Empyrean Technology, China's top maker of chip-design software, said profit almost tripled in the first nine months of 2026. Net profit for those nine months came to about 27 million yuan, up 197% from a year earlier. It reported on November 9.
The bull case is simple. US rules keep Western chip-design software out of China, so Chinese chipmakers have one real place to go. If that door stays shut, growth like this can keep coming, even if Empyrean's software still lags what it replaced.
The bear case is about the base. The company's own numbers show a net loss for the first half of 2026, and R&D spending has been eating most of its revenue. A 197% jump off a loss or a near-zero number isn't the same as a 197% jump off a healthy profit. The margin behind the headline is still thin.
There's a newer wrinkle too. Two other Chinese chip-design software firms just merged into a state-backed platform called Xinyusi. The "only tool in town" story needs there to be only one tool. That stopped being clearly true the same month.
It's also a different bet from SMIC or NAURA. A software firm's margin depends on what it spends building the product, not on how full a factory is. All three ride the same push to replace foreign suppliers, but the risks underneath aren't the same.
What would really break the bull case is two quarters in a row of shrinking revenue. Nothing here is close to that yet.
From what I've read, SenseTime's revenue rose over the first nine months of 2026. Gross margin in its latest reported period was near 41%. And that's while it keeps handing its newest AI models to developers for free.
Kuaishou had the opposite kind of quarter this week. Revenue came in around 31.6 billion yuan, down about 11% from a year earlier. Operating margin went negative, and spending on its own video model, Kling, keeps rising.
These are two different bets on the same question. You can give your AI away and make money on the compute and support around it. Or you can keep it closed and hope it pays for itself someday.
SenseTime rents out GPU capacity through SenseCore and sells deployments to companies and governments. The free models are what get developers and companies in the door. Kuaishou keeps Kling closed and builds it into its own short-video and e-commerce app, so it pays for all the training and inference itself.
The bull case for SenseTime is that free distribution is working for now. Giving the models away hasn't stopped revenue or margin from rising. The bear case is that free can look great right up until you need to start charging. SenseTime also carries debt with interest costs that move with local rates.
The bull case for Kuaishou is that Chinese short video is still mostly a two-player market. Owning your model is the only way to control what it turns into, whether that's better ads or a new paid feature. The bear case is this quarter. Ad growth has slowed enough that AI spending now shows up as a straight loss, not a cost the core business can soak up.
It's too early to call either bet. One quarter of each isn't much to go on.
Moore Threads put out a teaser this week for a new graphics card it calls Lushan. It promises record memory and a big jump in ray tracing. The full reveal comes at its own conference in late December.
The timing is what caught my eye. Reports this week said TSMC has tightened how many chips at 16 nanometers and below it will make for Chinese GPU designers. That matters less for Moore Threads directly. The US already put it on an export blacklist years ago, cutting it off from TSMC for advanced work. It was already routed to SMIC, China's biggest contract chipmaker, the company that manufactures the chip to another firm's design. The problem is SMIC is not a spare tank waiting to be filled.
SMIC told investors its lines ran at 97 percent in the third quarter. Its co-CEO said this month that even with plants full, the company still cannot absorb how much raw materials have gone up. That is a foundry already stretched before a fresh wave of Chinese GPU designers gets pushed its way by the TSMC move.
A flashy new card teased this week lands on top of a strained supply chain. The one domestic option left is already maxed out. It is also getting more expensive to use, not less. I want to see whether Moore Threads says anything concrete about wafer allocation or yields at the December unveil. The usual spec sheet of ray tracing numbers and memory size won't settle this. A chip is only as real as the line that can make it.
I don't know if SMIC can free up room by easing older, lower-margin orders. Or whether every domestic GPU hopeful ends up fighting for the same slots at once.
TL;DR The new BIS remote-access rule closes the last legal way for Chinese firms to use high-end US chips: renting them in overseas data centers. Using Alibaba as a case study ahead of its earnings, Longbridge Dolphin Research estimates the rule could remove about 1.5GW of planned compute in 2027 and cut Alibaba Cloud's 2027 external revenue growth from about 51% to about 17%.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. Alibaba Cloud external revenue: original vs. adjusted
Our take: 2027 takes the hit, domestic chips catch up later
Jensen Huang's exit on Nov 12 was only the starting gun, as we flagged earlier. On Nov 16, BIS issued a remote-access rule that essentially shuts the door on Chinese companies renting NVIDIA compute through overseas data centers, while the Remote Access Security Act and AI Overwatch Act move forward.
