r/sysadmin • • 2d ago

General Discussion Weekly 'I made a useful thing' Thread - November 20, 2026

7 Upvotes

There is a great deal of user-generated content out there, from scripts and software to tutorials and videos, but we've generally tried to keep that off of the front page due to the volume and as a result of community feedback. There's also a great deal of content out there that violates our advertising/promotion rule, from scripts and software to tutorials and videos.

We have received a number of requests for exemptions to the rule, and rather than allowing the front page to get consumed, we thought we'd try a weekly thread that allows for that kind of content. We don't have a catchy name for it yet, so please let us know if you have any ideas!

In this thread, feel free to show us your pet project, YouTube videos, blog posts, or whatever else you may have and share it with the community. Commercial advertisements, affiliate links, or links that appear to be monetization-grabs will still be removed.


r/sysadmin • • 11d ago

General Discussion Patch Tuesday Megathread - (November 10, 2026)

128 Upvotes

Hello r/sysadmin, I'm u/AutoModerator, and welcome to this month's Patch Megathread!

This is the (mostly) safe location to talk about the latest patches, updates, and releases. We put this thread into place to help gather all the information about this month's updates: What is fixed, what broke, what got released and should have been caught in QA, etc. We do this both to keep clutter out of the subreddit, and provide you, the dear reader, a singular resource to read.

For those of you who wish to review prior Megathreads, you can do so here.

While this thread is timed to coincide with Microsoft's Patch Tuesday, feel free to discuss any patches, updates, and releases, regardless of the company or product. NOTE: This thread is usually posted before the release of Microsoft's updates, which are scheduled to come out at 5:00PM UTC.

Remember the rules of safe patching:

  • Deploy to a test/dev environment before prod.
  • Deploy to a pilot/test group before the whole org.
  • Have a plan to roll back if something doesn't work.
  • Test, test, and test!

r/sysadmin • • 10h ago Regret

PowerCLI multiple default server mode just cost me my job

507 Upvotes

I work (well, worked) at an MSP. One of our bigger clients has a prod vCenter at their main site and a separate vCenter at their DR site. Twice a year we restore their critical VMs from backup into the DR cluster on an isolated network. Their app owners log in and sign off, then we tear it all down. We restore with the original names because a couple of their apps freak out if the hostname changes, and since it's all in a bubble it's never been an issue.
Tuesday was teardown. 31 VMs, and the DR datastore was sitting at like 92%, so I wanted them actually gone from disk, not just pulled from inventory. I had the name list from the restore job, so I ran the same little script I've used after the last three tests:
$vms = Get-VM -Name (Get-Content .\drtest.txt)
$vms | Where-Object PowerState -eq 'PoweredOn' | Stop-VM -Confirm:$false
$vms | Remove-VM -DeletePermanently -Confirm:$false
Yes Stop-VM, not Stop-VMGuest. They're throwaway DR copies, I didn't care about clean shutdowns.
What I forgot is that earlier that morning I'd connected to the prod vCenter in the same PowerShell window to look at a snapshot for a different ticket, and I never disconnected. And at some point years ago I'd said yes to that PowerCLI prompt about working with multiple default servers. So Get-VM without -Server pulls from every vCenter you're connected to.
Same names on both sides. So $vms had 62 objects in it instead of 31, and I never looked.
The power-off step went through all of them. I didn't notice, because a bunch of the DR copies were still running and a wall of power-off output is exactly what I expected to see. Then the deletes started. I'm half watching, and it's still going after it should've been done. About the same time Teams starts going off. I hit ctrl+c, and by then 6 of the prod VMs were deleted from disk: a SQL server, two app servers, an RDS host, their file server, and a print server (the only one nobody missed). The other 25 prod VMs had just been hard powered off in the middle of the workday.
I called my manager right then and told him exactly what I did. There wasn't any point doing anything else, my username is on every event in vCenter.
Most of the 25 came back fine once we turned them on, though one of the other SQL boxes needed some babysitting. Backups were good, thank god. Instant recovery had the 6 deleted VMs running off the backup repo within about an hour, but the repo is a box of spinning disks and SQL running off it was painful. Migrating everything back to real storage wrapped up around midnight. The last backup was 10pm the night before, so the file server lost most of a day of work. SQL had log backups, so it only lost a few minutes.
The client's IT director called our owner Wednesday and said he didn't want me in their environment again. They're about a quarter of our revenue and I was basically the guy on that account. Friday I got the "this isn't working out" call. Honestly can't even be that mad, it was completely avoidable.


r/sysadmin • • 4h ago

Sysprep /generalize /oobe vs. post-clone SID changers (SIDCHG / Wittytool) with FOG Project - What are you actually using in production?

