r/China • u/AdExtreme1002 • 19h ago
搞笑 | Comedy "Rocket truck" spotted downtown in a Chinese city
I spotted this "rocket truck" on the streets of Chengdu while driving today—do you know what it’s used for?
r/China • u/AdExtreme1002 • 19h ago
I spotted this "rocket truck" on the streets of Chengdu while driving today—do you know what it’s used for?
r/China • u/Slow-Property5895 • 10h ago
On November 16, Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao (联合早报) published an article by UK-based scholar Yue Jianyong (岳建勇), titled “The Ideals and Realities of Provincial Federalism” (“联省自治”的理想与现实). The article reviewed and reconsidered academic reflections on the concept of “political grand unification” (政治大一统), and assessed the feasibility, advantages, and disadvantages of the movement for “provincial federalism” (联省自治) during the Republican era (民国). I have also long followed and reflected on national unity and separation, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of “grand unification” (大一统). I would therefore like to take this opportunity to offer some brief comments.
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As Mr. Yue mentioned, there is now considerable reflection and discussion about “grand unification” in Chinese-language academic circles and public opinion. More precisely, against the backdrop of the Chinese authorities’ promotion of “grand unification” and centralization of power, there are many views and voices in academia and public discourse opposing “grand unification” and centralization. Such views have gradually become quite popular among anti-establishment groups.
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The so-called “grand unification” refers to a vast national territory governed by a single central government, under which all ethnic groups and regions must obey the authority and directives of the central government, and a unified system and body of laws are implemented throughout the country. Supporters of “grand unification” believe that it facilitates the concentration of resources to accomplish major undertakings, promotes domestic economic and cultural exchanges, peace and stability, and maintains national strength, while also making the people happier. Over the past several decades, especially since the beginning of reform and opening up (改革开放), “national unity and ethnic solidarity” (国家统一与民族团结) and opposition to national disintegration have become among the most important political principles and propaganda narratives of the Chinese authorities, almost turning into unquestionable doctrines.
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Those who oppose “grand unification,” on the other hand, argue that China’s thousands of years of autocratic centralization and the people’s lack of rights and freedoms are precisely the results of the concentration of power, political monopoly, and suppression of pluralism brought about by “grand unification.” They believe that only through autonomy or even separation among China’s various regions can China achieve freedom and democracy.
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Supporters of “provincial federalism” constitute one category within the “anti-grand-unification” camp, and their position is already relatively moderate. Others go even further, advocating that China should break up into dozens of countries, arguing that only China’s disintegration can dismantle totalitarianism and bring freedom and liberation to the people of its various regions. Examples include scholar Liu Zhongjing (刘仲敬) and his “Zhu Xia” (诸夏) theory, as well as localist independence advocates in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
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In my view, however, both positions are biased and deviate from what should be the central concern, putting secondary considerations before fundamental ones. This is because, whether one supports or opposes “grand unification,” the fundamental focus should be on the well-being of the people and the prosperity of society, rather than on “grand unification” itself. Not only do both “grand unification” and “non-grand-unification” (separation) have their respective advantages and disadvantages, but neither unification nor separation is a panacea capable of effectively resolving all kinds of problems.
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For example, many advocates of “anti-grand-unification” consistently regard the model of “small states with small populations” (小国寡民) as a utopia, believing that it will bring freedom, peace, and prosperity, and citing small and relatively weak European countries and the regions of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan as examples. Such views can easily be disproved by a number of real-world examples. The Middle East, Central America, and Africa all contain numerous countries with small territories and relatively small populations, yet many of them struggle with warfare, poverty, and high crime rates, and some are authoritarian dictatorships.
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For example, Central American countries such as Honduras and El Salvador have some of the world’s highest crime and incarceration rates. Countries that are not particularly large, such as Lebanon and Syria, are further divided internally into numerous factions and have suffered from prolonged civil wars and internal conflicts. These countries also rank near the bottom globally in terms of democracy and individual freedom. The model of “small states with small populations” has not brought freedom or happiness.