If everything lands and is strictly enforced, roughly 14–18% of Alibaba's planned compute in 2027–30 disappears, with the biggest hit in 2027. Domestic chips have enough volume overall, but T-Head capacity is fully used by the original plan in 2027–28, so the backfill is slow and small until 2029.
Alibaba will most likely protect in-house model training and AI apps first, so the gap falls mainly on compute rented to outside customers. Training is hit harder than inference: B-series GPUs are key to Qwen pre-training, and the best domestic chips only match roughly an H200.
Which version Alibaba gets is still unclear: a cut from January, a base case from April, or a milder one from September. Watch tonight's call for how management handles overseas compute, how much T-Head and other domestic chips can fill, and whether next year's growth outlook holds.
What the new rules actually do
Since 2022, US rules had already blocked Chinese firms and their overseas entities from buying advanced chips directly. Before this rule, the only legal path to mid-range-and-above US chips was third-party data centers renting them to Chinese customers remotely.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. US export controls on NVIDIA AI chips to China, 2022–2026
The BIS rule, effective Nov 19, requires a license for any data center renting more than 12M aggregate TPP (about 700–800 H100s) to Chinese firms, gives existing providers 90 days to get licensed, looks through subleasing, and adds a separate license for exports to five transshipment hubs. Foreign foundries making Chinese-designed chips at 16/14nm and below are also restricted.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. New US rule on remote access to AI chips
The AI Overwatch Act, which may be folded into the year-end NDAA, would require congressional review of each China export license, ban B100-class and newer chips outright, and void existing licenses. Small gaps remain for recommendation-only compute and CPUs, but NVIDIA has said it will stop selling H200 to China.
How much compute Alibaba loses
Alibaba's official anchor is data center power in 2032 at 10x 2022, about 20GW. In the original plan, overseas was about a quarter, and US chips fall from about 90% of compute in 2025 to about 40% by 2030 as T-Head ramps.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. Alibaba compute build-out toward 20GW by 2032
We assume about 20% of overseas US-chip compute is unaffected (CPUs, sub-H20 GPUs, Alibaba-owned capacity) and the rest is removed, while domestic additions from 2027 are cut 20%. That removes about 1.46GW in 2027, cutting that year's net additions from 2.0GW to about 0.55GW.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. Alibaba US-chip compute: original plan vs. after the rule
Can domestic chips fill the gap?
In the original plan, domestic-chip compute grows from about 1.4GW in 2026 to 9.5GW in 2030, about 61% of the total, with T-Head and other domestic chips roughly 4:1. Meeting it needs about 530k T-Head chips in 2027 and 880k in 2028; channel checks put output at about 500k and 900k, just enough with nothing to spare.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. Alibaba domestic-chip compute plan
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. T-Head: planned demand vs. Morgan Stanley shipment forecast
Buying 100k extra cards from Huawei or Cambricon in 2027 is already optimistic, since everyone is scrambling and Huawei competes with Alibaba Cloud. Wafers aren't the constraint; HBM and advanced packaging may bottleneck first, with US curbs on HBM2E and above already in place.
The hit lands on cloud revenue
In the original plan, external cloud takes about 60% of compute. After the rule, we assume non-AI internal use is unchanged, AI training and apps are cut only about 10%, and nearly 90% of removed compute comes out of external cloud, leaving rentable compute roughly flat in 2027 versus +37% planned.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. Alibaba compute allocation: original vs. after the rule
With the base-case cut from April 2027 and unchanged revenue per GW, Alibaba Cloud's external revenue falls about 20–25% below expectations, and 2027 growth drops from 51% to 17%. A January cut would leave just 8%; a September cut, 35%.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. 2027 sensitivity by start date of the cut
Adding about 100k extra domestic cards in 2027 and 200k in 2028 lifts 2027 growth only to about 20% and narrows the 2028 revenue gap from about 25% to 19%. From 2029, T-Head ramps enough to backfill most of the gap.
Source: Company reports, Longbridge Dolphin Research. Alibaba Cloud external revenue with other domestic-chip backfill
Beyond the numbers
With high-end compute scarce, big platforms will keep compute for their own models, leaving independent model makers most exposed; some may be forced to drop frontier training or be consolidated. Firms with in-house chips (Alibaba's T-Head, Huawei's Ascend) are relatively better placed.
T-Head may have to divert chips meant for outside customers back to Alibaba, making it look more like an internal supplier just as it prepares a separate listing. For China's chip, HBM and packaging supply chain, this speeds up domestic substitution, and China may push back in areas like rare earths.
PDD just posted a rare big beat. In short: ad revenue growth sped up, Temu spending slowed, and profit came back.
