r/foreignpolicy • • 7h ago

I saw Russian power from the inside. This is how Ukraine’s drones are really hurting Putin

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1 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 1d ago

Honestly, I am not shocked anymore, but at least it shows the true intentions of the US administration - Trump calls Putin 'my friend' at China summit, alarming European allies

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9 Upvotes

I am sure behind this "friendship" are happening shady deals that damage US interests


r/foreignpolicy • • 1d ago

Did Trump disrespect western democracy at his recent trip to China speaking on his relationship with Putin this past week ?

2 Upvotes

Trump went to China this past week. While meeting with Putin he said while taking about his close ties and friendship with Putin '  “I can’t speak to the American people on this.“ about Ukraine . Was this comment a concern to anyone living in USA or North America ? Is this an anti American slant indicating a more fascist direction in the US Government ?


r/foreignpolicy • • 2d ago

'WILL UNLEASH HELL' Iran is About to Break U.S. Blockade in Strait of Ho...

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0 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 2d ago

Israeli ambassador to USA: "You get American soldiers back to their families here when Iran is defeated." + Iranian FM reaction

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13 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 2d ago

The 2026 Shenzhen Trilateral Summit of the U.S., Chinese, and Russian Leaders: More Form Than Substance, Its Impact Greatly Overestimated, Significant but Limited in Effect

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2 Upvotes

On November 19, U.S. President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a trilateral summit during the APEC meeting in Shenzhen, China. The U.S.–China–Russia summit had already attracted considerable international attention before it began, was in the global spotlight while it was taking place, and sparked extensive discussion among various parties after it concluded. Many have compared this summit to the “Yalta Conference,” which shaped the post-World War II international order, divided spheres of influence, and determined the fate of the world.
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In my view, such assessments and expectations greatly overestimate the significance and influence of this U.S.–China–Russia summit and are clearly at odds with the summit’s actual impact and the realities of international politics.
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First, the meeting of the three countries’ top leaders and the issuance of a joint declaration certainly carry important symbolic significance. However, even in terms of form and official designation, this summit is far from being an epoch-making event comparable to the “Yalta Conference/Agreement.”
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This is because the summit featured neither calls to “overthrow the old order” nor declarations about “establishing a new order.” The main proposals in the joint declaration, including United Nations reform, energy cooperation, an emphasis on national sovereignty and limitations on the functions of international institutions, and nuclear disarmament, are either familiar topics that have been discussed repeatedly or technical and limited issues. They do not constitute a fundamental transformation of the existing order.
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Looking at the realities of the international situation, although the world has indeed experienced considerable turmoil and instability in recent years, particularly with the prevalence of populism and isolationism, these developments have not fundamentally changed the international order established after World War II and during the post-Cold War era. Even as the old order increasingly disintegrates, there is still no clear prospect of a new order being established. Even if the world truly undergoes a fundamental transformation, this summit is neither capable of determining nor reflecting such a transformation. Against this background, even if the power and influence of the “new Big Three” are comparable to those of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, they cannot simply do whatever they wish or radically reshape the world through the efforts of just three individuals.
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Second, although the United States, China, and Russia are major powers, their strength has not reached a level that would allow them to determine the fate of the world without encountering obstacles. Beyond these three countries, the European Union, including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, as well as the United Kingdom, India, Japan, Brazil, and other countries, all possess considerable strength and international influence. If they cooperate, they would be more than capable of preventing the U.S.–China–Russia “Big Three” from monopolizing the international order. Even if the United States, China, and Russia joined forces and managed to suppress resistance from other middle powers, the costs would be enormous, difficult to bear, and far greater than any potential benefits.
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Third, although relations among the United States, China, and Russia currently appear relatively friendly, the three countries still have deep-rooted and clearly visible disagreements and contradictions, as well as a complex triangular relationship. This also means that they cannot possibly establish sufficient mutual trust or cooperate wholeheartedly without significant reservations and obstacles.
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For example, China and the United States are engaged in intense competition and strategic rivalry in economics, technology, international strategy, and many other areas. The U.S.–China trade war, intelligence warfare, and mutual sanctions have not ended because of repeated meetings and friendly relations between the two countries’ leaders. Likewise, the long-standing hostility and rivalry between the United States and Russia have not fundamentally changed simply because Trump and Putin enjoy friendly personal relations. China and Russia also harbor mutual suspicions and seek to use each other for their own purposes, rather than maintaining a friendship free of grievances or genuinely pursuing cooperation “without limits.”
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Fourth, all three countries face serious domestic problems, and their leaders confront numerous internal challenges and risks. They cannot simply act arbitrarily by relying on their authority as the highest leaders.
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In the United States, the midterm elections have just concluded, and Trump’s Republican Party suffered a crushing defeat, losing its majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as several governorships and control of some state legislatures. The Democratic Party has regained control of Congress and received the endorsement of a majority of voters. This means that Trump’s power has diminished, and his policies and measures will face strong resistance from Congress. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party has always had major disagreements with China and Russia over values and is unlikely to support Trump’s policies of rapprochement and friendly relations with the two countries. Trump can no longer determine foreign policy entirely as he wishes. Even if he has a strong desire to reshape international relations, achieving that goal will be difficult, or at least the results will fall far short of his ambitions.
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Although the leaders of Russia and China are authoritarian rulers, they must likewise take into account dissent within their ruling establishments and public dissatisfaction. One of the reasons Putin launched the war against Ukraine was to divert attention from domestic conflicts. As his military campaign has suffered setbacks, potential dissatisfaction within Russia has continued to grow, and the superficial stability maintained through high-pressure repression is unreliable. Chinese leader Xi Jinping faces an economic downturn, deteriorating living conditions, and dissatisfaction within the Communist Party caused by his concentration of power and political purges. His foreign policy has consistently been conservative and focused on maintaining stability, and he has shown little willingness to intervene actively in external affairs.
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Returning to the trilateral summit itself, an examination of its content and achievements also reveals that it was more about form than substance. Its limited practical achievements were concentrated in areas unrelated, or only marginally related, to changing the international landscape. United Nations reform and nuclear nonproliferation are longstanding topics, and this summit is likely to follow the same pattern as previous efforts: grand declarations but few tangible results. Energy cooperation will primarily have economic implications and will not overturn the existing order.
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Only the three countries’ joint criticism and rejection of the International Criminal Court will undermine the rules-based and multilateral international order, but even this impact will be limited. The summit also addressed the Russia–Ukraine war and the Iranian issue, but it offered no novel proposals, and the current stalemates on these two fronts will not change because of the summit.
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In conclusion, this trilateral summit of the top leaders of the United States, China, and Russia certainly carries important significance and will have an impact on the international order. However, it falls far short of overturning the existing international order or determining the future direction of the world. Moreover, given domestic political changes in all three countries, particularly in the United States, as well as the deep-rooted conflicts of interest and multiple contradictions among them, it will be difficult for the United States, China, and Russia to maintain such relatively friendly and actively cooperative relations in a stable and lasting manner. Therefore, this summit should be viewed more rationally and realistically. Its significance should neither be underestimated nor overestimated.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer living in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original article was written in Chinese.)