13 Upvotes

I manage around 700 Dell OptiPlex workstations at a university (across 2–3 models, including older OptiPlex 3020 and 790 units) using FOG Project as our image deployment server. We standardized on Windows 11 23H2 as our main OS to avoid the heavier background AI overhead in newer builds on our legacy hardware.

Right now, my workflow is building our golden image in Audit Mode, installing all required software and then running sysprep /generalize /oobe /shutdown before capturing the image with FOG. However, I constantly run into AppxPackage validation errors during Sysprep, sometimes over basic built-in apps like Notepad, Calculator, Sticky Notes, or Snipping Tool forcing me to track down and remove packages before Sysprep will complete.

This made me wonder why some admins skip generalizing altogether, capture the live image directly with FOG, and just use a post-clone SID changer (like SIDCHG or Wittytool) alongside the FOG Client to handle ID resets afterward.

I recently re-read Mark Russinovich’s classic post,The Machine SID Duplication Myth and Why Sysprep Matters, which breaks down why duplicate SIDs aren't the real issue, it's all the other machine-specific IDs (WSUS client IDs, KMS CMIDs, endpoint agent IDs, certificates, etc.) that Sysprep clears. (Worth noting too that recent Windows 11 security updates like KB5065426 have started enforcing stricter machine SID uniqueness checks for Kerberos/NTLM authentication, making post-clone ID conflicts an even bigger headache.)

For those managing similar fleets (especially with FOG Project) in production:

  • What does your actual imaging workflow look like, are you strictly running sysprep /generalize before FOG capture, or are any of you capturing non-sysprepped images and using post-clone ID tools without issues?
  • How do you prevent Windows 11’s built-in apps (Notepad, Calculator, Snipping Tool, etc.) from updating or registering per-user in Audit Mode so Sysprep doesn't break? (Note: I already build completely offline with the network cable unplugged and only install standalone manual updates, yet it still triggers per-user Appx errors during Sysprep.)

Appreciate any insight into what’s working cleanly in your environments.


r/sysadmin • • 6h ago

Question What does good with servers and networking actually look like in your day to day job, and what should I look for on a resume?

11 Upvotes

Hello.
In most IT environments, I think it's rare for roles to be strictly separated into only servers or only networking(maybe...)
You usually end up dealing with both (such as Windows Server 2022, VMware, VLANs, routing, etc.)
Recently, my manager asked me to look through a stack of resumes and pick out candidates who are strong in either servers or networking.
I'm not quite sure what specific keywords, experiences, or skills on a resume prove that someone actually has real competence in those area
Please tell me from the perspective of those working in the field
In day-to-day work, what does being capable in servers and networking specifically look like?
When screening resumes, what specifically do you look for to determine whether someone truly has the knowledge and practical skills?
Thank you.


r/sysadmin • • 21h ago

Does Microsoft's Entra Connect Health cloud API breach give you pause?

103 Upvotes

As you know, Microsoft's Entra Connect Health cloud API was breached within the past few days.

The breach itself does not seem catastrophic, but the timeline and some details give me some concern.

July 23, 2026: Microsoft introduced vulnerability into API

Nov. 9, 2026: Microsoft detected vulnerability

Nov. 19, 2026: Microsoft deployed fix

Nov. 20, 2026: Microsoft completed investigation and confirmed unauthorized access to tenants

Nov. 21, 2026: Customers notified

With all its AI usage, it took Microsoft 4 months to detect a vulnerability. It took 10 days to stop the bleeding. And why was an expired certificate kept on its server and available via API for two years to begin with? To me, this seems sloppy. And it was allowed to slip through the cracks for two years? Does Microsoft not review its infrastructure?


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

Question Dell: What sort of disaster is happening over there??!!

1.3k Upvotes

The behavior of our Dell sales contacts is downright chilling. Our org's sales portal is down so we can't buy anything. It was explained to us they're launching a new portal and are having some technical setbacks, but we're at a dead stop on purchasing anything from laptops to keyboards.

Our sales rep is ghosting our emails and calls go straight to VM. Our regional rep is doing the same. It's been weeks.