Ads: growth picked up Ad revenue, the core of PDD’s platform business, grew 12% YoY to nearly RMB 60B. That’s a clear jump from 3.5% last quarter and about 6% above the RMB 56.3B consensus.
Profit: a big beat Adjusted operating profit was RMB 32.6B, about 17% above the RMB 27.8B expected. Margin hit 30%, the highest in eight quarters.
Costs did a lot of the work. Gross margin recovered to 58.2%, edging toward 60%. Marketing spend was RMB 25.3B, down 17% YoY and RMB 6.4B below expectations. Even admin expenses fell.
Revenue: Temu dragged the top line Total revenue was RMB 108.3B, roughly flat YoY and about 6% below the RMB 115.2B expected. The gap came mainly from transaction services, where Temu contributes a large share of commission revenue. That came in well below expectations, as new EU parcel fees and Temu’s spending cuts both took a clear toll.
Hygon opened a dedicated account for a new share buyback on November 17, according to a filing carried by Zhongcaiwang. The plan is to spend 500 to 800 million yuan buying back shares, with a cap of 318.52 yuan each.
The stock closed at 189.10 yuan on November 18, so the cap sits far above the actual price. A cap set that high usually just means it was set to satisfy a rule, not that the company plans to pay anywhere near it.
The more useful detail is how it's funded. Earlier filings this month show the buyback is backed by a bank loan of up to 720 million yuan, and it's earmarked for an employee stock plan, not an open-market purchase the company funds itself. That's different from a company spending its own cash because it thinks the stock is cheap. It's closer to a staff compensation mechanic that happens to run through the share price.
For contrast, Hygon's prior buyback, which it just finished winding down this month, was done years ago at a small fraction of today's price. The new program isn't a repeat of that one. It's a different kind of transaction wearing the same name.
None of this says whether the stock is over or undervalued. It just means the headline "company announces buyback" is doing more work than the filing supports. I don't know how the market is supposed to tell this kind of buyback from a genuine one, and maybe it isn't supposed to.
Tencent’s Q3 put shareholders under pressure again. In one line: it spent more and earned less. Versus expectations, the main gap was in costs. But beyond this quarter, investors will want answers on three things: what happens to compute prepayments under the new remote-compute limits, how Tencent will deploy compute from here, and whether its capex target changes. The earnings call is worth watching.
Two numbers that stand out Core operating profit fell 6% YoY, and free cash flow was about -RMB 70B. In an AI spending cycle like this, a profit squeeze at asset-light Tencent was expected. But most Tencent holders are value investors and insurers who care about real profit. However good the AI story or cloud unit economics sound, if they don’t show up in the bottom line, they’re a hard sell.
Q3 capex hit RMB 81.4B, far above the RMB 55–60B expected, and full-year capex could top RMB 220B. That includes about RMB 86B in compute prepayments. Excluding those, free cash flow was RMB 16.9B, still lower than in past years.
Revenue: games missed, ads and cloud held up Revenue grew 7.5% to RMB 207.3B, about RMB 3B below consensus, mainly due to international games and social networks. Ads grew 18%, helped partly by short dramas on WeChat Mini Programs, which now have 150M monthly users. Cloud growth sped up to 35%, at the top of sell-side estimates.
Profit: compute and content costs rose Expense ratios held steady, so the pressure came from costs tied to compute: server hosting, depreciation and content costs all rose notably.
Buybacks: thinner wallet Tencent bought back HK$7B in Q3 and HK$30B year-to-date, likely under HK$50B for the year. It’s unclear whether compute money that can’t be spent will flow back to shareholders.
Tencent and Alibaba both put out new AI models this week, and both talked up how cheap they are to run. I don't think that headline number tells you much.
Both use a setup called mixture of experts. Only a small slice of the model answers any one question, and the rest sits idle. But the whole model still has to sit in chip memory, ready to go. So what drives how much hardware you need is the full size, not just the slice doing the work.
Tencent's Hy4 Flash, launched November 16, has 224 billion parameters in total. It only switches on about 12 billion of them per question, TechNode reported. Alibaba's Qwen4-Max came out the same day and is much bigger, at 2.4 trillion parameters. About 71 billion of those are active per token, according to Yahoo Finance.
Rough math says Alibaba's flagship needs something like ten times more memory loaded on chips than Tencent's. The active part isn't ten times bigger, though. That's a very different ask of the hardware. Tencent's model can probably run on far fewer, cheaper chips per user. Alibaba's needs racks with a lot more memory just to keep the whole thing loaded.
Both want to serve millions of queries a day without burning margin. The advertised price per million tokens won't tell you which one needs less hardware. I'd watch the memory bill each one reports in AI spending over the next few quarters.
