during de Gaulle's years in opposition.
At Matignon, the General made clear that he did not intend to replace the Fourth Republic with another system in which the President merely presided over a succession of parliamentary ministries. He wanted the head of state to appoint the government, chair the Council of Ministers and possess sufficient authority to intervene when political disputes threatened the operation of the State. The conduct of foreign affairs and national defence was of particular concern to him. These were matters in which the continuity of national policy could hardly be assured if every ministerial crisis brought with it the possibility of a new diplomatic or military direction. In de Gaulle's conception, the President had to stand above the parties without becoming powerless before them.
Debré was in broad agreement, although he was unwilling to leave the government's constitutional position entirely dependent upon the wishes of the presidency. Ministers would still be required to conduct administration, prepare legislation and answer before the National Assembly. If the President could direct every department without restriction, the Assembly might find itself holding ministers responsible for decisions which they had not actually made. Debré therefore sought a division in which the head of state possessed substantial authority over national affairs while the Prime Minister retained genuine responsibility for the daily operation of government. The problem was not particularly difficult to imagine under de Gaulle himself, who could probably expect ministers to follow his lead. It was the constitutional relationship between their offices, and the circumstances under which future occupants might disagree, which made the matter less straightforward.
Paul Reynaud, appointed Minister of State for parliamentary and constitutional relations, became one of the principal defenders of a clearer division of authority. Reynaud was hardly an admirer of the parliamentary practices which had brought down so many governments. He had advocated strengthening the executive long before the RPF existed and shared much of de Gaulle's impatience with the Fourth Republic. Nevertheless, he had also spent enough time in French politics to know that the personal prestige of a head of state was not a permanent constitutional guarantee. The new Republic would eventually have presidents who were not Charles de Gaulle, and it was under those successors that an ill-defined relationship between the presidency and the ministry might become dangerous.
The disagreement first became serious over the Prime Minister's appointment and dismissal. Some of the General's advisers wanted the President to possess unrestricted authority to remove the head of government, effectively making the ministry dependent upon his confidence. Reynaud considered this an invitation to future difficulties. A Prime Minister who could be dismissed by both the President and the National Assembly might find himself answerable to two authorities pursuing entirely different policies. Debré shared the concern, although neither minister was prepared to restore the old practice of requiring parliamentary approval before a government could assume office.
De Gaulle eventually accepted an arrangement under which the President appointed the Prime Minister without preliminary parliamentary investiture, and appointed the remaining ministers upon the Prime Minister's proposal. Once formed, the government could begin exercising its responsibilities without first presenting its composition to the National Assembly for approval. Parliament retained the power to compel the ministry's resignation through a formal motion of censure, but the President himself remained independent of parliamentary confidence. The departure of a Prime Minister was to be effected through the presentation of the government's resignation, rather than an unrestricted presidential power of dismissal. For the General, the essential achievement was that the Assembly would no longer have the opportunity to dictate the formation of ministries before they had even taken office.
De Gaulle was less accommodating concerning the conduct of national policy. The President was to become commander-in-chief of the armed forces, preside over the principal defence councils, exercise authority over senior military appointments and oversee France's strategic military direction. Foreign relations would likewise fall under his leading authority, including the negotiation and ratification of treaties according to the procedures established by the Constitution. The Prime Minister and responsible ministers would administer these policies and prepare the legislation required for their implementation, while Parliament continued controlling military appropriations, declarations of war and treaties requiring legislative authorization.
Reynaud still insisted upon retaining the principle that the government determined and conducted the policy of the nation. Debré incorporated it into the draft, but the final wording also permitted the President to establish the principal orientations of the State through the Council of Ministers, extending his influence beyond defence and diplomacy to major questions of economic and social organization. Ministers would remain responsible for preparing the legislation and administrative measures necessary to carry out those decisions. The Prime Minister, meanwhile, continued answering before Parliament for the government's conduct.
