r/threatintel • • Aug 11 '24

Official CTI Discord Community

26 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

Exciting news for our community on reddit, in collaboration with r/CTI (thanks to u/SirEliasRiddle for his hard in work in setting this up for all of us).

We're launching a brand new Discord server dedicated to Cyber Threat Intelligence. It's a space for sharing content, news, resources, and engaging in discussions with others in the cybersecurity world. Since the community is still in its early stages, it might not have all the features yet but we're eager to hear your suggestions and feedback. This includes criticisms.

Feel free to join us and share the link with friends!

Discord Link


r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Part 3: I sent the proxy company a right-of-reply email. Their replies told me more than my OSINT did.

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1 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Free holiday themed CTF hosted by Flare

0 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

We're running a free holiday themed CTF that we thought this community might enjoy. 

It's four weekly challenges: featuring a house full of traps, and a couple of bandits who picked the wrong house. Solvers get a chance to win limited-edition shirts!

We've run CTFs before, including one with WiCyS and SANS, and a D&D-themed one we self-hosted last year. 

Keep an eye on our LinkedIn, or join flare.io/community for early access to all the challenges when they drop.

Happy to answer questions in the comments!


r/threatintel • • 1d ago

CVE-2026-125283 · NGINX Plus : priorité moyenne (43/100)

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2 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Zero-Import Persistence: How Malicious Python .pth Files Hijack Every Interpreter Launch

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1 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 2d ago

Free self-hostable CTI ticker

12 Upvotes

Long-ish time lurker, first time poster.

I originally maintained a git-based daily CTI report that would spit out a daily digest to my inbox, but lately that hasn't been very reliable since the internet decides to be on fire constantly rather than on a neat schedule. So I started dabbling and built a thing to get updates in a more timely fashion.

It's a lightweight Python collector that runs on a free-tier cloud VM and uses Apprise to push clean headlines to Discord channels (not limited to Discord, that's just where I decided to put it).

What It Does

  • Broad Clearnet Coverage (~60 Sources): Combines structured feeds (CISA KEV JSON, Ransomware.live, CISA Advisories, CERT/CC, Exploit-DB), major vendor PSIRTs (MSRC, Cisco, Palo Alto, Fortinet, SonicWall, ZDI, Red Hat), threat research labs (Mandiant/Google Cloud TI, Project Zero, Unit 42, Talos, SentinelLabs, Elastic, DFIR Report, Huntress, watchTowr, etc.), international CERTs (CERT-EU, UK NCSC, JPCERT, ACSC, CCCS), and breaking security newsrooms.
  • Inline CVE Enrichment: Automatically extracts CVE-YYYY-NNNN IDs from incoming headlines, checks them against a local cache of the CISA KEV catalog, and queries the FIRST EPSS API so you immediately see 🚨 IN CISA KEV and exploitation probability badges without clicking through.
  • Dynamic Keyword & Escalation Routing (keywords.json): High-signal matches (KEV CVEs, high EPSS scores, or active-exploitation keywords—with exclusion filters so monthly Patch Tuesday roundups don't trigger false alarms) get automatically cross-posted to a dedicated #active-exploitation channel.
  • Two-Tier Deduplication: Tracks seen item IDs in SQLite and uses channel-scoped token/CVE similarity over a 36-hour window so when six news outlets cover the same breach in #firehose, you only see it once—while primary vendor advisories in #vendor-psirts-vulns still post normally.
  • Built-In Feed Health Monitoring: Tracks consecutive HTTP/XML failures per source in SQLite, alerts a #bot-status channel after 3 consecutive failures (and when it recovers), and sends a daily health digest.

Tech Stack

  • Python + uv for reproducible dependency management
  • curl_cffi + feedparser for RSS/Atom/JSON ingestion
  • SQLite for state, deduplication, and feed health tracking
  • Apprise for notification delivery (currently wired to Discord webhooks, easily swappable to Slack, Telegram, Pushover, email, etc.)