SMIC's 2026 Q3 report highlights a clear shift in domestic foundry demand. Revenue grew 28.1 percent year-over-year to 21.98 billion RMB, while recurring net profit more than doubled to 2.64 billion RMB. Fabs are running nearly flat out with utilization climbing to 97.3 percent and 12-inch wafers reaching 78.9 percent of total shipments, pushing gross margin to 29.9 percent.
The demand mix is changing rapidly behind those numbers. Smartphone revenue dropped from 21.5 percent a year ago down to 14.3 percent, and consumer electronics continued to soften. Instead, local supply chain switching and AI power management orders drove sequential revenue up 26 percent in industrial and auto, 26 percent in PCs and tablets, and 18 percent in wearables.
On the spending side, Q3 capex was cut in half from a year ago to 7.42 billion RMB as SMIC shifts from aggressive expansion to maximizing output from existing lines. For Q4, management expects revenue to grow another 4 to 6 percent QoQ, though gross margin is guided down to 26 to 28 percent as new line depreciation and higher upstream material costs start to weigh on margins.
Zhongji Innolight hit a new low for the year today, down roughly 70% from its June high. Most of that drop came in the last few months.
The odd part: the same day, Chinese outlets reported the company is running a 5 billion yuan buyback and cancelling the shares it buys back. It also said order visibility now goes out to 2028. Companies that are actually losing orders don't usually spend real cash shrinking their share count. And they don't usually tell you they can see further out than before.
The sell-off doesn't seem to be about Zhongji itself. The coverage ties it to Nvidia's rough stretch. That dragged down pretty much every optics and networking name tied to the AI buildout. One article put the stock at about 17x earnings, which seems cheap to me for a company supplying some of Nvidia's fastest optical modules.
Not saying it's a sure thing. A buyback can be funded with debt, and guidance to 2028 is just guidance until it shows up in a filing. If the next results show orders shrinking, the buyback will look like bad timing. But right now there's a big gap between what the company is doing with its own cash and what the stock is doing. I'm wondering which one is wrong.
The question people want answered on Alibaba's Nov 19 earnings is pretty straightforward: is its AI spending shifting from Nvidia chips to Chinese-made ones as export rules tighten? A filing that surfaced this week makes me think the answer may not be a clean yes or no.
On Nov 10, Alibaba confirmed its chip design unit, T-Head, had filed to list separately in Hong Kong. T-Head has been described as holding a small but real slice of China's AI accelerator market in the first half of this year. That's the domestic-substitution story in a fairly pure form: Alibaba owns something that gets more valuable if China needs fewer Nvidia chips.
At the same time, a Singapore subsidiary, Apex Enterprise Solutions, took a pledge of equipment and IP from a Malaysian unit of Megaspeed back in June 2024, and that arrangement was still reportedly active as of last week. Megaspeed is a data-center operator now under scrutiny in the US and Singapore over a large volume of Nvidia chips, and Alibaba is said to have rented compute from it to train its own models. The Hong Kong-listed shares dropped more than 7% on Nov 12 when the link became public.
So Alibaba isn't really picking a lane. It's building the chip unit that benefits if Nvidia access shrinks, while a subsidiary has financial ties to an operator whose own Nvidia supply is being questioned.
That matters for Wednesday, because if Alibaba has been renting compute through an arrangement like this rather than buying chips outright, it wouldn't show up as hardware purchases at all. It would sit inside cloud rental costs, blended in with everything else. The capex number people will stare at on the call might not be the one that answers the question they're asking.
XPeng’s Q3 came in clearly better than expected. Revenue, gross margin and losses all beat, and Q4 guidance topped consensus.
Revenue: a richer mix pushed prices up Revenue was RMB 24.3B, about 7% above consensus and above the top of guidance. Average selling price rose about 11% QoQ to RMB 183K, roughly RMB 15K above expectations. The pricier GX had its first full delivery quarter, and overseas sales made up a bigger share.
Longbridge Dolphin Research thinks this shows XPeng has moved from “selling volume with Mona” to “upgrading the mix.” With higher-priced SUVs like the GX and G9L established, XPeng can grow volume and hold prices at the same time. Services revenue dipped only RMB 50M to RMB 2.65B, a milder hit from lower VW R&D fees than feared.
Margins: car sales picked up the slack Overall gross margin was 18.9%, above expectations, and the QoQ dip came entirely from services. Vehicle margin rose 1 point to 13.1% (vs. 12.5% expected). Gross profit per car rose about RMB 4K to RMB 24K, thanks to more expensive models, scale, and its in-house Turing chip offsetting pricier memory chips.