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Clearly, “small states with small populations” cannot prevent autocracy and corruption, nor does it mean that people will obtain freedom and democracy. Using the prosperity and democracy of a handful of small countries to demonstrate the benefits of “small states with small populations” is a case of false attribution and imposing a causal relationship where none has been established. Whether a country is free and democratic, and whether its economy and society are prosperous, depends more on its institutions and policies, its governance capacity in practice, the attitudes and civic qualities of its population, its international environment, and other factors. None of these is determined by the size of its territory or population.
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Moreover, the periods of the “Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms” (五代十国) and the “Sixteen Kingdoms of the Five Barbarians” (五胡十六国) in Chinese history were not paradises resembling the mythical Peach Blossom Spring (桃花源). On the contrary, they were filled with warfare and disasters. Although the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (春秋战国) witnessed the “contention of a hundred schools of thought” (百家争鸣) in intellectual and cultural life, allowing scholar-officials to put their talents to use, ordinary people were clearly far from happy.
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Similarly, “provincial federalism” during the Republican era did not necessarily mean freedom and democracy. As Sun Yat-sen (孙中山) commented on “provincial federalism”: “Tang Jiyao (唐继尧) established separatist control over Yunnan (云南) … Chen Jiongming (陈炯明) established separatist control over Guangdong (广东). This kind of separatist provincial federation is a federation of warlords, not a federation based on the people’s self-government.” Nowadays, some Chinese intellectuals, driven by their aversion to “grand unification,” view “provincial federalism” and “small states with small populations” through rose-colored glasses, to the point that their understanding has become seriously distorted.
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Those who unconditionally defend the narrative of “grand unification” while ignoring its drawbacks and costs are equally biased. Under a system of “grand unification” and centralized power, the autonomy and vitality of localities and individuals are indeed suppressed. When the overall system becomes rigid and harmful policies are implemented, “grand unification” means systemic breakdown on a nationwide scale, with more people suffering the consequences and little room for dissent, checks and balances, or resistance.
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National unity also does not mean the absence of warfare and disasters. For example, the “grand unification” of the Qing dynasty (清代) is particularly emphasized and praised by the Chinese authorities. Yet from its establishment to the late Qing period, numerous wars and massacres occurred, including the killings committed by the Manchu Eight Banners (满洲八旗) when Qing forces entered China proper, the “pacification” of the Dzungars (准格尔), and the enormous casualties caused by the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom movement (太平天国运动). Earlier “grand-unification” dynasties, including the Qin dynasty (秦代) and the Mongol Yuan dynasty (蒙元), also engaged in bloody slaughter during the process of unification and repression of the population after unification. Such forms of “grand unification” clearly brought disaster rather than well-being to the people.
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For countries with vast territories, multiple ethnic groups concentrated in their respective regions, and substantial regional differences, maintaining unity is almost inevitably costly. It is difficult to treat all regions fairly, and some regions are therefore likely to become dissatisfied. To preserve unity and harmony, “grand unification” does not hesitate to suppress the distinct sentiments and demands of the various ethnic groups within the country. It requires the ethnic majority to make concessions while denying minority groups independence and autonomy. As a result, all ethnic groups often pay a price, yet remain dissatisfied with one another.
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“Grand unification” preserves a relatively large territorial expanse. However, when internal contradictions become intense and difficult to reconcile, and when certain regions have particularly distinct characteristics and a strong desire for independence and autonomy, the authorities seek to maintain unity at any cost, employing both soft measures (economic appeasement) and hard measures (violent repression). Although such methods may superficially suppress separatist tendencies, they worsen and accumulate internal contradictions, keeping the costs of maintaining state control and stability persistently high. There is also the possibility that separation will eventually occur through even more brutal means, or that civil war will break out. Poor regions resent exploitation and injustice, while prosperous regions believe they contribute too much through fiscal transfer payments. Instead of developing mutual affection, they become increasingly resentful of one another.