Repo: https://github.com/AlbusNoir/cti-monitor


r/threatintel • • 3d ago

Help/Question I built a 10 sensor honeypot network for my master's thesis: 13,458,093 events in 141 days

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167 Upvotes

Hi. For my master's thesis (Big Data) I built a distributed honeypot platform and I've been collecting data for 141 days. I'm not posting the full report, but I wanted to show what it does and how it differs from running a single honeypot and reading the logs.

How it's built

  • 10 active sensors: India (Conpot), USA (Cowrie), Spain (Cowrie), Spain (Dionaea), India (Dionaea), USA (Dionaea), Singapore, United States, Sweden and Spain.
  • One more already retired, its data is still in the history.
  • Decoy types: low interaction with 20 emulated services, Cowrie for SSH and Telnet and Dionaea to capture malware.
  • Specialised decoys: ADBHoney (Android debug port), Conpot (industrial systems) and DDoSPot (attempts to use the sensor to amplify DDoS).
  • My own web honeypot that keeps the whole request, POST body included.
  • Suricata as IDS on the sensor I run at home.
  • p0f on the sensors to work out the operating system of whoever connects, without sending them anything.
  • Everything lands in a central PostgreSQL database.

The numbers

  • 13,458,093 events between 2026-07-01 and 2026-11-18.
  • 105,575 unique source IPs, 5,420 of them over IPv6.
  • Top source countries: United States, China, United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Ukraine.
  • 557,689 web requests to 25,572 distinct paths, 30.9% of them over HTTPS.
  • 525 unique malware samples captured.

What makes it different

  1. Cross sensor correlation. A single honeypot only sees noise. With several at once you can see who goes after all of them. 22.6% of the IPs hit more than one sensor and 15 reached 11 different sensors. Also, 17,060 IPs went through more than one decoy type.
  2. How long an attacking IP lasts. 74.1% of the IPs attack on a single day and after 30 days only 17.9% are still active. A blocklist without expiry ends up full of addresses nobody uses anymore. 54.9% of the IPs that hit me in the last 30 days are not on any of these public lists: Feodo Tracker, IPsum and Spamhaus DROP. Of those that did end up on a list, my sensors saw 98.6% first, with a median head start of 31 days.
  3. Who is on the other side. p0f looks at the first packet of each connection and guesses the operating system. 31.1% of the IPs don't use a normal TCP stack: they are scanners like masscan or zmap crafting packets by hand. 1,267 IPs come through a tunnel or VPN, judging by packet size. On SSH, 188,487 sessions fit into just 101 distinct HASSH fingerprints, and the top 10 cover 98.0%. Behind thousands of IPs there are very few tools.
  4. What they look for on the web. For every HTTP and HTTPS request I keep method, path, headers, User-Agent and Host, and on my own web honeypot the body too. What most IPs look for, in order: root, robots.txt, favicon; secrets and backups (.env, .git, dumps); admin panels and VPN portals. 1,016 IPs tried to use the sensor as an open proxy. 63.3% of the IPs claim to be a browser; the rest identify as scripts, scanners or bots.
  5. WordPress. There is no real WordPress and still 888 IPs went looking for it. Most common, in order: recon (wp-includes, readme…); vulnerable plugins and themes; stealing wp-config.php backups. Since the web honeypot keeps the POST body, I can see 3,224 login attempts with a password against wp-login.php from 61 IPs. 8 requests to xmlrpc.php use system.multicall to try many passwords in a single call.
  6. Credential campaigns. 27,025 username/password pairs were tried on 3 or more sensors. The most widespread, admin / admin, shows up on 10. That's the fingerprint of the same dictionary being thrown at the whole internet.
  7. CVEs on real traffic. So far 229 distinct CVEs detected, 99 of them in the CISA KEV catalog (the ones being exploited for real). Suricata is just one of the sources: a nuclei-templates catalog (182 CVEs), Suricata (31 CVEs), suricata+nuclei (12 CVEs), sigma (11 CVEs), my own signatures (10 CVEs), sigma+nuclei (6 CVEs), curada+sigma (4 CVEs), curada+sigma+nuclei (4 CVEs), curada+nuclei (2 CVEs), suricata+curada (2 CVEs), native honeypot detection (1 CVE), suricata+sigma+nuclei (1 CVE), suricata+curada+nuclei (1 CVE), suricata+curada+sigma (1 CVE), suricata+curada+sigma+nuclei (1 CVE) and suricata+sigma (1 CVE). They are searched in HTTP requests, HTTPS requests, my own web honeypot, Suricata alerts, elastic, Cowrie commands and adbhoney. Of the 8 CVEs published after capture started, the first attempt arrived a median of 32 days after publication. In 6 cases the sensors saw the attack before CISA added it to KEV, a median of 20 days earlier.
  8. What they do once inside. In Cowrie, out of 711,133 sessions, 612,610 got in, 519,931 ran commands and 13,831 tried to download something.
  9. Own indicators, not copied. Commands and downloads give me 88 servers handing out malware, 4 SSH keys left as a backdoor and 525 distinct malicious files. 84.4% of the servers with an IP are not on any public list.
  10. Specialised decoys. ADBHoney, 8,231 connections to the Android debug port from 924 IPs. Conpot got 17,347 events from 5,150 IPs looking for industrial systems. DDoSPot logged 196,949 attempts to use the sensor as a DDoS amplifier. Those source IPs are the spoofed victims, so they don't count as attackers anywhere else.