So profit is now driven by car sales, not services. Adjusted net loss was RMB 890M, better than the RMB 1.11B expected. Losses narrowed even as services stepped down, and the core business is getting closer to breakeven.
Guidance: volume and revenue both beat Q4 delivery guidance of 169–174K tops the 170K expected, implying about 59–62K a month in Nov–Dec. Revenue guidance of RMB 30.4–31.8B also beats. Price per car may fall about RMB 15K as cheaper Mona models ramp, but scale should offset most of that.
On AI, Robotaxi got approval for L4 trials in Guangzhou, and the new humanoid robot is aiming for mass production by year-end.
A controversy involving NVIDIA’s former CEO Jensen Huang is adding another dimension to the growing technological rivalry between the United States and China.
According to the Associated Press, U.S. officials suspect that a businesswoman connected to Huang had ties to Chinese intelligence and may have sought to influence NVIDIA’s access to the Chinese market.
The allegations have not been independently established, and Beijing has rejected the accusations.
The controversy is nevertheless generating political pressure in Washington to tighten restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports to China.
A brokerage in China just finished swapping its quote-gateway server for one built on a Hygon CPU, and the trade-penetration latency dropped 30 to 40 percent against the foreign server it replaced, reported by 观点网 on November 13. That is a small, boring-sounding fact, but it is a different kind of proof than most domestic chip news. It is not a spec sheet or a lab demo. It is a regulated, latency-obsessed industry running real trades on the thing.
Cambricon gets talked about here as the default Chinese Nvidia (no clue about CEO's affairs though), and its own nine-month sales did grow. But that framing quietly assumes Hygon is just a cheaper also-ran. A CPU running inside a live brokerage system, next to a buyback and a pile of other deals this month, is a harder thing to wave off than another chip announcement.
I would not call this settled. Hygon's own September quarter revenue came in under what analysts had pencilled in, even with profit still rising for the first nine months. So the proof of real-world use is there, but the proof that it is winning on volume, not just on headlines, still isn't.
Thoughts on these?
(Disclaimer I own long perpetuals on both companies)
Baidu's search ad business is getting squeezed by AI chat, that part everyone already talks about. What I noticed reading through Baidu's World event this week is a second, quieter move: Baidu just launched a model-trading platform called Ciyuan, basically a marketplace where other companies' AI models get hosted and billed by the call, and founder Robin Li said demand for model calls is exploding, with open-source model revenue on its Qianfan platform reportedly up more than tenfold over the past year.
So the same outside labs building the chat assistants that replace a Baidu search click may also need somewhere to actually run those models. Baidu is trying to be that somewhere. It also confirmed on the same day a chip roadmap running through 2028, its own Kunlunxin silicon meant to make that hosting cheaper to run at scale.
I don't think this cancels out the ad problem. It's a different bet entirely: instead of out-competing the chatbots for users, Baidu tries to rent them the floor space. It only works if outside developers actually trust a search company's cloud with their models, and if the chip roadmap doesn't slip.
China has a crowded field of robot-model builders, and a general multimodal model is now outscoring purpose-built robot policies in simulation. For that ecosystem the core debate is whether this makes robot-specific models obsolete, from VLAs to touch encoders, or whether physical robots still demand their own model layer.
Researchers behind arXiv 2609.24170 tested GPT-6 Astra without any robotics fine-tuning on all 42 RoboDojo sim tasks, 2,100 trials. It averaged about 22% success, scoring higher than all 40 publicly listed policies on that leaderboard. Yet the same team halted real hardware trials when Astra repeatedly issued physically dangerous commands that broke equipment. A separate group (arXiv 2609.38537) measured about 40 seconds of inference per action call, so 30 seconds of simulated locomotion ate up around 2.8 hours of the model's time. Meanwhile a touch encoder from Ant Group's Robbyant lifted four different policies' real-hardware scores 14 to 25 points, gains raw sensor input couldn't match. Their open LingBot-VLA 2.0 covers 20 body types across 17 manufacturers per company figures.
I think the robot model builders own the layer that physically contacts the world, with general frontier models serving as planners that call into them. For those betting general models make that whole stack redundant, how do you square 40 second inference latency and real hardware breaking in testing with an investable thesis?
Global aluminium supply growth sounds simple until the power requirement appears
Nalco's planned Indian expansion would add 500,000 tonnes of annual capacity, but it also needs around 1,100 MW of extra power and is targeted only for 2030-31
as I view this, it explains why hongqiao's existing scale and established energy system still have value. new competition is coming