There was comparatively little argument over the method of electing the President. De Gaulle remained attached to the electoral college he had proposed at Bayeux, composed of representatives extending well beyond Parliament. Within the RPF, however, some believed the circumstances justified a more ambitious change. The movement's electoral success and the demonstrations accompanying the August crisis appeared to offer an opportunity to establish the presidency through direct universal suffrage. Why should the General, whose popularity had been so important to the constitutional transition, not receive his mandate directly from the country?
Reynaud and several Christian Democratic ministers were reluctant to encourage the idea. A President elected by the entire population might claim an authority superior to that of the National Assembly, making disputes between the institutions considerably more difficult to resolve. De Gaulle had no particular reason to insist upon direct election, since the broader college already satisfied his principal demand for a presidency independent of parliamentary parties. The question was consequently settled without the prolonged negotiations which had accompanied ministerial responsibility.
The head of state would serve a seven-year term, elected by parliamentarians and representatives of municipal, departmental and other elected local institutions throughout the Republic. The college was expected to contain many tens of thousands of delegates, with its precise composition and voting procedures established through organic legislation. Election would require an absolute majority on the first ballot, with subsequent voting following the applicable electoral rules. The National Assembly would no longer determine the occupant of the Élysée by itself.
De Gaulle was also determined to restore dissolution as an effective presidential prerogative. Under the Fourth Republic, the conditions governing dissolution had been so restrictive that deputies could participate in the downfall of successive governments without seriously risking their own seats. The new Constitution permitted the President to dissolve the National Assembly after consulting the Prime Minister and the presidents of the two parliamentary chambers. New elections would follow within twenty to forty days, and another dissolution would be prohibited during the year following those elections. The Assembly would retain the right to dismiss ministries, but its members would now have to reckon with the possibility that prolonged parliamentary obstruction might result in an election rather than another round of ministerial negotiations.
Much of September was occupied by Debré's attempts to give the government greater independence from the ordinary workings of Parliament. Parliamentary committees had acquired considerable influence over ministries, while deputies could threaten the survival of governments over appointments, expenditure measures and relatively minor legislative disagreements. A minister might spend as much effort maintaining the support of his parliamentary allies as administering his department. Strengthening the presidency alone would accomplish little if ministers remained compelled to negotiate every important administrative decision with a shifting collection of party leaders.
Debré therefore proposed a constitutional distinction between matters requiring legislation and those which the government could regulate independently. Civil liberties, nationality, taxation, criminal law, elections, public finance and the organization of the principal state institutions remained within Parliament's legislative competence, together with the fundamental principles governing property, education, labour rights, social security and national defence. The Assembly would continue establishing the essential legal principles governing economic and social institutions, but ministers could determine their detailed organization, administrative procedures and methods of operation wherever the law had not reserved those matters to itself. The government would thus possess considerably greater freedom to reorganize public bodies and implement national programmes.
Not all of the government's allies were pleased. Pierre-Henri Teitgen and several other Christian Democratic deputies feared that the proposed regulatory powers might permit ministers to alter social protections without an ordinary legislative vote. The MRP was willing to accept a clearer division between lawmaking and administration, but not a system in which the executive could determine the substance of labour rights or individual liberties through regulations. Debré accommodated these objections by explicitly preserving parliamentary authority over the fundamental principles of social legislation. Technical implementation would remain a matter for the government, although the essential guarantees of labour law, social security and public liberties could not simply be rewritten at ministerial discretion.
The cabinet also wanted to recover control over the parliamentary timetable. A ministry might possess a coherent programme and still find its legislation delayed or amended into something entirely different from what it had originally proposed. Under the new arrangements, the government received priority over a substantial portion of legislative business and could demand a vote bloqué, requiring the Assembly to decide upon a bill containing only amendments accepted by the ministers. Deputies remained free to reject the text, but they could no longer compel a ministry to accept amendments which fundamentally altered its policy.