I've been trying to get a quote for an enterprise SAN warranty extension and replacement hardware. Our enterprise rep will at least get back to me, but has delayed the quote twice now over "sales team" delays.

In 18 years I've never experienced anything like this. Even Dell at their worst has never shied away from selling you things; something really bad is going on over there.

We're not a small company. We've already started to cut over to other hardware channels and they'll likely lose us as a customer over this.

Does anyone have any context to add?


r/sysadmin • • 12h ago

How to provide email business continuity when primary mail server (Exchange Online) outage occurs? (In relation to MO1550821)

14 Upvotes

Hi All,

After Microsoft incident MO1550821, we are reviewing whether our current email architecture provides enough business continuity.

We have roughly 3,500 users and a hybrid Exchange environment (mainly Exchange online however some "legacy" mailboxes still on-prem). To estimate our business scale - during the approximately 24-hour incident window when the incident occured, our organization generated around 60,000 outbound messages.

We intend to continue using Microsoft 365 as the primary email platform. The question is what should happen when Exchange Online or a related Microsoft dependency is unavailable for an extended period.

  1. Can Exchange on-premises act as a redundant platform for Exchange Online?

Could synchronized copies of Exchange Online mailboxes be maintained on-premises and activated during an outage?

For example, could the normal mailbox use example.com domain, while a synchronized emergency mailbox usesexample.eu? The exact domain is not important. The objective would be to give users access to recent messages and allow them to continue sending and receiving while Exchange Online is unavailable.

Is this technically possible and supported, or would it create problems with synchronization, mail routing, duplicate messages, calendars, compliance and mailbox consistency?

2. Could another email platform provide this redundancy?

If on-premises Exchange cannot do this, could an independent email server or hosted mail platform maintain synchronized standby mailboxes?

What is the current industry-standard alternative: a secondary mail system hosted on the organization’s own servers, another hosted email provider, or a dedicated email continuity service? We are looking for a solution that could provide users with access to recent messages, receive and send email through the corporate domain during an outage, and synchronize the outage-period messages back to Exchange Online after recovery. If you have any vendors, solutions worth checking - please share it with me, I am happy to review (my background is not exactly Email administration, more general organization BCP side).

At the end to add complexity our current mail flow includes a secure email gateway, as well as a separate email DLP layer in the MX/mail-flow path - we would like to have this still be implemetned on the backup mail infrastructure.

Edit:

I know that redundancy costs money but for know I want to know what are the potential technical options which can be implemented to be more resistant.

First recommendation was Mimecast which I wasn't previously familiar with - big thanks I am checking its functionality right now.

I also know that if majority orgs relay on MS and they are down, I won't be able to reach them however still MS doesn't have 100% of the market, there are some companies Google based, or smaller email servers hosting based so not 100% of destinantions would be down.


r/sysadmin • • 5h ago

Increase in SPAM being allowed through EOP ?

3 Upvotes

Has anyone else noticed a massive increase in the amount of SPAM being allowed through EOP very recently? It seemed to start yesterday, November 21st. Really obvious SPAM is coming through with an SCL of 1. To be clear, I'm not talking about virus laden attachments, but emails in languages other than English, emails with no text (all HTML), etc. The types of emails that would at least not make it to the focused inbox.


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

General Discussion BackBlaze started selling customer data to ads partner network the past 12 months

174 Upvotes

... and basically only recently started to put it in their privacy docs

not fully to repeat myself, but from a pure privacy standpoint, I strongly suggest re-thinking if you're a customer of their services

full post here:

https://www.reddit.com/r/backblaze/s/RJnwPHiNeH

BackBlaze refs:
• ⁠https://www.backblaze.com/company/policy/privacy-april-2026
• ⁠https://www.backblaze.com/company/policy/privacy

HN:
• ⁠https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50585593


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

Microsoft Important security notification regarding Microsoft Entra Connect Health

254 Upvotes

Has anyone else had this email from Microsoft? I guess it’s my turn to say, I’m tired boss!

Microsoft is notifying you of a security vulnerability in Microsoft Entra Connect Health that affected your tenant. The vulnerability resulted in unauthorized read activity of your tenant's technical contact and administrator email account(s) and tenant-level configuration metadata.  
Microsoft Entra Connect Health is a cloud-based monitoring service that gives administrators a single view in the Microsoft Entra admin center of the health, performance and alerts for their on-premises identity infrastructure.  