Under the hood

  • Python ingestion into PostgreSQL every 5 minutes, with content based deduplication.
  • CVE detection with my own signatures plus a catalog built from nuclei-templates, enriched with CISA KEV, EPSS and NVD dates.
  • Unsupervised ML: attacker clustering, Isolation Forest for the odd ones and botnet families grouped by the password dictionary they use.
  • MITRE ATT&CK mapping and an IP, ASN and CVE community graph.
  • A natural language copilot over the database running on a local LLM (Ollama). The data never leaves my network.
  • PHP web dashboard with Chart.js.

Criticism and ideas welcome. If you'd like to see a specific analysis, I can pull it out.


r/threatintel • • 3d ago

Immediately patch nginx servers

8 Upvotes

Critical vulnerability nginx2root went live today shared by Xint Research.

A Xint researcher found the specific vuln that hits nginx in its default config. This discovery was around the same time he found another critical vulnerability in a different project that we cannot talk about yet due to the same concerns as nginx2root. We took those learnings and incorporated them into the harness as a new, general Xint feature (that is, not fine-tuned to nginx), which then found the other 4 critical nginx vulnerabilities with no human guidance.

Remediation steps and more info at https://nginx2root.com/


r/threatintel • • 3d ago

Help/Question Feedback on potential master thesis?

3 Upvotes

Hey all, i'm currently in my last year of my master's degree in cybersecurity and I needed to think of a thesis topic, i'm planning to do it at a company and I'd appreciate some feedback if what I had in mind could actually be useful to people who specialize in CTI.

So I had multiple topics in mind that I discussed with my professor but one stuck out to me the most mostly because LLMs are basically everywhere right now and I feel like what I chose is basically an evolution of what I did for my bachelor's thesis, anyways the concept is:

I want to see if an on prem LLM (preferably open weight) can digest CTI reports and (after deterministically extracting indicators from reports) accurately create STIX 2.1 bundles, the pipeline I would eventually create (should) fill STIX object properties, resolve actor aliases against existing knowledge bases, create a document about what each report adds, and of course be able to be steered by analysts that can correct it anytime.

Of course my research would cover how well it compares to classical BERT, normal prompting, RAG and LoRA or QLoRA (if I have the time).

Other topics that I had in mind but didnt stick out to me as much would be:

Researching the quality, overlap and decay of threat-intelligence feeds, the end goal would be to get a per-source and per-type decay analysis to get a "too old", "untrusted" or "actionable" categories.

OR

Researching about indirect prompt ingestion for CTI reports, a determined actor can potentially flood thousands of slop reports that could sneak attacks in there, end goal would be creating something at the data ingestion stage that can detect it, and just seeing if there's anyone actually doing it currently.