Financial legislation was treated with particular care. Amendments reducing public revenue or increasing expenditure without adequate financial provision would be inadmissible, while the budget itself would be subject to strict constitutional deadlines. If Parliament failed to act within the prescribed period, the government could bring the necessary financial provisions into force by ordinance. Antoine Pinay and the ministers concerned with the Treasury had good reason to support the reform. The ability of parliamentary groups to alter expenditure without assuming responsibility for the resulting financial obligations had long been a source of difficulty, particularly for governments attempting to maintain a consistent budgetary programme.
The rules governing ministerial responsibility were altered just as substantially. A motion of censure would require the signatures of at least one-tenth of the National Assembly's members, followed by a minimum interval of forty-eight hours before voting. Its adoption would require the affirmative support of an absolute majority of all deputies, not merely a majority of those present. Abstentions would therefore favour the government's survival, and deputies supporting an unsuccessful motion would face restrictions upon introducing another during the same session. A ministry could still be dismissed, but only by an Assembly majority willing to vote explicitly for its removal.
Debré was not content merely to make votes of no confidence more difficult. He also wanted the Prime Minister to be able to stake the government's survival upon the passage of legislation. Following deliberation in the Council of Ministers, a bill could be declared adopted unless the National Assembly succeeded in passing a motion of censure within twenty-four hours. Deputies would then have to choose between accepting a measure they opposed and removing the government altogether.
Reynaud saw considerable danger in the proposal, as did several Christian Democratic ministers. A government might find itself unable to assemble a majority for an unpopular bill, yet still secure its passage because the opposition lacked the votes to bring down the ministry. The RPF had little sympathy for this objection. Its deputies had spent years criticizing parliamentary groups which obstructed government legislation while refusing to assume responsibility for replacing the governments themselves. De Gaulle sided with Debré, and the final draft imposed no numerical restriction upon the procedure. The Assembly retained its right to dismiss the ministry, but opposition to individual measures would no longer suffice to prevent their adoption.
The General's supporters considered this one of the principal victories of the drafting process. Ministers would no longer be obliged to bargain over every important provision simply because a parliamentary majority could be assembled against it. The Christian Democrats remained uneasy, especially since the procedure could be employed repeatedly, but de Gaulle had obtained a means of ensuring that a government could carry out legislation even where opposition to its individual measures was stronger than the opposition prepared to dismiss it. Whether future ministers would employ the procedure sparingly or make it an ordinary instrument of government was a matter the Constitution largely left to political judgment.
For programmes requiring extensive technical implementation, ministers could also request parliamentary authorization to legislate by ordinance. Parliament would determine the subjects covered and the duration of the authorization, permitting the government to adopt the necessary measures without submitting every provision to ordinary legislative proceedings. Subsequent ratification was required for the ordinances to acquire the status of parliamentary legislation. Debré considered the procedure particularly useful for administrative reorganization, where the preparation of numerous separate bills might occupy months without materially improving the resulting law. Unlike the extraordinary presidential powers being considered elsewhere in the draft, ordinary ordinances would depend upon authorization granted by Parliament for a specified purpose and period.
Bicameralism attracted comparatively little opposition within the cabinet. De Gaulle had long favoured a second parliamentary chamber, while Debré wanted it to participate meaningfully in legislation without reproducing the ministerial instability associated with the National Assembly. The proposed Senate would replace the Council of the Republic and represent the territorial collectivities of France. Its members would be elected indirectly, principally through colleges drawn from municipal and departmental institutions, under procedures established by organic law. The National Assembly, elected by direct universal suffrage, would remain the principal representative chamber and the only one before which the government exercised political responsibility.
Gaston Monnerville, president of the Council of the Republic, was particularly concerned with the settlement. He had no desire to see the upper chamber reduced to the consultative position originally granted to it in 1946, and pressed for effective powers of legislative revision. Monnerville wanted the Senate to examine government proposals independently and objected to arrangements which might allow ministers to disregard its amendments whenever they became inconvenient. De Gaulle was willing to accept a stronger upper chamber, so long as disagreements between the two assemblies could not indefinitely prevent legislation from passing.