r/foreignpolicy • • 2d ago

War Is a Business. Regular People Pay the Bill.

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1 Upvotes

I understand that countries have legitimate security concerns. Ukraine has the right to defend itself after Russia invaded, and the situation with Iran has its own complicated history.

But at what point do we admit that endless war is fucking stupid?

Civilians die. Soldiers die. Cities get destroyed. Taxpayers spend billions. Fuel and shipping costs get screwed with.

Meanwhile, somebody is making money.

The U.S. war with Iran alone had already cost more than $47 billion by late October, according to Pentagon estimates, while the Pentagon is simultaneously handing out enormous contracts to replace missiles and weapons depleted by conflicts in Iran and Ukraine.

Ukraine is still seeing thousands of civilian casualties years after Russia's 2022 invasion.

I'm not saying defense companies secretly start wars.

I'm saying the people paying the biggest price usually aren't the people making money from them.

Eventually every war ends somehow.

How many people have to die before everyone finally sits down and figures that shit out?

Make it make sense.


r/foreignpolicy • • 3d ago

Iranian oil tankers are preparing to set sail for their destinations. If the tankers are attacked, oil facilities in the Gulf will be targeted, according to Fars News Agency. Iran is threatening to escalate the current status quo in the Strait of Hormuz, and will attempt to break the U.S. blockade.

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5 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 3d ago

Thesis question

1 Upvotes

Hello! I use a neorealist approach over Turkey at Black Sea ( I need to analyze relations with the main actors US, NATO, UE, Russia - but I don't know what to explain). For exemple I once used neorealism to explain the creation of the state, but now, I don't know how to use it, what to explain. Can you give me some examples of situations I could analyze through neorealism? I thought about the creation of alliances, but I need some exemples at the empirical level. Thank you so much for any help!


r/foreignpolicy • • 3d ago

Strait of Hormuz & Middle East Update: ADNOC vessel struck leaving one crew member missing, IAEA presses for nuclear access, and US expands sanctions

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1 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 3d ago

The Shadow of Yalta Hangs Over Trump’s Summit in China - The New York Times

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1 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 4d ago

We got GTA 6 before Iran got a Nuclear Weapon

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1 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 4d ago

Diversification Push Tests Asia’s Role in Global Economic Diplomacy

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2 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 4d ago

El Arquitecto del Caos: El Hombre que Engañó a Todo un País

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0 Upvotes

With all the media frenzy surrounding the former president's imprisonment, I feel like the true architect of this disaster is being completely overlooked: Miguel Vázquez and his network of power.