Only have an internship under my belt so if someone who has some experience in the field can tell me if any of these topics could be actually useful or just interesting in general to people who actually work in CTI would help me out immensely.


r/threatintel • • 3d ago

APT/Threat Actor Follow-up to our North Korean IT-worker research: the other side of it is recruiters asking real employees to lend their identity

9 Upvotes

Between October 3 and November 6, 2026, we found eight North Korea-linked operators emailing roughly 38 employees at 13 organizations we monitor. They weren’t applying for jobs this time. They were the recruiters.

The pitch was the same in every version. Create an account on an AI-training platform. Complete the identity verification yourself. An offshore team does the actual work under that account, and you keep a share. The platforms named were DataAnnotation, Outlier, Handshake AI, Mercor, Snorkel, and AfterQuery. They’re legitimate platforms, and they aren’t the problem here. One email opened with ‘What if you could earn money even while you’re asleep?’ One recruiter put the whole arrangement as ‘You can just make the accounts and allow me to work on that.’

The packaging changed from sender to sender. Some promised $8,000 or $10,000 a month, with the recipient keeping 30% to 50%. One introduced himself as a senior full-stack and AI engineer in Singapore looking for a long-term collaborator. Another said his previous AI-training account was no longer active and he needed help getting access to new opportunities.

Some emails linked a Google Doc titled ‘Flexible Side-Income Opportunity.’ It read like an ordinary business proposal, with a team introduction, a list of platforms, earnings screenshots, a privacy policy, 30% of project revenue, a $150 monthly minimum, and a $50 referral bonus. It also explained why they needed someone: many of these platforms mainly accept US-based individuals and verify identity through services like Persona. Then it said ‘That’s why we’re seeking your collaboration.’ It laid out the split. The team finds the projects, prepares the applications, and does the work. The recruit creates the accounts and completes verification.

Nobody was asked for a password or a passport. The messages told people not to share those directly. They were asked to complete the verification themselves. If an identity can’t get past verification on its own, convince its owner to do that part.

We’ve been tracking North Korea-linked fake applicants, and fake identities are already central to that scheme. We can’t say from the emails alone what these accounts were used for. What they show is what recruiting real people to provide access to their identities can look like, and it may be one way operators source them.

If a version of this pitch has landed in your organization, what did it look like, and did anyone report it?


r/threatintel • • 3d ago

APT/Threat Actor Inside a Russian-speaking credential-theft operation: 603 implants, US bank and federal identity loot, one exposed directory

1 Upvotes

Hunt researchers got a full view of this one because the operator left the loot and tasking store exposed on a Netherlands VPS (145.63.138[.]67, Podaon SIA).

Scope: 603 implants across 469 hostnames over a 27-day window (12 Oct to 8 Nov 2026), processed through three custom C2 components on a single box. The stolen data is the better signal than the beacon geography, which is hidden behind Cloudflare. At least 57 victims hold a US bank or government login and at least 46 hold a US federal identity account, with ID.me on roughly 20 and Login.gov on roughly 19, which are the way in to IRS, SSA and VA. Chase shows up in 31 victim datasets, Capital One in 20, Citi in 17, Wells Fargo in 15.

Attribution is hedged but consistent: Russian-language comments, docstrings and full operational log prose throughout 249 files, written for the operator's own use. The toolchain also targets 35 AI developer products and 44 crypto platforms.

Full campaign scope and IOCs: https://hunt.io/blog/us-bank-irs-ssa-logins-stolen-russian-speaking-operator


r/threatintel • • 3d ago

Project Zero has cut its disclosure deadline from 90 days to 30

1 Upvotes

That 90-day window was set based on how long it reasonably took a human researcher to go from bug to working exploit. Google is saying that assumption no longer holds, because of AI-assisted exploit development.

Vendor patch cadences, internal vulnerability SLAs and the common "we'll fix it next release" habit were all built on the assumption that 90 days was generous enough. It wasn't generous, but it was something teams could work within.

30 days is going to break a lot of patching processes that were already running close to the old deadline, and that needed to happen. Some might say that 30 days is even too long.

What do you think?


r/threatintel • • 4d ago

Open-source phishing and email header analyzer that runs 100% client-side via WebAssembly: SPF/DKIM/DMARC, HTML smuggling, .msg support, STIX/MISP export

2 Upvotes

Most online email header analyzers want you to paste the message into someone else’s server. For phishing triage that’s awkward: the headers contain internal hostnames, employee addresses and sometimes the whole message.