Bills would pass between the Senate and National Assembly until an identical text had been adopted. If disagreement persisted, the Prime Minister could convene a joint parliamentary committee to prepare a compromise. Should reconciliation fail, the government could eventually request that the National Assembly make the final decision after the prescribed stages of reconsideration. Organic laws concerning the Senate's own organization would require approval in identical terms by both chambers, providing the upper house with a particular safeguard over its institutional existence.
Monnerville had secured a chamber capable of revising legislation, defending local interests and participating substantially in parliamentary debate. It would have no authority to dismiss ministers, however, and the National Assembly retained the final decision over ordinary legislation and public finance under the applicable procedures. For de Gaulle, this was an acceptable price for restoring a second chamber with meaningful legislative responsibilities. The Senate might criticize the government and delay its bills, but it could not become another institution capable of producing ministerial crises.
The representation of organized economic and social interests was dealt with separately. A new Conseil économique et social would provide trade unions, employers' organizations, agricultural bodies, cooperatives and other recognized professional and social groups with a permanent consultative institution. The composition of the Council and the method of selecting its delegates would be determined through organic legislation.
De Gaulle had never been particularly sympathetic to the notion that Parliament alone should determine the political direction of France. The events of August had only strengthened his conviction. His return to power had depended upon parliamentary negotiations, certainly, but it had also been accompanied by demonstrations and a public movement whose demands could hardly be reduced to the composition of the National Assembly. For the General, there was no reason why the electorate should be excluded from settling important national questions merely because the parties were unable, or unwilling, to reach an agreement among themselves. He therefore wanted the President to possess the authority to submit certain legislative proposals directly to the French people.
This was precisely what troubled Reynaud. Having spent much of his political career advocating stronger executive government, he was hardly opposed to an occasional appeal to the electorate. What concerned him was the prospect of a President repeatedly resorting to referendums whenever his legislation encountered parliamentary resistance. A government unable to secure approval for a particular measure might simply take the matter to the country, leaving the National Assembly to confront a President claiming to speak with the authority of the national electorate. Several Christian Democratic ministers shared these reservations. The President would already have the power to dissolve the Assembly and call new elections; granting him an unrestricted legislative referendum could make parliamentary opposition considerably more difficult.
De Gaulle had no intention of surrendering the principle. The RPF had been founded in opposition to a political system which, in his view, allowed parliamentary parties to exercise authority without accepting the responsibilities of government. Requiring parliamentary consent before the President could appeal to the people would leave the proposed referendum power dependent upon the very institution it was intended to check. Reynaud and the Christian Democrats might object to such reasoning, but the General was prepared to accept restrictions upon the subjects eligible for a referendum, not a requirement that Parliament first authorize one.
The provisions eventually accepted covered the organization of public powers, the principal organization of economic and social life, and legislation establishing major national reforms. A referendum could be proposed by the government or by the two parliamentary chambers acting jointly. More importantly for de Gaulle, the President would possess an initiative of his own. He would have to consult the Prime Minister and the presidents of both chambers before exercising it, although their approval would not be necessary. Nor would the decision require ministerial countersignature, making it one of the President's personal constitutional powers.
A President faced with parliamentary resistance to an eligible reform could consequently submit the proposal to the electorate without first obtaining the agreement of the ministry or a parliamentary majority. Once approved, the measure would be promulgated as law and possess the same legal force as legislation adopted by the chambers. Such laws could establish the principal arrangements of a national programme, assign responsibilities to the institutions charged with carrying it out, and authorize implementing regulations or ordinances within the limits approved by the voters. Parliament retained its ordinary legislative responsibilities over matters not covered by the referendum, but no subsequent parliamentary vote would be required for provisions already enacted by the electorate.