I’ve been researching the Prosecutor's Office documents and local press, and the level of organization behind this embezzlement is on another level. It’s not just about linked loans; we’re talking about a "circular repayment" system where they used funds from other companies within the same group to pay off debts, creating a massive illusion of solvency to fool the regulators.

Also, the real impact on everyday people really caught my attention. While there are 27 people indicted (including former bank executives, Central Bank chiefs, and the former president himself), there are still about 87,000 people who haven't recovered their savings. Meanwhile, the IPS funds (the country's pension money) are still in limbo.

I made a video detailing step-by-step how this financial network operated and who is all going down. I’ll leave it down here in case you want to dive deeper into the modus operandi.


r/foreignpolicy • • 4d ago

El Arquitecto del Caos: El Hombre que Engañó a Todo un País

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0 Upvotes

Con el revuelo mediático por la prisión del expresidente, siento que se está pasando por alto al verdadero arquitecto de todo este desastre: Miguel Vázquez y su red de poder.

Estuve investigando los documentos de la Fiscalía y la prensa local, y el nivel de organización del desvío de fondos es de otro nivel. No solo se trata de préstamos vinculados; hablamos de un sistema de "repago circular" donde usaban fondos de otras empresas del mismo grupo para pagar las deudas, creando una ilusión de solvencia.

Además, me llamó mucho la atención el impacto real en la gente: mientras hay 27 personas imputadas (entre exdirectivos del banco, jefes del Banco Central y el propio expresidente), todavía quedan unas 87,000 personas que no han recuperado sus ahorros, y los fondos del IPS (las jubilaciones) siguen en el limbo.

Hice un video detallando paso a paso cómo operaba esta red y quiénes son todos los que están cayendo. Se los dejo por acá abajo por si quieren profundizar en el modus operandi.

¿Ustedes qué opinan? ¿Creen que el sistema de regulación del BCP falló por negligencia o por complicidad?


r/foreignpolicy • • 4d ago

Is the US-Israel war on Iran turning into a ‘frozen conflict’?

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1 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 5d ago

Is Iran Cyber Attacking The US

21 Upvotes

Anyone that knows me knows that I am not one for conspiracies.

Seriously though?

Microsoft, FAA Groundings, Banking glitches, and more. The NSA having complications.

Iran warned the US if we moved more military in their direction they would retaliate. All of this in the same week.

And we all know they can’t reach us other than cyber attacks.

This seemingly not such a coincidence to me comes shortly after over fifty thousand troops and a new aircraft carrier landed in the Middle East.

What are your thoughts?


r/foreignpolicy • • 5d ago

Congress should hold a separate vote on any new funding for the war with Iran

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1 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 5d ago

The Strange Contradiction Behind America's Russian Diesel Deal

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1 Upvotes

I'm still pretty new to making geopolitical content, especially around energy and international relations. I recently made a video about how Ukraine's attacks on Russian refineries, China's tightening fuel exports, and rising diesel prices have created an unusual situation where Trump is giving Putin a second chance, despite years of efforts to isolate Russia.

But as Al Jazeera recently reported, that doesn't mean American traders are willing or obligated to buy Russian diesel. Legal uncertainty remains, and Russia's opportunity may not turn into actual sales. I thought this was an interesting contradiction worth exploring. Hope I managed to share something useful here, and I'd appreciate any feedback or corrections!

Video: https://youtu.be/nrNNHqvkJnU

Article: https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/11/7/why-are-oil-traders-refusing-to-buy-russian-diesel-after-trump-putin-deal


r/foreignpolicy • • 5d ago

New Wave Of Iran War Propaganda From CNN And The New York Times

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0 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 6d ago

Diplomatic Accountability in Question as Bureaucratic Indecision Persists at South Korea’s Foreign Ministry

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1 Upvotes

With recent discussions focusing on the structural pressures and accountability challenges facing MOFA, I wanted to open a discussion here. Do you think these issues are symptomatic of broader organizational strains within South Korea's civil service and diplomatic corps, or are they isolated challenges?

How is this impacting public trust in South Korea's international engagements? Let’s discuss.


r/foreignpolicy • • 6d ago

Iran war live: Third US carrier arrives, Iran says oil tankers hit mines

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1 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 7d ago

Putin demands Finland out of NATO, all troops out of eastern Europe for a Chamberlainesque "Peace for our time" Is Trump Putin's chump?

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0 Upvotes

r/foreignpolicy • • 7d ago

Netanyahu calls Trump daily to urge renewed strikes on Iran - ToI Staff

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7 Upvotes

We have seen a slowdown in direct hits from the US on Iran, and rarefied agressive verbiage from POTUS toward Iran and Houthis.

Are we going toward the end of the war or rather a final disastrous act from Trump on Iran ?