So I built ESHA (Email Security Header Analyzer). The analysis engine is Python running in your browser through Pyodide (WebAssembly). There’s no backend. The page has a CSP with connect-src 'self', so it can’t contact any other server, and you can check in DevTools → Network that nothing is sent when you analyze a message.

Live: https://0xanalyst.github.io/email-security-header-analyzer/
Source (GPL-3.0): https://github.com/0xAnalyst/email-security-header-analyzer

What it does

  • Paste headers, or drop an .eml or Outlook .msg file
  • SPF / DKIM / DMARC / ARC from the receiving server’s Authentication-Results, plus a domain alignment table: From vs envelope sender vs DKIM d= vs Return-Path vs Reply-To vs HELO
  • Relay route hop by hop, with each hop’s delay; the slowest hop is marked in red (like Microsoft’s MHA) and Created vs Delivered time are shown. Clock skew is handled without reporting a fake 24-hour delay.
  • Look-alike domains (typos, Cyrillic/Greek homoglyphs, punycode) and cousin domains of the sender’s own org in Reply-To and links (classic invoice and payroll fraud)
  • Recognises SendGrid, Mailchimp, SES, Mailgun, SFMC and others, so “SPF passed for sendgrid.net” is explained instead of flagged. When DMARC fails, it tells you why that pass is meaningless.

Newer phishing techniques it checks (static parsing only, nothing is opened or run)

  • HTML smuggling in HTML/SVG attachments (atob, Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, large base64 blobs)
  • Password-protected and nested ZIPs, and ISO images hiding .lnk or .exe files (it reads the ISO 9660 directory, it doesn’t extract)
  • QR-code phishing (detects image-only or “scan this code” messages; doesn’t decode the QR)
  • Calendar-invite phishing, fake “RE:” replies, and thread hijacking from look-alike domains
  • DKIM signatures that don’t sign From or use l=, and BIMI headers on mail that fails DMARC

For the analyst workflow

  • Every finding has a stable rule ID, a “what to do” note and a MITRE ATT&CK mapping
  • IOC tab with defanged values; export as CSV, JSON, STIX 2.1 or a MISP event (only suspicious items get to_ids or become STIX indicators, so SendGrid doesn’t end up on a blocklist)
  • A self-contained HTML report for tickets (no scripts, links defanged)
  • It also runs locally (./run.sh, Docker) with a CLI and JSON API, e.g. esha analyze mail.msg -f stix -o bundle.json

Limitations, so nobody is surprised

  • The risk score is heuristic. It’s for triage, not proof.
  • No DNS, WHOIS or reputation lookups. That’s deliberate, to keep it offline. An opt-in enrichment mode for the local version is planned.
  • The bundled GeoLite2 country data is old; you can update it locally with a free MaxMind key.
  • RTF-only .msg bodies aren’t decoded, and RAR/7z contents aren’t fully listed.
  • The first visit downloads about 14 MB (the Python runtime); after that it’s cached.

I tested it against a set of legitimate newsletters, receipts, calendar invites and mailing-list posts that all have to score “low”. False positives are what I most want to hear about. If it flags a legitimate message from your environment, or misses something obvious, please open an issue (with sanitized headers).

It started from the open-source MHA project by lnxg33k and has been mostly rewritten since. Feedback welcome.


r/threatintel • • 4d ago

Any Reccomendation Regarding Threat Hunting Tools ?

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2 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 4d ago

APT/Threat Actor WhiteArmor: a 3-week-old extortion crew has already hit Maersk, J.B. Hunt, Ryder and Echo, and is openly recruiting insiders for Okta/VPN/Jenkins access

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13 Upvotes

We’ve been tracking WhiteArmor since its leak site appeared on 20 October. In about three weeks it has named 17 victims, with an unusual concentration in transportation and logistics: Maersk (which has confirmed a breach of an acquired legacy system), J.B. Hunt (disclosed, now facing class actions), Ryder, and Echo Global Logistics, all claimed inside a 15-day window.