The proposed Constitutional Council would supervise the regularity of referendums. It would not, however, possess the same authority to examine the substance of a law approved directly by the electorate as it would over ordinary parliamentary legislation. Formal constitutional amendments would remain subject to a separate revision procedure requiring parliamentary participation, but within the subjects assigned to popular consultation, the President would have acquired an unusually effective instrument. An important reform could obtain the force of law through a national vote even where the government lacked a dependable majority in the Assembly, with its subsequent implementation entrusted largely to the responsible ministries.
Reynaud accepted the arrangement reluctantly. Limiting referendums to specified subjects offered some protection against their use in every disagreement between the executive and Parliament, and the government's allies had at least prevented the creation of a completely unrestricted presidential legislative power. Yet de Gaulle had secured what he wanted most: the opportunity to appeal to the country without first obtaining permission from the parties whose opposition had occasioned the dispute.
The proposed emergency powers were still more uncomfortable for the General's parliamentary allies. De Gaulle's experience of 1940 remained central to his thinking. France had suffered military defeat amid the collapse of its political institutions, and he was determined that a future national catastrophe should never leave the State without an authority capable of acting. The President, charged with safeguarding national independence and the continuity of republican government, would therefore possess extraordinary powers when ordinary constitutional procedures had become impossible to exercise.
Neither Debré nor Reynaud disputed the need for such an article. Their concern lay in determining when it could be invoked and, perhaps more importantly, who would decide when its use was no longer justified. The government eventually settled upon two conditions which had to exist simultaneously: a grave and immediate threat to national independence, territorial integrity, international obligations or republican institutions, accompanied by an interruption of the regular functioning of constitutional public authorities. The existence of a serious political dispute or military danger would not, by itself, be sufficient. The ordinary machinery of constitutional government would also have to be unable to function as intended.
Before assuming these powers, the President would formally consult the Prime Minister, the presidents of both parliamentary chambers and the Constitutional Council. He could then adopt the exceptional measures required by the circumstances, including measures which would ordinarily fall within Parliament's legislative domain, with the object of restoring constitutional government. Parliament would assemble automatically and continue sitting throughout the emergency. The National Assembly could not be dissolved while the exceptional powers remained in operation, and the Constitutional Council would be consulted concerning the measures adopted.
These safeguards did not satisfy everyone. The article contained no fixed expiration date and no mandatory independent review after a prescribed period. The President would determine whether exceptional circumstances continued to exist, subject to the constitutional requirement that his measures be directed toward restoring the regular functioning of public authorities. Neither consultation with the Constitutional Council nor the continued presence of Parliament gave those institutions a direct power to terminate the emergency regime. De Gaulle opposed an automatic time limit, arguing that the duration of a national crisis could not always be known in advance. He had little interest in providing the State with extraordinary powers only to have them expire while the danger remained unresolved.
For Reynaud, this was perhaps the most difficult concession of the negotiations. The requirement that a grave national threat coincide with an interruption of ordinary constitutional government considerably narrowed the circumstances in which the article could be invoked, and Parliament would at least continue meeting throughout its operation. These guarantees were sufficient for him to accept the final wording, although they did little to resolve his concern that the President would retain the final judgment over the duration of his own exceptional powers. Debré paid particular attention to distinguishing the emergency provisions from ordinary government by ordinance, which depended upon parliamentary authorization within defined limits.
The extraordinary powers granted to de Gaulle's government during the August transition were also kept outside the new arrangement. Those temporary authorizations had been conferred under the constitutional law permitting the preparation of a new Republic and would expire according to their original terms. The permanent emergency provisions would become available only once the Constitution itself entered into force.
Having divided legislative and regulatory authority between Parliament and the government, Debré also needed an institution capable of determining when either had exceeded its constitutional responsibilities. The Constitutional Council was intended to perform that function, examining organic laws, resolving disputes concerning legislative and regulatory competence, and supervising the principal national elections. Debré did not envisage a court whose business would be to reconsider every political decision taken by the government or Parliament. Its principal responsibility was to ensure that the institutions of the Republic acted within the powers assigned to them by the Constitution.