What happened  
On 9 November 2026, we detected a vulnerability in the Microsoft Entra Connect Health API that was introduced on 23 July 2026. The vulnerability could allow an unauthorized party to access tenant and service-monitoring metadata and potentially make changes to Connect Health monitoring configuration. 
We deployed and fixed the vulnerability on 19 November 2026. On 20 November 2026, we concluded our investigation and determined that unauthorized read-only access to tenant-level metadata associated with your organization had occurred. We did not identify any unauthorized configuration changes. 

What information was accessed  
For your tenant, the accessed API responses contained the following fields:  
Email addresses of the tenant's technical contact and administrator accounts 
Tenant configuration metadata: Tenant ID, tenant display name, initial domain name, country code, tenant’s region scope, Microsoft Entra license tier, directory synchronization status (enabled or disabled and last sync timestamp), Connect Health onboarding status, and a legacy, expired certificate previously used by Connect Health to register agents with an internal service that was decommissioned in late 2024. The certificate was no longer in use but had not been removed from Connect Health storage and was still returned by the API. 

What information was NOT accessed  
This vulnerability did not expose user passwords, password hashes, authentication tokens, valid cryptographic keys, or on-premises server and Active Directory topology details. The vulnerability did not expose Microsoft Entra tenant data beyond what was identified above nor Azure subscription information. 

What Microsoft has done  
On 19 November 2026, Microsoft deployed a service-side fix to the Microsoft Entra Connect Health API that closed the vulnerability and blocked further unauthorized access. 
Our security investigators reviewed available telemetry to identify unauthorized Connect Health API calls against Microsoft Entra and Microsoft Entra Connect Health customers. 

Recommended actions for your organization  
The vulnerability in the Microsoft Entra Connect Health API has been fixed, and no software update or other remediation is required from your organization to address the vulnerability itself.  While our investigation did not identify unauthorized configuration changes, we recommend the following precautionary measures to help your organization assess potential risks associated with the exposed tenant metadata and technical contact email addresses. These actions are not required to remediate vulnerability: 
Alert your security and IT teams. Notify your Global Administrators, SOC, IT operations teams, and your tenant's Technical Contact to watch for targeted phishing or social-engineering attempts that reference your organization, tenant, Microsoft Entra or Connect Health. We recommend confirming that your tenant's technical contact(s) and notification recipients are current and appropriate. 
Protect privileged accounts. Verify or configure that all Global Administrator and other privileged accounts require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) and use Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for just-in-time activation, where applicable. 

Review the information that may have been exposed. Microsoft has published a read-only PowerShell script that you can run locally to view the information that could have been returned through the GetTenant service call. The script returns current values, which may differ from the values that were exposed if the information has changed since the exposure occurred. This script is for understanding the types and current values of potentially exposed metadata, not reconstructing the historical exposure. Visit https://aka.ms/ConnectHealth/scripts and download the GetTenant script. Other scripts that may be available at this location do not apply to your tenant. 
If pksCertificate is populated in the result, it is a legacy, expired certificate that was previously used to register Connect Health agents with an internal service that was decommissioned in late 2024. The certificate poses no risk and is no longer used by that service; the expired certificate had not been removed from Connect Health storage and continued to be included in the GetTenant API response. You can use the GetTenantPksCertificateDetails script to view the certificate details and confirm its expired status.  

Confirm your Connect Health configuration. Please confirm that this matches your expectations and review your configuration for any unexpected settings or changes. As an additional precaution, review relevant Microsoft Entra audit and sign-in logs and Azure Activity Logs for unexpected Connect Health changes or anomalous administrative activity. To review your Connect Health configuration, go to https://aka.ms/EntraConnectHealth. 

Verify this notice in Azure Service Health: Sign in directly to the Azure Portal instead of clicking links in an email. Open the Security Advisory and check that your tenant is listed. 

Microsoft will never ask for your password, sign-in codes, or secrets by email. Watch out for urgent messages that ask for credentials, unexpected sign-in approvals, or clicks on unknown links. If you are unsure, verify in Azure Service Health or contact Azure Support.   

URGH!


r/sysadmin • • 18h ago

Worried about the future

12 Upvotes

I know this post was probably made before but i wanted to give my two cents. I finished college (which was a lot of maths+computer science)3 years ago and my first job was a standard support l1 +lv2 role it support role. I am now on my second job in the field which is basically a mix of sysadmin and sap 4hana/dm support

I am content with it since the pay ain't bad for my experience and also I feel like I would benefit a lot from learning sap. But lately I keep worring since I really wanted to make a career in this field, but I feel hopless because of AI, yeah. That's it. How do you feel about this?