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In countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia, brutal wars have taken place between separatist forces seeking independence and central governments determined to preserve unity. Moreover, in many of these countries, separation was still the eventual outcome after the wars, making the bloodshed even more pointless. By contrast, the constituent republics of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia and Montenegro, which separated through negotiation and mutual consent, did not experience civil wars or large-scale bloodshed. Under such circumstances, preserving “grand unification” at all costs means reversing the relationship between means and ends, with the costs outweighing the benefits. A peaceful separation is instead the wiser choice.
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Both in principle and in practice, neither “grand unification” nor “anti-grand-unification” is a cure-all. Neither necessarily brings democracy, progress, and prosperity, nor does either invariably lead to autocracy, regression, and decline. Whether one seeks to preserve “grand unification” at any cost or deliberately engineers division in the hope of realizing a dreamed-of “utopia,” both approaches put the cart before the horse, confuse means with ends, and ultimately produce costs that outweigh the benefits.
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As for “provincial federalism” during the Republican era, which Mr. Yue discussed in his article, the fundamental reasons for its failure were that, amid internal turmoil and external threats, it was incapable of resolving domestic problems or resisting foreign aggression. Nor did it genuinely safeguard the rights and freedoms of the people. Instead, it merely served as a tool for warlords and local interest groups. Nevertheless, those elements of the concept of “provincial federalism” that are conducive to checks and balances on power, policy innovation, and local autonomy deserve praise and consideration as valuable lessons.
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Faced with the controversy over “grand unification,” the genuinely rational choice is to decide between unity and separation, and to balance centralization and autonomy, in accordance with each country’s national circumstances and the characteristics of its historical stage, adapting to local conditions and the demands of the times. Such choices should also fully consider practical feasibility and public opinion, rather than placing unity or separation above the well-being of the people, indulging in fantasies detached from reality, going against the prevailing circumstances and historical trends, or becoming trapped in emotionally driven disputes.
(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original article was written in Chinese.)
r/China • u/Old_Conclusion_7970 • 17h ago
I went through the November 6 buyback statements from ten A-share tech manufacturers and the filings that followed. By November 19, four of the ten had bank loan commitments, Hygon among them. A commitment letter isn't borrowed money, though four in two weeks doesn't seem slow.
China's central bank cut its buyback relending rate to 1% from 1.25%, Chinese financial media reported. The once-temporary facility became long-term; the central bank lends to banks at that rate, and banks lend to listed companies for buybacks, adding their own margin. All ten posted buyback statements on November 6, most saying they'd weigh their own funding and market conditions, make full use of the facility, and protect company value through buybacks and other means, though none gave a borrowing figure.
Three-Circle's November 6 notice was the earliest disclosure, up to 810 million yuan from China Construction Bank's Chaozhou branch. Hygon, Avary and Victory Giant followed by November 18, the smallest being Avary's at up to 153 million yuan. All four notices state that the loan commitment doesn't commit the company to any buyback amount, and all set terms of three years or shorter.
I checked funding sources in progress filings, and Avary had bought back about 340 million yuan by November 19, all with its own cash. Its November 20 notice says the loan paperwork is still in process and none of the loan has been used. Han's Laser completed its buyback plan by November 17 at about 300 million yuan, with its own cash, and the filing says those shares can later be sold. Hygon made its first purchase under the plan on November 19, about 235 million yuan.
Innolight's chairman proposed a 2 billion to 4 billion yuan buyback with the company's own or self-raised money, pending board approval. Until a progress filing shows loan proceeds in the funding source column, the commitment letters remain just that. When would a company use a bank buyback loan over its own cash?
All four with loan commitments are A-share holdings in CNQQ, which also holds Hong Kong stocks, with Hygon the largest of the four at about 1.63% on the issuer's holdings date of November 18. CQQQ follows the FTSE China Incl A 25% Technology Capped Index.
r/China • u/Any-Respond3 • 17h ago
So i was recently in china in foshan and i went to a clothing store named SCQ and a ‘7’ sign beside it and it has many branches i guess and i tried searching for it on google but i am not able to find it i was looking for its online platform where i can see all of its collections for later purchase. Can you help me find it its logo is green in color .