TL;DR: Dragos planted about 2M bait secrets in prompts sent to AI providers. The secrets leaked through breached hosting providers, resellers that log everything and hidden router hops. Leaked AWS keys were used within hours, and ZDR / no-retention flags often didn't stop it. Agents send whatever they can read, so pin your providers, keep real creds away from Hermes and plant canaries.
Ars has a write-up on research by HD Moore at Dragos that's worth reading if you run Hermes on anything other than a local model:
https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/11/a-leaky-ai-supply-chain-is-exposing-secret-user-data-at-an-alarming-rate/
What they did: From July to November they sent about 2 million prompts to AI providers. Each prompt carried one unique bait secret: an AWS key tied to an empty account, an SSH password, a private URL or a git repo reference. When a secret got used, they could tell exactly which hop in the chain leaked it.
What they found:
- Three hosting providers were breached. Attackers were copying requests at the front door, including some that were rejected before a model ever ran.
- Leaked AWS keys got used within hours. Attackers went through S3 and Secrets Manager, tried to turn on Bedrock and created their own IAM users to keep access. In the biggest breach, one key was still in use three weeks later.
- Some marketplace sellers simply logged everything. No exploit needed. Some of the cheap capacity on reseller marketplaces is literally paid for with stolen keys.
- Routers had hidden hops. One router was quietly forwarding to a marketplace, and one route went through an OpenRouter hop nobody had mentioned.
- ZDR / "no data collection" flags didn't help much. A scraper run by a Chinese AI lab fetched secret URLs from more than half of the prompts sent to its models, including about two-thirds of the ones flagged no-retention. It did this even when the model was resold by a US host. Dragos sums it up as: a privacy flag only binds the first hop.
Why this matters more for agents than for chat: a Hermes agent with terminal and file tools doesn't just send your question. It sends whatever it reads: command output, config files, `.env` contents, internal hostnames, repo URLs. The report points this out directly: agents will send any credentials they can read.
What I'm changing in my setup:
- Pick providers explicitly. Don't let a router choose for you. If you use OpenRouter, pin your upstream providers and check that the privacy settings actually change routing.
- Go direct to first-party APIs where possible, or run local models (vLLM, llama.cpp, Ollama) for anything that touches real infra.
- Avoid sketchy cheap resellers behind custom OpenAI-compatible endpoints. If the price is too good to be true, your prompts may be the product.
- Keep real secrets out of what the agent can read. Run Hermes as a dedicated non-root user, use scoped or short-lived creds, and don't give it your main AWS profile.
- Plant canaries yourself. Drop a Thinkst Canarytoken (a fake AWS key, a fake URL) into the agent's workspace or memory and treat any hit as an incident.
Is anyone here already running canaries in their agent context, or routing everything to local models? I'm curious what setups people have landed on, especially for multi-agent / gateway setups (Telegram etc.) where you don't see every prompt the agent sends.
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Note: English isn't my first language, so I used Claude (AI) to help me write this post. The setup changes and the questions are my own.