Edit:Forgot to mention, my biggest concern is the fact that I know that AI can't replace sysadmin right now, but who knows how advanced will it be in 2, 5, 10 years


r/sysadmin • • 15h ago

Question - Solved Root CA cert lands in Intermediate store and Trusted Root after autoenrollment

7 Upvotes

I've just built my first 2-tier PKI and published the root and intermediate certificates to AD with certutil -dspublish so domain joined devices pick them up automatically.

I noticed the root CA cert was getting placed in the Intermediate CA store as well as Trusted Root store on clients.

I read somewhere that autoenrollment copies the AD AIA container into the Intermediate store, and that publishing the root with certutil -dspublish puts a copy in AIA.

I deleted the root’s entry from CN=AIA,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration in ADSI Edit and ran certutil -pulse on a test machine.

The root cert disappeared from the Intermediate store so I thought it was fixed, but I‘ve noticed the next time a device autoenrols for a template, the root is placed back into the Intermediate store.

I know this is probably harmless for chain validation, but I‘m just curious if this is expected behaviour.


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

General Discussion How are you guys handling the CVEs?

139 Upvotes

There's gotta be a better way than to be informed by reddit then telling the entire it department to flip through our entire documentation and emails on where we use php/nginx/emuhadra/etc.

I wanna hear what's working (or not) and see if I can pitch it to our team

Edit: found the post from someone two days asking the same question, Imma go read that one instead

Edit2: https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/s/wN9WhrxFBS


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

General Discussion Migrated our last non prod VMware box last night

475 Upvotes

Dear Broadcom,

I wish it hadn’t come to this. We migrated our last non prod vm to hyper-v last night. I just have some prod hosts that I’ll live with for the next year (most likely half year, but whatever).

It didn’t need to be this way.

You went from a $30k renewal to a $90k renewal to $150k renewal even after I dropped hosts for the last 3 years.

And now, after all that, you want to talk?

Sorry Broadcom, it’s not me, it’s you.


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago Bravo

General Discussion Don't Update your ScreenConnect Server While Using ScreenConnect to Connect to Your ScreenConnect Server

690 Upvotes

That is all.


r/sysadmin • • 11h ago

General Discussion What’s the actual process for getting the right people on a call when something breaks?

1 Upvotes

Curious how other teams handle the first few minutes of an outage.

When a server, a VPN or a key app goes down, there’s usually a scramble: someone finds the bridge link, someone else works out who’s on call, the manager and the vendor get pinged, and people join one by one while you’re still trying to diagnose.

  1. Do you have a defined process for this, or is it “whoever’s awake starts a Teams call”?
  2. How long does it usually take until the people you need are talking?
  3. What tooling do you use (Teams, Slack huddles, a standing Zoom bridge, PagerDuty/Opsgenie)?

r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

General Discussion Dropbox outage - "it's not a cyberattack or AI"

130 Upvotes

Outage resolved

Nov 20, 20:13 UTC

Resolved - This incident has been resolved.

Nov 20, 20:05 UTC

Monitoring - A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.


One more major service has gone down, and it's Dropbox this time.

Per status.dropbox.com:

Dropbox is not working as expected for some users

Nov 20, 2026 - 19:37 UTC

We are continuing to investigate this issue. The outage is not caused by a cyberattack or by AI acting on its own. We’re sorry for the disruption.

Nov 20, 2026 - 19:28 UTC

Investigating - We are currently investigating this issue.

If this isn't AI-related, I'm a teetotaling Mac user who never swears, because this sounds like a "trust me, bro" kind of situation.


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

Ignite 2026 for admins: the non-Copilot announcements for Entra, Intune, Windows and Azure (GA vs preview)

161 Upvotes

Ignite was wall-to-wall agents again, so I went through Microsoft's own product team posts and pulled out the bits that matter if you run a tenant, devices or Azure. Status is as Microsoft states it.

Already on, worth knowing about@

- Entra now has an out-of-the-box policy that disables agent identities after 60 days of inactivity. If teams are building agents in your tenant, owners will start getting notifications.

