r/netsec • • 20h ago Mindblown

Contains AI Researchers planted secrets in 2 million AI inference requests and caught third parties accessing canary URLs and using AWS credentials

Thumbnail dragos.com
776 Upvotes

TL;DR:

HD Moore and the Dragos research team published some fascinating research.

They planted canary tokens in nearly 2 million AI inference requests and caught third parties accessing secret URLs, attackers using stolen AWS credentials, and requests being routed through undisclosed AI providers.

OpenRouter also reported suspicious activity involving MiniMax models, where canary URLs embedded in prompts were accessed 40–130 hours after submission, including requests marked as Zero Data Retention.

Full research: https://www.dragos.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-security-canary-tokens


r/netsec • • 2d ago

Crafting Targeted MP4 Fuzzers

Thumbnail atredis.com
44 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 3d ago

Contains AI BOSSAI: a single operator’s 12-agent AI attack mesh that hit Taiwan’s emergency services (and 10 other countries)

Thumbnail acronis.com
56 Upvotes

Our Threat Research Unit tracked down a lone operator in Taiwan running a mesh of 12 AI agents - some abliterated/uncensored, some commercial - to conduct offensive campaigns across 11 countries. A few things that make this one stand out:

  • The operator built specialized agent roles: builders (Grok, Claude Code, Codex) handled infrastructure, while attackers (mainly an agent called Hermes, plus Cursor and others) scanned targets and ran exploits - all stitched together via 13 MCP servers wrapping tools like Kali, Ghidra, and sqlmap
  • Confirmed breaches hit universities and emergency-services systems, with exfiltrated medical data and PII - including a Taipei fire department’s patient-care records (ECG data, ambulance video, vitals) and a city’s 119 dispatch case records
  • Commercial models (Grok 4.5, MiniMax M3) consistently refused offensive requests and even lectured the operator on Computer Crime Act violations - forcing a pivot to locally-run abliterated models (DeepSeek, GLM, Qwen variants) for actual attack execution
  • The “offensive” models weren’t reliable either - one scanner hallucinated a critical RCE that didn’t exist, and over half of its high/critical findings turned out to be false positives
  • Weak OPSEC (reused branding, hardcoded API keys, a shared home IP hosting the attacker’s own legitimate side businesses) let TRU trace the whole operation back to a specific individual in Hualien City, Taiwan

This case is a clear example of what’s being classified as an “AI-augmented threat” (AAT), not quite a traditional APT, but a single person achieving APT-like reach across government, military, financial, and emergency-services targets by orchestrating AI agents instead of a human team.

Full writeup with the MCP toolchain breakdown, model-by-model refusal/jailbreak analysis, and IOCs is available here - https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/bossai-inside-the-ai-attack-mesh-that-targeted-taiwans-emergency-services/


r/netsec • • 3d ago

Contains AI Microsoft saw an AI offensive framework move from a public GitHub secret to Key Vault data in five minutes

Thumbnail microsoft.com
128 Upvotes

Microsoft’s report describes ARTEX being used for more than automated reconnaissance. The framework searched public repositories for cloud and AI-service credentials, authenticated as application identities, mapped Azure resources and retrieved additional secrets.

Failed API requests were followed within seconds by corrected methods or API versions. In at least one observed case, an agent moved from finding an application secret on GitHub to extracting Azure Key Vault data in five minutes.

The practical problem is less a new exploit than the speed at which a leaked credential can now be discovered, understood and used across connected services.


r/netsec • • 3d ago

The AI Repo Man: Exploiting Agentic AI Debt Collection Platforms

Thumbnail eaton-works.com
16 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 4d ago

Contains AI Java4Shell: Write once, RCE everywhere

Thumbnail calif.io
135 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 4d ago

Phrack #73 is out

Thumbnail phrack.org
148 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 4d ago

Ethersphere postmortem: bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 shipped the same loader via a compromised release bot

Thumbnail ethswarm.org
4 Upvotes

npm pulled bee-js@13.3.0 about 75 minutes after it was published. The same release bot had also shipped Swarm Desktop v0.56.2, and that build stayed the latest GitHub release for nearly eight more hours. Its macOS build was signed and notarized under the project's own Developer ID. I found it by following the bot's identity across the org instead of stopping at the npm package. At 03:26 UTC I posted the release, the commit, the loader and a containment list in the triage thread: https://github.com/ethersphere/bee-js/issues/1295#issuecomment-6731497299


r/netsec • • 4d ago

Introducing ForgePtr (CVE-2026-47501): from unprivileged process (neighbor) to root on the host (landlord) for GPU clouds...

Thumbnail stealthium.io
13 Upvotes

It's an NVIDIA GPU Driver LPE. (Not connected to infidelity or nation state honey-potting of tech execs)

It's scored as CVSS 7.8, a “local” bug. We think it's worthwhile though considering LPEs in light of neoclouds / rentable sliced GPUs. After all, in a multi-tenanted environment, local means everyone paying to be there.

In our write up we also walk through how configs can be neutered, including Secure Boot.

TLDR - the bug allows attackers are to rent their way to accessing someone else’s production AI on vulnerable drivers.