The Council would contain nine appointed members serving staggered nine-year terms, three selected by the President of the Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly and three by the President of the Senate. Former Presidents of the Republic would also become members for life, preserving a connection between the institution and the continuity of the presidency. Organic laws and parliamentary standing orders would undergo compulsory constitutional examination before entering into force. Ordinary legislation could be referred before promulgation by the President, the Prime Minister or the president of either parliamentary chamber, while the Council would also supervise presidential elections, adjudicate parliamentary electoral disputes and examine the regularity of referendums. Its decisions would bind the public authorities.
The rights recognized in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and the Preamble of 1946 would retain constitutional protection. Judicial independence was expressly guaranteed, with the President serving as its constitutional guarantor and the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature participating in the appointment and discipline of judges. The judicial authorities would remain responsible for protecting individual liberty against arbitrary detention.
Christian Democratic representatives attached particular importance to these guarantees. Socialist deputies, however, wanted parliamentary minorities to possess a broader right to challenge legislation before the Constitutional Council. Debré resisted the proposal. A party unable to defeat a bill through the ordinary parliamentary process might instead attempt to delay its implementation through constitutional proceedings, potentially reproducing some of the difficulties which the reform was intended to eliminate. The final text therefore restricted ordinary referral to the specified constitutional authorities, alongside the compulsory examinations required for organic laws and parliamentary rules.
By October, the Constitution had begun to acquire a relatively stable form. De Gaulle continued supervising the political direction of the work at Matignon, while Debré and his advisers prepared the successive drafts. Reynaud spent considerable effort maintaining agreement among the ministers and parliamentary representatives whose support remained necessary for the transition. The General's principal demands had largely survived the negotiations, although several provisions had been modified to satisfy Christian Democratic and Independent objections.
The RPF was not inclined to leave the outcome entirely to ministers and jurists. Its departmental organizations continued arranging meetings and circulating petitions, now defending the proposed presidency, dissolution and restrictions upon parliamentary obstruction rather than merely demanding de Gaulle's return. Gaullist speakers directed particular attention toward deputies who had supported the August constitutional authorization but remained reluctant to accept the full implications of the General's programme. The movement's parliamentary leadership regarded the authorization as a commitment to substantial institutional change, not simply permission to construct another parliamentary compromise.
This activity irritated some of the government's allies. Christian Democratic deputies who accepted the need for constitutional reform resented suggestions that disagreement with a particular presidential power amounted to opposition to de Gaulle himself. Several Independents were sympathetic to a stronger executive but apprehensive about the growing tendency to identify the Constitution with the General's personal authority. The Radicals had reasons of their own for concern. Their influence had traditionally depended upon parliamentary committees, local political networks and the negotiations through which ministerial coalitions were assembled. The proposed institutions promised to reduce the importance of precisely those activities.
The Communist Party openly challenged both the constitutional project and the political pressure surrounding its preparation. Its deputies denounced the concentration of executive authority and the restrictions imposed upon the National Assembly. Through the CGT and local party organizations, Communist campaigners also mobilized against the procedures permitting the government to secure legislation without ordinary parliamentary approval. They regarded the RPF's demonstrations as evidence that the proposed institutions were intended to strengthen de Gaulle's personal authority at the expense of the parliamentary parties.
The preliminary draft was submitted during October to a Constitutional Consultative Committee of thirty-nine members, comprising representatives designated by the parliamentary chambers and specialists in constitutional and administrative law. The committee could recommend amendments but could not assume the government's authority to prepare the Constitution. It nevertheless provided an opportunity for the parties to examine provisions which had already survived several rounds of ministerial negotiation.
The Communists were certain to reject the project, but its more awkward opponents might be the Christian Democrats and Independents whose votes had brought de Gaulle back to power. They had agreed to give his government the authority to prepare a Constitution, not to surrender every parliamentary power it proposed to curtail. The draft had survived Matignon. The Consultative Committee would now test how much of it the General's allies were actually prepared to accept.