GA:

- Entra guest lifecycle policies: disable or delete guests based on sponsor, inactivity and whether they ever redeemed the invite. There's a report of who'd be caught before you enforce

- Windows administrator protection: local admins run as standard users by default, Windows Hello approves each elevation

- Windows endpoint security platform: CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Sophos, ESET and others can move their protection out of the kernel into user mode

- Microsoft MCP Server for IT Admins (Entra, Purview, Intune)

- Azure Monitor health models

- Cobalt 200 VMs

Preview, worth testing:

- PIM just-in-time access to Azure and Arc VMs from My Access, with session monitoring and recording

- Conditional Access policy plans

- Advanced dynamic groups: MemberOf and Transitive Reports To

- Entra backup and recovery premium (30 days) and hard deletion protection

- Intune software compliance policy: mark devices non-compliant if they run unapproved AI agents, then block with CA

- CIS benchmark auditing in Intune Advanced Analytics

- Arc Machine Configuration baseline remediation, plus CIS Windows Server (audit) and STIG Linux baselines

- Windows Server 2028

One to watch: the ARM MCP Server now lets agents create and change resources, not just read them. Azure Policy evaluates those requests like portal changes, so your deny policies just became more important.

Microsoft didn't state licensing for most of this, so check before you plan around anything.

Full write-up with links to each Microsoft source: https://azureblog.co.uk/posts/ignite-2026-roundup-for-it-admins/

What did I miss? And is anyone brave enough to turn on administrator protection across the estate?


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

General Discussion Day light Robbery

153 Upvotes

A recruiter at a company reached out to me on LinkedIn about a “Microsoft certification project.” After a call, it turned out they wanted to associate my MS certifications with their company to meet Microsoft Partner requirements, even though I’d be an “independent consultant,” not their employee.

I asked reasonable questions, like which partner designation they’re targeting, whether this meets Microsoft’s eligibility rules while I’m employed elsewhere, and what obligations I’d have. I got vague answers. Then they sent the agreement: 6 USD per month for tying my credentials to their company. The contract also lets them end it immediately if anything is “inconsistent with Microsoft’s requirements,” with no protection for me if Microsoft takes action.

I’m not signing. But I’m curious:

  • Has anyone else in South Asia been approached like this?
  • Do companies really pay people to lend certifications, and for how much?
  • If Microsoft finds out, who bears the risk? (I assume the cert holder.)

I don't mind linking to the company if they had provided me with some projects to really work on, as I also want to do projects or real hands-on in ms platform as well.


r/sysadmin • • 2d ago

Windows PowerShell 5.1 Deprecation

172 Upvotes

Windows PowerShell 5.1 is deprecated. It's no longer in active development. Windows PowerShell 5.1 is still part of Windows, and it's still supported. It will continue to receive security updates according to the lifecycle of each version of Windows. Scripts and tools that rely on it will continue to run.

Windows PowerShell 5.1 will be removed from a future version of Windows. Timing will be based on usage data and communicated in advance.

Microsoft recommends upgrading to PowerShell 7, the upgrade from Windows PowerShell 5.1. For more information, see Migrating from Windows PowerShell 5.1 to PowerShell 7.

Timeline

2026: Windows PowerShell 5.1 is deprecated. Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11, version 26H2 are the last versions of Windows to include PowerShell 5.1 enabled by default.
Next Version of Windows: Windows PowerShell 5.1 will be available as a Feature on Demand (FOD), enabled by default on new Windows installs.
Future Version of Windows: Not available.

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/docs/2026/11/kb5137172-windows-powershell-5-1-deprecation

At the moment there are many, many Windows management PowerShell modules built in to that aren’t supported in PowerShell 7 - they are either completely untested, or they only work via the (PowerShell 5.1 dependent) compatibility layer. Does this mean we can expect new native modules, or everything to just break? #notholdingmybreath

Affected modules:
- Domain Controller deployment (ADDSDeployment)
- ADFS
- AppLocker
- AppvClient
- BestPractices
- ClusterAwareUpdating
- ConfigCI
- DFSR
- DhcpServer
- FailoverClusters, FailoverClusterSet
- GroupPolicy
- Both IIS management modules (IISAdministration, WebAdministration)
- IpamServer
- iSCSI, IscsiTarget
- ISE
- Microsoft.PowerShell.ODataUtils
- MsDtc
- NetLldpAgent
- NetWNV
- NetworkController, NetworkControllerDiagnostics
- NetworkLoadBalancingClusters
- PersistentMemory
- PKI
- Provisioning
- PSDesiredStateConfiguration (partially supported)
- PSScheduledJob
- PSWorkflow, PSWorkflowUtility
- RemoteAccess
- RemoteDesktop
- ServerCore
- ServerManagerTasks
- SMS
- StorageBusCache
- StorageMigrationService
- StorageReplica
- SystemInsights
- TLS
- UpdateServices