The more interesting artifact is a recruitment post the group calls “Project Trojan Horse.” Rather than just leaking data, it openly solicits initial-access brokers and insiders and names exactly what it wants: Okta, Azure, IAM, Jenkins, and VPN appliances (Fortinet, AnyConnect, Citrix, SonicWall). It sets a $500M revenue floor for targets and excludes the CIS region. Effectively a published targeting spec.

Most of the 17 are still unverified leak-site claims (only Maersk and J.B. Hunt have public corroboration), but the access list is a useful hardening checklist regardless: identity platforms, CI/CD, and VPN gateways, plus stale credentials in acquired or legacy environments.

Full write-up with the victim breakdown and demand amounts (disclosure: this is our own tracking data): https://darkwebsonar.io/blog/dark-web-most-wanted-2026-whitearmor/

Happy to answer questions on the telemetry.


r/threatintel • • 4d ago

Quick intel briefing regarding the Optimizely incident

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8 Upvotes

This is a brief sent to current users of freecti.org, sharing here for a quick rundown for everyone since Free CTI's AI already collated and merged info from multiple sources.


r/threatintel • • 4d ago

Optimizely malware hit 178 major sites (Zoom, BBC, HSBC). Only 15% had a CSP that stopped it. A breakdown of what worked and what didn't

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4 Upvotes

Quick summary for anyone who missed it:

On 16 November an attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web (an A/B testing tool) and added code to customers' "Project JavaScript" field. Optimizely's own CDN then served it to every page on 178 organisations' sites for most of the day, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, HSBC, Equifax, Salesforce, GitLab and IKEA.

The payload:
\- swapped crypto wallet addresses on the page and clipboard
\- skimmed card number, expiry and CVV from sites' own payment forms (hosted payment iframes were out of reach)
\- grabbed non-HttpOnly cookies and html2canvas screenshots
\- served the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits to older iOS versions

About $7,040 in crypto hit the attacker's wallets. The number of cards taken is unknown.

The CSP findings are the bit I think most web teams should look at:
\- 68 affected sites had no CSP at all
\- 50 had a CSP that let the payload run and send data out
\- 17 let it run but blocked the data leaving, thanks to connect-src
\- 24 (15%) blocked it completely

Allow-listing cdn.optimizely.com did nothing, because that's where the malware came from. 'unsafe-eval' let an inline fallback copy run at HSBC even though the attacker's domain was blocked. A tight connect-src was the setting that actually stopped the theft.

Curious how others handle this. Do you run CSP in enforce mode with vendors like Optimizely or tag managers, or have you given up and gone report-only?


r/threatintel • • 4d ago

Optimizely Experimentation compromise: loader served from Optimizely’s CDN to visitors of 178 orgs (wallet swapping, card skimming, iOS exploit kits

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1 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 4d ago

🔎 HOW TO CHECK IF YOUR WEBSITE IS VULNERABLE If your organisation uses Optimizely Web Experimentation

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0 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 5d ago

Part 2: The FBI seized their network. Three weeks earlier, their proxyware had already moved into a new app.

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1 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 5d ago

Help/Question security topics worth discussing with the company wide employees during this dark times

1 Upvotes

There is just a lot going on in the cyber space kindly advise


r/threatintel • • 5d ago

Help/Question Can agent swarms work from stale evidence?

1 Upvotes

Only just realised this could be an issue.

We were discussing agent swarms in SecOps, with one agent testing controls and another reviewing SIEM detections. The idea was to let them run overnight and check the results later. CrowdStrike's SOC agents and Cymulate Cowork's agent squads for security testing got me thinking about what happens when things change mid-run:

  • first agent runs an attack test
  • someone updates the SIEM rule
  • next agent reviews the old result

The result made sense when the test ran, but the rule has changed. Now the swarm could report a detection gap that's already been fixed. I assume there's some way to catch stale results, but what if a rule changes halfway through and nobody kicks off a new test? Has anyone run into this with agents handing work back and forth?


r/threatintel • • 5d ago

Threat eMail Database

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1 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 5d ago

ARTEX Traffic - Previdian Threat Intelligence Report November 2026

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5 Upvotes