The bug's been in the open-source driver for 4+ years, though is now patched following our responsible vulnerability disclosure process. Big thanks to the NVIDIA PSIRT team.


r/netsec • • 5d ago

Sign2Shell: How We Hacked Every Major Brazilian Signature Extension

Thumbnail amibeingpwned.com
45 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 5d ago

Discussion Glasswing overwhelms maintainers with underwhelming findings (VulnCheck)

Thumbnail lwn.net
84 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 9d ago

OWASP Top 10 Neocloud and AI Data Center Security Risks project released

Thumbnail owasp.org
84 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 9d ago

Contains AI NvRoot (CVE-2026-47591) where in neocloud multi-tenant GPU environments, rent = root. Essentially it's a dirty page cache LPE using GPUs as catalyzer

Thumbnail stealthium.io
21 Upvotes

From unprivileged user to root. Most dangerous for those renting multi-tenanted GPU from a neocloud.

Fixed versions: NvRoot in 610.57.04 / 595.91.07 / 580.178.04

no sysctl or seccomp workaround.

Disclaimer: I work at Stealthium, alongside the team that found these. Happy to answer questions on exposure


r/netsec • • 10d ago

prepared statements prevents SQLi. But it also helped me to exploit a 22 years old PostgreSQL 0-day RCE (CVE-2026-6460)

Thumbnail mehmetince.net
54 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 10d ago

Contains AI How we defended against an AI-driven ARTEX attack

Thumbnail labs.eye.security
42 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 10d ago

History of Password Cracking

Thumbnail netmux.com
42 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 11d ago

ScriptBlock Smuggling - AMSI Evasion

Thumbnail ipurple.team
11 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 11d ago

2.4% of AFRINIC’s IPv4 addresses answer from outside Africa, and about 81% of those sit in one company’s four blocks

Thumbnail ipinfo.io
125 Upvotes

I work at IPinfo and this one started with a simple question: if a registry says an address is African, is it actually in Africa?

This started as work for a paper by our research team (WHEREIS, IMC 2026). We tested it with ping times. Light in fiber only travels so far in a millisecond, so a fast reply puts a hard limit on how far away an address can be.

Most registries pass, but AFRINIC is the exception: 2.4% of the addresses we could measure answer from outside Africa. And about 81% of those are in just four blocks, held by one company.

What surprised me most while writing this is that the registries’ own files still list 98.6% of them as African. So anything that blocks or allows traffic by registry country gets these wrong.

The numbers are a minimum, and anycast is left out.


r/netsec • • 11d ago

New Kimsuki (APT-43) active infrastructure and campaign discovered

Thumbnail stormshield.com
2 Upvotes

Stormshield's Cyber Threat Intelligence team has uncovered the Trigram campaign, targeting the AI, blockchain, and logistics sectors across Europe and the United States.

  • The Bait: Threat actors impersonate 50 companies using fake job offers, invitations, and package tracking notifications to deliver an infostealer to victims.
  • Behind the Scenes: A dedicated platform enables the attackers to track the entire operation end-to-end, from the initial click to credential theft.

By correlating this data with research from Proofpoint, SafeDep and Genians, Stormshield attributes this campaign with high confidence to North Korea, as a continuation of the UNK_DeadDrop cluster and the Kimsuky group (APT-43).


r/netsec • • 11d ago

Supabase Security findings why RLS is only 25% of the issues

Thumbnail oneleet.com
6 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 11d ago

Cracking Server 2022 NTLMv1-SSP Hashes with Rainbow Tables

Thumbnail hunio.org
37 Upvotes

A while back, I had released a blog showing that NTLMv1 downgrade attacks still work on Windows Server 2022! While it isn't a default setting, it's still a misconfiguration to potentially look for.

If a DC’s LmCompatibilityLevel is set to 0-2, you can coerce authentication, strip Extended Session Security (ESS), and obtain an NTLMv1-SSP hash that’s crackable with a rainbow table. :)

Blog: https://hunio.org/security/ntlmv1-ssp-cracking/


r/netsec • • 12d ago

Kubernetes Non-Core Security Audit

Thumbnail shielder.com
15 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 12d ago

Electron, we have a problem

Thumbnail schaerli.org
55 Upvotes

Many Electron apps auto-update without verifying signatures. Many also still trust the compromised eMudhra certificates. Together, that lets an attacker on your network install malware on your machine.

I've compiled a list of notable Electron apps, installed them in a lab, and test which still trust the eMudhra certs, compared to whether they verify update signatures.

You can find the full table of apps on my post.


r/netsec • • 12d ago

IP snowshoeing under US .gov email via a whitelisted AmazonSES typo in SPF

Thumbnail sh.consulting
195 Upvotes

UPDATE: Livingston County, MI, has removed amzonses[.]com from its SPF record. It had been there since at least November 2023, and when we checked, it authorized 32,066 IPs to send email as milivcounty[.]gov Since our research on US government domains went public, several government organizations have made changes to their DNS. The City of Waynesboro, TN has fixed the typo in its MX record, and the private company’s homepage served under woosterar[.]gov has been taken down. The Alabama Legislature looks to have a fix in progress too.

I run a small email security consultancy and this is our research.

A typo of AmazonSES in US government DNS whitelisted 32,066 IPs to pass DMARC p=quarantine as milivcounty[.]gov, with the IP set rotating every 3-8 days.

Attackers are snowshoeing the IPs, and once they get listed by Abusix and Spamhaus, they rotate the SPF include chain.

Other AmazonSES typos in gov SPF are amasonses[.]com under pikevilleky[.]gov and amazones[.]com under townofkirkwood[.]gov.

There are also 40 other US Gov domains with dangling & abused NS (domain takeover), MX (mail interception), and DMARC (telemetry hijack) records.

Our team has registered 17 of these typos and expired domains, including one that had been in use for 20 years and only expired in August.

DNS vulnerabilities have been around for decades, but many US government orgs decided to skip the security guardrails when they had the chance, and now those old gaps are being exploited by the same technologies they missed.