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/windows/module-compatibility?view=windowsserver2025-ps

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_windows_powershell_compatibility?view=powershell-7.6


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

General Discussion vCenter CVE-2026-123890 was exploited as a zero-day since early September. Fixed Nov 19, 7.0 gets no public patch

115 Upvotes

Broadcom's VMSA-2026-0009 (Nov 19) fixes an unauthenticated authentication bypass in the vCenter Directory Service, CVSS 9.8, no workaround. Fixed builds are 8.0 U3m, 9.0.2.0200 and 9.1.1.0200. For vCenter 7.0 the advisory says to contact Broadcom Support if you hold an extended support contract.

Google's Mandiant team says a suspected PRC-nexus group (ARMORY CASTLE, formerly UNC5221) used it in early September, after getting into the network through a BeyondTrust Remote Support appliance. Its tool created an SSO admin account and copied the vmdir database. A second utility used the stolen SAML signing key to forge tokens that skip MFA. It also ran against a vCenter that was already patched for the July bug, CVE-2026-59309.

That means the upgrade does not undo an earlier compromise. Mandiant's CTO says to patch and then look for evidence of compromise. What the write-ups give to check:

  • unexpected local or SSO administrator accounts (Mandiant saw a local admin whose name starts with sps-)
  • SSH on the appliance switched on through the VAMI API (/rest/appliance/access/ssh) and off again minutes later
  • TCP 2012 and 5480 reachable from servers that have no reason to talk to vCenter
  • new root SSH keys on ESXi hosts

If any of those turn up, the signing certificate needs replacing, and so does every credential the appliance could read.

Question for people running 7.0: is the plan an upgrade to 8.0 U3m, or isolating the appliance until you can? I'd like to know how many sites are still on 7.0.

Sources: https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/39495 , https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere , https://www.securityweek.com/newly-patched-vmware-vcenter-flaw-exploited-as-zero-day-by-chinese-apt/


r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

General Discussion Attackers Actively Exploit Critical Cisco Expressway Flaw to Pivot Into Internal Networks

37 Upvotes

Threat intelligence firm F6 reported active exploitation of CVE-2026-76466, a critical Cisco Expressway remote code execution flaw (CVSS 9.8), following the public release of proof-of-concept exploit code after Cisco's October 21, 2026 disclosure. In the observed incident, attackers compromised two internet-facing Expressway devices with root privileges, pivoted to two internal cluster nodes, and deployed AI-assisted Python scripts to scan internal systems, SMB shares, SQL Server, WinRM, and GitLab repositories for credentials and sensitive data. Defenders should immediately upgrade to fixed releases such as X15.5.20 (or migrate off X14 and earlier), audit logs and file paths against F6's indicators of compromise, and restrict firewall access to TCP ports 4371–4372 to trusted cluster nodes if patching is delayed.

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r/sysadmin • • 1d ago

General Discussion Missed in the noise, a 10.0 vulnerability in NVIDIA AIStore - CVE-2026-65162 - allows remote attackers to supply unauth K8s host-namespace and more

87 Upvotes

A Critical 10.0 in a popular storage layer under production AI. Because the vuln is in orchestration, the exploit just looks like normal job creation. (This one was a bit overlooked, has there been other cyber or NVIDIA news lately? I didn't see this one posted in the subreddit so thought i'd post)

CVE-2026-65162 in NVIDIA AIStore: an unauthenticated ETL request could stand up a container with the host's process namespace and full privileges, then reach the GPU node underneath.

If you're running AIStore:

  1. Move to the fixed 5.x line.
  2. Require authentication, and keep ETL off where you don't use it.
  3. Enforce admission policy that rejects privileged and host-namespace pods.

No public exploitation (reported) or tooling seen (yet).

For those curious, Stealthium reproduced the attack end to end in an isolated lab, and confirmed runtime detection. Nothing crazy fancy, it's behavioral detection that hunts for escapes and privilege escalation moments, which allows us to catch this and other attacks like it (and not be singular CVE or signature specific!)

Given prevalence and timelines, we won't be publicly publishing the exploit POC we used to confirm root from this vuln.